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Abstract
Electric power systems are a part of the most-crucial infrastructure on which societies
depend. In order to operate efficiently and reliably, the physical layer in large electric
power networks is coupled with a cyber system of information and communication tech-
nologies, which includes compound devices and schemes, such as Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). These
communication-base schemes and components are mainly a part of protection and control
systems, which are known as the backbones of power networks, since the former detects
abnormal conditions and returns the system to its normal state by initiating a quick cor-
rective action, and the latter preserves the integrity of the system and stabilizes it following
physical disturbances. This dissertation concentrates on the cyber-security of protection
and control systems in power networks by unveiling a vulnerable protective relay, i.e., the
Line Current Differential Relay (LCDR), and a susceptible controller, i.e., the Automatic
Generation Control (AGC) system, and proposing application-based measures for making
them robust against cyber threats.
LCDRs are a group of protective relays that are highly dependent on communication
systems, since they require time-synchronized remote measurements from all terminals of
the line they are protecting. In AC systems, this type of relay is widely used for pro-
tecting major transmission lines, particularly higher voltage ones carrying giga-watts of
power. On the other hand, due to the limitations of other protection schemes, LCDRs has
been identified as a reliable protection for medium-voltage lines in DC systems. There-
fore, the cyber-security of LCDRs is of great importance. On this basis, this dissertation
first shows the problem in both AC and DC systems and reveals the consequences and
destructiveness of cyber-attacks against LCDRs through case studies. Then, it presents
three solutions to address his problem, two for AC networks and one for DC grids. For AC
systems, this dissertation presents two methods, one that can be used for Sampled Value
(SV)-based LCDRs, and another one that works for both SV-based and phasor-based re-
lays. Both methods are initiated after LCDRs pickup, to confirm the occurrence of faults
and differentiate them from cyber-attacks. To detect attacks, the first method compares
the estimated and locally-measured voltages at LCDR’s local terminal during faults for
both Positive-Sequence (PS) and Negative-Sequence (NS). To estimate the local voltage
iv
for each sequence, the proposed technique uses an Unknown Input Observer (UIO), the
state-space model of the faulty line, and remote and local measurements, all associated
with that sequence. The difference between the measured and estimated local voltages
for each sequence remains close to zero during real internal faults because, in this condi-
tion, the state-space model based on which the UIO operates correctly represents the line.
Nevertheless, the state-space model mismatch during attacks leads to a large difference
between measured and estimated values in both sequences.
The second proposed method for an AC LCDR detects attacks by comparing the cal-
culated and locally-measured superimposed voltages in each sequence after the relay picks
up. A large difference between the calculated and measured superimposed voltages in any
sequence reveals that the remote current measurements are not authentic. Given that local
measurements cannot be manipulated by cyber-attacks, any difference between the calcu-
lated and measured superimposed voltages is due to the inauthenticity of remote current
measurements.
The proposed method for DC LCDRs is comprised of Passive Oscillator Circuits (POCs)
installed in series with each converter. During faults, the resultant RLC circuit causes the
POCs to resonate and generate a damped sinusoidal component with a specific frequency.
However, this specific frequency is not generated during cyber-attacks or other events.
Thus, LCDRs’ pickup without detecting this specific frequency denotes a cyber-attack.
Given that the frequency extraction process is carried out locally by each LCDR, the
proposed approach cannot be targeted by cyber-attacks.
On the other hand, an AGC system, which is the secondary controller of the Load Fre-
quency Control (LFC) system, is a communication-dependent vulnerable controller that
maintains tie-lines’ power at their scheduled values and regulates grid frequency by adjust-
ing the set-points of a power plant’s governors. This dissertation proves the destructiveness
of cyber-attacks against AGC systems by proposing a Stealthy Hybrid Attack (SHA) that
disrupts the normal operation of the AGC system quickly and undetectably. Afterwards,
two methods are proposed for detecting and identifying intrusions against AGC systems.
Both methods work without requiring load data in the system, in contrast to other meth-
ods presented in the literature. To detect attacks, the first method estimates the LFC
system’s states using a UIO, and calculates the UIO’s Residual Function (RF), defined
v
as the difference between the estimated and measured states. In normal conditions, the
estimated and measured values for LFC states are ideally the same. Therefore, an increase
in the UIO’s RF over a predefined threshold signifies an attack. This method also iden-
tifies attacks, i.e., determines which system parameter(s) is (are) targeted, by designing a
number of identification UIOs.
The general idea behind the second proposed method for detecting and identifying
attacks against AGC systems is similar to the first one; yet, the second one takes into
account the effect of noise as well. Therefore, instead of a UIO, the second method utilizes
a Stochastic Unknown Input Estimator (SUIE) for estimating the states of the LFC system
and minimizing the effect of noise on the estimated states. Similarly, increasing the SUIE’s
RF over a predefined threshold indicates the occurrence of an attack.
vi
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In an article published by the Associated Press in March 2016, Duke Energy Chief Execu-
tive Officer (CEO) stated that “If I were to share with you the number of [cyber-]attacks
that came into Duke Network everyday, you will be astounded. It is from nation-states that
are trying to penetrate systems” [3]. A cyber-attack is a kind of intrusion, defined as “an
event that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
an information system or the information that the system processes, stores, or transmits
or that constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of security policies, security
procedures, and acceptable use policies” [4]. Recently, cyber-related problems have raised
new concerns regarding the security vulnerabilities of smart grids and their large-scale ef-
fects on critical power system infrastructure. Some of the significant issues reported are
directly related to either cyber-attacks or malfunctions of the cyber-layer of power systems.
For example, the 2011 annual report of the Repository for Industrial Security Incidents
(RISI) states that about 35% of industrial control system security issues were initiated
by remote access through cyber systems. This report also indicates that between years
2004 and 2008, twelve cyber-attacks targeted the power sector, which is 20% more than
in the previous four years [5]. So far, in total, 800 total cyber-attacks globally have been
documented since 1980 [6]. Three examples of recent cyber-attacks that targeted power
systems are:
• On December 17th, 2016, a power cut due to cyber-attacks occurred in the Ukrainian
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capital, Kiev. The blackout started before midnight and lasted for one hour. This
cyber-attack de-energized about one-fifth of Kiev’s consumers [7].
• On January 25th, 2016, Israel’s Electricity Authority was under a “severe cyber-
attack”. The attack was carried out by a virus, delivered to the Electric Authority
over Email, and spread over computers on the network. There was no loss of power
in Israel’s case, since the attack was identified and thwarted quickly before it affected
computers of the electric company or distribution sites [8].
• On December 23rd, 2015, the first successful cyber-attack was carried out against the
Ukraineian power grid. Hackers manipulated the information systems of three power
distribution companies and temporarily disrupted the electricity supply to 230,000
end consumers for a period of one to six hours. This cyber-attack switched off 30
substations [9].
Power systems became vulnerable to cyber-attacks mainly after the integration of com-
munication infrastructure, which gave rise to the emergence of compound protection and
control schemes, such as the SCADA system, IEDs used for controlling circuit breakers,
transformers, capacitor banks and other equipment, voltage/frequency/power control mon-
itors, sensors, or device status indicators. These communication-base schemes and devices
are mainly a part of protection and control systems, which are known as the backbones of
power networks (since the former detects abnormal conditions and returns the system to its
normal state by initiating a quick corrective action, and the latter preserves the integrity
of the system and stabilizes it following physical disturbances). Although the integration
of communication infrastructure and the above-mentioned schemes were to improve the
reliability, service continuity, flexibility, and efficiency of power networks, they introduced
new concerns in terms of proneness to cyber-attacks. Therefore, in addition to the physical
security of a power network, the cyber-security of its protection and control schemes should
be improved as well [10]. The following identifies two vulnerable protection and control
schemes, and discusses their related research gaps and motivations.
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1.1 Line Current Differential Relay, a Vulnerable Pro-
tection Scheme
The cyber-attack targeting the Ukrainian power system in 2015 involved opening and
closing circuit-breakers without any input from the control centers [11]. This cyber-attack
sparked off a renewed debate over restricting remote access to circuit breakers and instead
controlling them locally. However, limiting direct remote access to breakers does not
necessarily prevent a cyber-attack from sending malicious commands to them. Breakers
can be controlled locally by protective relays, and relays often rely on communication
networks, which are potentially vulnerable to cyber-attacks [12]. Therefore, if an attack
can manipulate the data transmitted to a relay such that the relay issues a false trip
command, the respective breaker has been indirectly targeted.
A successful attack on a protection system can involve tampering with the measure-
ments obtained and decisions made by a remote relay communicating with a local relay
[13]. LCDRs are a group of communication-dependent relays that are increasingly used
to protect AC transmission lines, particularly for critical lines carrying large amounts of
power [14], and are highly reliable for medium-voltage DC lines [15, 16, 17, 18, 19].
An LCDR must be equipped with a high-bandwidth communication channel to receive
the synchronized currents measured at the other line terminal. Thus, the operation of
LCDRs depends crucially on the integrity of the utilized communication channel and the
Global Positioning System (GPS) [20]. This dependence makes LCDRs potential targets
for cyber-attacks, as will be explained in Chapter 2.
Research on the cyber-security of protection systems in AC and DC systems is generally
in its early stages, and can be divided into three main groups. Studies in the first group—
such as [21], [22], [23], and [24]—have focused on attack modeling and risk assessment in
protection systems. In [21], a framework is presented for modeling coordinated switching
attacks over circuit breakers and relays. In [22], the impact of bus and transmission line
protection schemes on power system cyber-security has been evaluated. In [23], a resilience
and assessment metric is proposed to quantify the ability to and the cost required for
the system to recover from an attack. Moreover, the authors of [24] have proposed a
game-theoretic graph-coloring technique to determine the optimal allocation of security
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mechanisms diversity that minimizes the impact of vulnerabilities to the grid. It is also
shown that this technique provides a Nash equilibrium solution.
In the second group, studies have concentrated on the cyber-security of substations. In
[25], a method is proposed to detect and mitigate cyber-attacks on substation automation
systems. In this method, protection devices collaboratively defend against cyber-attacks
against substations, even if information and communication technology (ICT)-based tech-
niques are compromised. To avoid malfunctions due to substations receiving fake data
packages, the authors of [26] have proposed a method whereby a substation identifies vi-
cious attacks by using context information, such as its own voltages and currents. This
method collects all measurements of the substation and feeds them to a probabilistic neu-
ral network. An event that differs from the known fault pattern is identified as an attack.
Moreover, a distributed intrusion-detection system is proposed in [27] to monitor and detect
anomalies in power systems and IEC-61850-based messages. A number of other studies,
such as [28] and [29], have also proposed intrusion-detection systems for substations.
The third group of studies has developed attack detection or identification method for
protection systems. In [13], a distributed scheme is proposed, that detects attacks and
differentiates them from faults using both the cyber and physical properties of power net-
works. In [30], an anomaly detection approach, which works based on zone partition, is pro-
posed for industrial cyber-physical systems. Moreover, the authors of [31] have presented
an end-to-end attack-resilient cyber-physical security framework for wide-area monitoring,
protection, and control (WAMPAC) applications. They also describe a defense-in-depth
architecture and discuss several attack-resilient algorithms for WAMPAC systems.
All above-mentioned studies have focused on the cyber-security of protection systems.
However, the cyber-security of LCDRs in both AC and DC networks has barely been in-
vestigated to date. The only work appearing in the literature about the cyber-security
of LCDRs proposes a remedial pilot protection scheme in AC network, which works in-
dependently of timing information [32]. This remedial pilot protection scheme makes AC
LCDRs independent of the GPS, and thus AC LCDRs can no longer be affected by GPS
signal spoofing. However, even if LCDRs are resilient against GPS spoofing, they are still
vulnerable to False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), since attackers can also break into
communication systems (e.g., Wide Area Networks (WANs) and substations’ Local Area
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Networks (LANs)) in order to target LCDRs [33, 34, 35]. The research gap that remains
in the area of line differential scheme cyber-security can be filled by the development of
cyber-resilient LCDRs for both AC and DC systems.
1.2 Automatic Generation Control System, a Vulner-
able Control Scheme
Power system controllers in the SCADA center process the collected data and send the
required commands to pertinent actuators. AGC, one of these controllers, operates in
a closed automated loop and greatly depends on communication infrastructure. AGC
is the secondary LFC loop, and has the additional objective of economic dispatch [36].
By adjusting the load reference set-point, the AGC keeps the system frequency within
acceptable bounds and regulates the power exchange between adjacent areas at scheduled
levels. The inputs to the AGC are frequency and tie-lines power measurements, and its
outputs are the load reference set-points for different generators. All inputs and outputs are
sent and received through communication system. This dependence on the communication
system, however, renders AGC systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks, as will be discussed in
Chapter 6. Cyber-attacks can inject incorrect control or wrong measurements into the AGC
data stream, and thus directly affect the frequency, stability, and economic operation of
the grid [37]. As a result, an intrusion-resilient AGC is needed to prevent the consequences
of such attacks on power system operation.
The targeting of AGC systems by cyber-attacks and the performance of LFC systems
under intrusions have been studied in [38, 39, 40, 41, 42]. In [38], a model is developed
to find the optimal and fastest series of FDIAs against AGC systems. In addition, [40]
investigates the impact of time-delay switching attacks on an AGC system, and proposes a
defense mechanism that augments the AGC with a time-delay estimator. In [42], an attack
against AGC systems is proposed to destabilize the power system, and then a procedure
is proposed to identify attacks. In [39], the risks faced by AGC systems are identified, and
an attacker-defender game is modeled to find the most effective defensive actions during
FDIAs. In [43], a series of FDIAs against an AGC system are devised to obtain an optimal
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attack strategy that triggers the load-shedding or generation-tripping schemes.
In addition to theoretical analysis, [44] and [38] investigate AGC system vulnerability
to FDIAs experimentally. In [44], testing of a system in Iowa, USA, shows FDIAs to
be potential sources of under-frequency conditions and could result in unnecessary load
shedding. In [38], a real 16-bus system is tested to practically demonstrate the possibility
of attacks against AGC systems.
To detect FDIAs against an AGC system, the method developed in [2] forecasts the load,
and then uses the forecasted values during real-time operation to validate the performance
of the AGC system and to detect FDIAs. Additionally, [38] detects attacks targeting
the AGC system by checking the consistency between observed and predicted frequency
deviations. However, due to the unavailability of real-time values of loads in the system,
both of the above-mentioned methods use estimated or forecasted load changes—which
might not be perfectly accurate. Consequently, the accuracy of both of these methods
depends strongly on the authenticity of forecasted or estimated loads. Moreover, none
of the attack-detection methods proposed in the literature have considered the effect of
noise. Noise can affect the operation of FDIA-detection methods adversely by increasing
the number of false alarms, as discussed in Chapter 8. Therefore, developing an attack-
detection method that works robustly against noise and does not require load data in the
network has not received particular attention in the literature yet.
1.3 Research Objectives
Driven by the above-mentioned motivations and research gaps, this dissertation first unveils
the potential consequences of cyber-attacks against AC and DC LCDRs and AGC systems.
Additionally, it develops application-based measures for making AGC systems and LCDRs
robust against cyber-attacks. The dissertation targets the following specific objectives,
which are also shown in Fig. 1.1:
1. Unveiling the vulnerabilities of AC and DC LCDRs and investigating the conse-







































Figure 1.1: Diagram of Research Objectives.
2. Developing attack-detection techniques for SV-based and phasor-based AC LCDRs,
with the goal of proposing techniques that are initiated when LCDRs pick up, in
order to confirm faults and differentiate them from attacks.
3. Developing attack-detection techniques for DC LCDRs to confirm faults and differ-
entiate them from attacks.
4. Revealing the vulnerabilities of AGC systems and investigating the consequences of
cyber-attacks against this controller.
5. Developing an attack-detection and -identification techniques for AGC systems. The
proposed methods should work independently from load-change data in the system,
since this type of data is not normally available in real-time. Independence from
noise is another feature that should be taken into account.
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1.4 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation is divided into two main parts: the next four chapters, which concentrate
on the cyber-security of LCDRs, and the subsequent three chapters, which focus on the
cyber-security of AGC systems. The individual chapters are organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides the necessary background on the working principals of AC and DC
LCDRs, as well as on their communication and time-synchronization requirements
and vulnerabilities. Additionally, this chapter formulates FDIAs against both AC and
DC LCDRs, and presents three case studies to show the consequences of coordinated
attacks against such relays.
Chapter 3 presents an attack-detection technique for AC SV-based LCDRs. To confirm
the occurrence of faults and to differentiate them from attacks, the proposed method
is initiated after LCDRs pick up. In this method, the estimated and locally-measured
voltages at an LCDR’s local terminal are compared during faults. To estimate the
local voltage, the proposed technique uses a UIO, the state-space model of the faulty
line, and remote and local measurements. The difference between the measured and
estimated local voltage remains close to zero during real internal faults, because
in this condition the state-space model based on which the UIO operates correctly
represents the line. Nevertheless, the state-space model mismatch during attacks
leads to a large difference, as will be shown in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 develops an attack-detection technique that works for both SV-based and
phasor-based AC LCDRs. The proposed technique is initiated when LCDRs pick up.
The method confirms faults and differentiates them from attacks by comparing the
calculated and locally-measured superimposed voltages at an LCDR’s local terminal
after the relay’s pickup. A difference between the calculated and the measured super-
imposed voltages reveals that the remote measurements are not authentic, because
local measurements cannot be manipulated by cyber-attacks. Thus any difference
between the calculated and measured superimposed voltages is due to the inauthen-
ticity of remote current measurements.
Chapter 5 presents an attack-detection method by which DC LCDRs can differentiate
between cyber-attacks and faults using local measurements. The proposed method
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installs a POC, which includes an inductor and a capacitor in parallel, at each con-
verter’s terminal. A POC thus resonates and generates a damped component with
a specific frequency, i.e., fd, only under fault conditions. Each LCDR detects fd by
applying Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to the uncompromisable locally-measured
voltage across each POC in real-time. Detecting fd thus validates an LCDR’s trip-
ping decision. Accordingly, a cyber-attack is flagged if an LCDR picks up without
detecting fd.
Chapter 6 supplies the necessary background on the AGC system state-space model,
operating principals, and alarms. To investigates the vulnerabilities of this controller
and to demonstrate the destructiveness of FDIAs against AGC systems, this chapter
formulates and optimizes an SHA to disrupt the normal operation of the AGC system
quickly and undetectably. Additionally, it models the AGC system under FDIAs and
develops its associated state-space equation.
Chapter 7 develops an attack-detection and -identification method for AGC systems.
The proposed method detects FDIAs by estimating the LFC system’s states and
comparing them with measured ones. For estimating the LFC system’s states, the
proposed method uses a UIO that does not require load-related data in the system.
This chapter also identifies attacks by using a number of identification UIOs.
Chapter 8 proposes a method for detecting and identifying FDIAs against AGC systems
in the presence of measurement and process noise. This method uses a SUIE that
estimates the LFC system’s states without requiring real-time load changes in the
grid. FDIAs are detected by comparing the estimated and measured states. Addi-
tionally, FDIAs are identified by using a number of Attack Identification Stochastic
Unknown Input Estimators (AISUIEs).




Vulnerability of LCDRs to
Cyber-Attacks: Background and
Problem Statement
LCDRs are a group of communication dependent protection devices that are increasingly
used to protect AC transmission lines, particularly for critical ones carrying gigawatts of
power [45], and medium-voltage DC lines [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. This type of relays perform
well under conditions for which other protection schemes may malfunction, e.g., high-
impedance faults, series-compensated lines, and lines connected to converter-interfaced
wind and solar power plants [14]. LCDRs detect faults by comparing the synchronized
current measurements at all of the line terminals. Therefore, the main requirements of
LCDRs are reliable communication of measured currents between relays at a line terminals,
as well as an external time reference, e.g., GPS, if the communication channel is not
symmetrical [46]. However, this dependence on communication systems and the GPS
renders LCDRs vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Thus, superior performance of LCDRs is
achieved at the expense of exposing the protection system to cyber-threats.
On this basis, Section 2.1 briefly discusses the working principal of AC and DC LCDRs.
Afterwards, Section 2.2 describes the vulnerabilities of LCDRs to cyber-attacks and elab-
orates on LCDRs’ communication and time-synchronization requirements and vulnera-
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bilities. Section 2.3 then formulates FDIAs against AC LCDRs, and proceeds with the
procedure that must be carried out to trip AC lines protected by LCDRs. Additionally,
Section 2.4 formulates FDIAs against DC LCDRs. Afterwards, Section 2.6 presents three
case studies to show the consequences of coordinated attacks against AC and DC LCDRs.
Finally, Section 2.7 presents the concluding remarks.
2.1 Working Principal of LCDRs
LCDRs detect internal faults based on Kirchhoff’s current law, by comparing the currents
going in or out of the line from all terminals. To this aim, LCDRs installed on different
terminals of a line communicate with each other to share the time-synchronized current
measurements [14]. The following explains how AC and DC LCDRs operate.
2.1.1 AC LCDRs
Some AC LCDRs exchange current phasors, while modern ones communicate the SVs of
currents. Compared to phasor-based AC LCDRs, SV-based ones (i) share half amount data,
because they share instantaneous values instead of the magnitude and angle of phasors, (ii)
exchange data at higher rates (e.g. a few kilohertz), while phasor-based LCDRs exchange
data every 4 ms [47], (iii) are not dependent on the GPS, as the SVs can be synchronized
by measuring the communication link latency and interpolating the received data, and
(iv) share more information—such as harmonics or rate of change of currents—with the
remote relays, simplifying certain LCDR requirements, such as fast detection of Current
Transformer (CT) saturation [14].
Some SV-based and phasor based commercial AC LCDRs issue the trip command only
if they pick up, i.e., their operating point in the differential-restraining plane of Fig. 2.1
enters the trip zone [1]. In this figure, Idiff and Ires are the differential and restraining
currents, which are formed differently for SV-based and phasor-based AC LCDR. Phasor-
based relays compute these two currents from the shared phasor values using the following
equations:
Idiff [k] = |I1[k] + I2[k] + · · · IN [k]| (2.1)
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Figure 2.1: LCDR characteristic [1].
Ires[k] = |I1[k]|+ |I2[k]|+ · · · |IN [k]| (2.2)
in which, In[k]= |In|∠θn is the current phasor entering the n-th terminal of a line at time-
step k, N is the total number of terminals, and |.| denotes the absolute value operator.
However, SV-based relays use following equations to obtain Idiff and Ires:
Idiff [k] = ‖i1[k] + i2[k] + · · ·+ iN [k]‖ (2.3)
Ires[k] = ‖i1[k]‖+ ‖i2[k]‖+ · · ·+ ‖iN [k]‖ (2.4)
in which, in[k] is the SV of the current entering the n-th terminal of a line at time-step k,
and ‖.‖ denotes the operation of filtering and magnitude estimation. The operating points
of both AC LCDR types enter the trip zone when
Idiff [k] > Iop (2.5)
in which, Iop is a function of Ires, and is given by
Iop (Ires) =
{
Id0 + k1 × Ires Ires 6 Ib
Id0 + k1 × Ib + k2 (Ires − Ib) Ires > Ib
(2.6)
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where Ib, Id0, k1, and k2 are the settings of the differential-restraining characteristic, and
are shown in Fig. 2.1.
For further security, some other AC LCDRs additionally require that the Disturbance
Detector (DD) element of the relay also picks up before a trip command is issued [47].
The DD element is a sensitive current disturbance detector that supervises current-based
elements such as LCDRs to prevent their malfunction. Commercial LCDRs utilize various
settings for detecting disturbances. These settings are chosen such that the DD element
picks up even during small disturbances, e.g., high-resistance ground faults [14]. For ex-
ample, the DD element of some LCDRs picks up if one of the these criteria are met in 1
cycle [47]:
• the magnitude of the Zero-Sequence (ZS) or PS currents changes by more than ±0.02
p.u.
• the angle of the ZS or PS currents varies by more than ±8◦.
Any event meeting either or both of these criteria activates the DD element.
2.1.2 DC LCDRs
Unlike AC LCDRs, DC ones utilize only the magnitude of current measurements at all line
terminals to detect faults in DC systems. Therefore, the differential current of DC LCDRs
is obtained using
Idiff,dc [k] = |i1,dc [k] + i2,dc [k] + · · ·+ iN,dc [k]| (2.7)
in which in,dc [k] is the DC current sample at the n-th terminal of a line at time step k. In
normal conditions, Idiff,dc[k] is ideally zero. A fault is thus detected if
Idiff,dc [k] > κInom (2.8)
in which κ is a reliability coefficient whose value can be set to between 0.1 and 0.25, and
Inom is the nominal current of the line [16].
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2.2 Vulnerability of LCDRs to Cyber-Attacks
Intrusions against LCDRs can be categorized into three main groups: Denial of Service
Attacks (DoSAs), FDIAs, and Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs). DoSAs cause a
break in the normal transmission of real-time protection messages and disable the primary
line current differential element of LCDRs [48]. However, as most commercially available
LCDRs, e.g., [1], [47], and [49], include other protection schemes, such as over-current and
directional comparison elements in the same device, the line remains still protected by
other elements if the differential element is disabled [48]. Additionally, some relays, such
as in [49], include redundant communication links [50]. During FDIAs against LCDRs,
however, the measurement values are manipulated. On the other hand, TSAs manipulate
the time-tags of measurements [51, 32], e.g., by spoofing the GPS signal. Therefore, in the
case of LCDRs, FDIAs and TSAs are more disruptive than DoSAs, since they are able to
fool LCDRs into tripping lines [48]. In the rest of this chapter, the focus will be on these
two types of cyber-attacks.
2.2.1 Communication and Time-Synchronization Media, Proto-
cols, and Susceptibilities
To share time-synchronized measurements with relays installed on other terminals, an
LCDR must be equipped with a high-bandwidth communication channel. Therefore, the
operation of LCDRs depends crucially on the integrity of the communication channel and
the authenticity of synchronization mechanism [20]. LCDRs’ data can be transmitted via a
dedicated fiber or multiplexed network [52]. Dedicated fiber channels communicate at the
speed of light through the fiber, thus no extra delays are incurred due to encoding, buffering,
(de)multiplexing, and converting to electrical signals. Additionally, direct point-to-point
channels are symmetrical, i.e., the propagation times for transmitting and receiving data
are equal. Therefore, no external time reference, e.g., the GPS, is required. However,
the application of direct channels for long distances is limited, and they have no inherent
redundancy, which results in the loss of the differential scheme when its associated fiber
fails [46].
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LCDRs’ data can also be transmitted via multiplexed channels, which are widely used
nowadays, due to their superiority over direct point-to-point fiber in terms of cost-efficiency,
path redundancy, and wireless connectivity to remote locations. In multiplexed channels,
the relay’s communication interface is connected to a substation multiplexer—either T1/E1
or a Synchronous Optical Network (SONET)/Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH)—to
transport data over a WAN [53, 52]. The availability of multiplexed channels, however,
is adversely affected by the availability of devices and physical channels that transmit the
data. On the other hand, unlike direct fiber, delays in multiplexed channels are longer due
to signal conversion and buffering. Moreover, multiplexed channels are not symmetrical,
requiring external time reference, e.g., GPS [46]. Therefore, LCDRs that utilize multiplexed
channels receive timing information from the substation using a hardwired network-based
protocol, e.g., Inter-Range Instrumentation Group Code B (IRIG-B), or packet-based time
synchronization protocols, e.g., IEEE 1588 Precision Timing Protocol (PTP) [54].
In the case of both communication channels, FDIAs can target LCDRs by intruding into
substations’ LAN and accessing the control center facilities [55, 56]. This vulnerability has
been proven by the attacks that paralyzed the substations of the Ukrainian power system
in 2015 and 2016 [11]. On the other hand, the protocol that LCDRs use to communicate in
substations, i.e. IEC 61850 [57], is also vulnerable to cyber-attacks. This has been shown
experimentally in [35] and discussed in [58] and [59]. Multiplexed channels, however, can
also be attacked by FDIAs targeting wide-area communication systems, as well as by TSAs
[60, 61, 32]. To change the time reference in the whole substation, the GPS signal can be
spoofed by a TSA, in which the authentic GPS signal is overwhelmed using noise of the
same frequency and the GPS receiver is mislead by a counterfeit GPS signal [32]. TSAs
can also be carried out by targeting synchronization protocols. The vulnerability of IRIG-
B to TSAs is proven experimentally in [62]. The susceptibility of PTP and the required
procedure to target this protocol by TSAs are also discussed in [32].
In conclusion, LCDRs are vulnerable to FDIAs and TSAs. These vulnerabilities can
provide cyber-attackers with indirect access to circuit breakers through LCDRs, leading
potentially to outages or blackouts [63]. The rest of this chapter shows how these vulner-
abilities endanger the integrity of an tire system.
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2.3 Tripping AC Lines by Targeting LCDRs
This section unveils how FDIAs and TSAs can fool AC LCDRs into tripping the line they
are protecting. To this aim, this section considers the more secure type of AC LCDRs,
which are also equipped with a DD element. As a result, this type of relays require (i) the
pickup signal of the DD element, and (ii) the pickup signal of the relay to issue the trip
signal.
This section uses the 39-bus new England system, shown in Fig 2.2, and the PSCAD/EMTDC
program for simulations. The specifications of this test system are provided in Appendix
A. As explained in this appendix, Lines 6-11, 4-14, 2-3, and 3-18 are critical, so they are
protected by LCDRs, which are set based on the default settings of [1]. Additionally, a
100 MVAr capacitor banks has been installed on Bus 12 to supply the required reactive
power by load connected to this bus, and Line 5-8 has been 60% compensated using series
capacitors. The focus in this subsection is on LCDRs I and II in Fig. 2.2 protecting the 100
km line between buses 6 and 11. Following the default settings given in [1], the parameters
of these LCDRs are set at I0 = 0.05 kA, Ib = 0.585 kA, k1 = 0.2, and k2 = 0.4. During
normal operation, the currents measured by LCDR I and II in Fig. 2.2 are 0.282∠111.2◦
kA and 0.262∠− 78◦ kA, respectively, and so Iop = 0.158 kA and Ires = 0.544 kA.
2.3.1 Targeting Phasor-Based AC LCDRs by Cyber-Attacks
To move the operating point trajectory of phasor-based AC LCDRs into the trip zone,
an attacker can manipulate the magnitude, phase angle, and/or time stamp—altering the
time stamps of an LCDR’s measurements is equivalent to changing the measurements’
phase angle [64]—of remote measurements. Therefore, during FDIAs or TSAs the remote
measurements of terminal n are changed from (|In|∠θn) to (|In|+ |∆In|∠(θn + ∆θn). The
























































Figure 2.2: 39-bus new England system.
As Idiff in normal conditions is ideally zero, using (2.1), the following equation holds for
any terminal n (1 6 n 6 N):
∑
j∈{1,··· ,N}−{n}
(|Ij|∠θj) = − (|In|∠θn) (2.10)
Substituting (2.10) into (2.9) results in
Imdiff [k] = |(|In|+ |∆In|)∠ (θn + ∆θn)− |In|∠θn| (2.11)
Given that the restraining current before the initiation of the attack was Ires[k0], it changes
to Ires[k0] + |∆In| when the attack starts. To trip the line, an attacker must select ∆θn
and |∆In| such that the manipulated differential current, Imdiff , becomes greater than Iop
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Figure 2.3: Operating point trajectory of LCDRs during MMAs.
in (2.6). Hence, an LCDR picks up during an attack if the following equation is satisfied:
|(|In|+ |∆In|)∠ (θn + ∆θn)− |In|∠θn| ≥ Iop (Ires[k0] + |∆In|) (2.12)
Since all relays of a line share current measurements among each other, these current
values—i.e., |In|∠θn for n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}—are available after intruding into the commu-
nication systems or substations. As a result, Ires[k0] is calculable at anytime for attackers
during FDIAs or TSAs. To satisfy (2.12), the following attacks can be carried out:
• Magnitude Modification Attack (MMA): An MMA is a kind of FDIA that involves
manipulating the magnitude of the remote end current measurements before they are used
by LCDRs for detecting faults. As shown in Fig. 2.3, when |∆In| is injected into the n-th
terminal’s current measurements, the operating point of other terminals’ LCDRs move
from point 1© to 2©. Therefore, the operating point in Fig. 2.3 enters the trip zone if the
MMA satisfies
|∆In| > IM (2.13)
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Ires[k0] < (1− k1) Ib − Id0
Iop(Ires[k0])+(k1−k2)(Ib−Ires[k0])
1−k2 Ires[k0] > (1− k1) Ib − Id0
(2.14)
In (2.14), Ires[k0] and Iop (Ires[k0]) can be calculated according to (2.2) and (2.6) using
the measurements that an attacker can access through the communication network linking
LCDRs.
Using (2.14) and the aforementioned current values for LCDR I, IM is 0.251 kA for this
relay. Therefore, LCDR I’s operating point enters the trip zone during non-fault conditions
if the |∆I6| associated with an MMA is greater than 0.251 kA. The trajectory of LCDR
I’s operating point during an MMA with |∆I6| = 0.251 kA is illustrated in Fig. 2.4.
Consequently, a false pickup signal is issued as soon as the operating point of the relay
enters the trip zone.
• Phase Modification Attack (PMA): A PMA is another kind of FDIA that involves
manipulating the phase angle of the remote end current measurements from θn to θn+∆θn
before they are used by LCDRs for detecting faults. Thus PMAs change the differential
current in (2.11) to
Imdiff [k] = |In| × |(1∠ (θn + ∆θn))− (1∠θn)| (2.15)
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During a PMA, |∆In| is zero; thus Ires does not change. Therefore, using (2.6) and
(2.15), an LCDR picks up if ∆θn satisfies



















For (2.16) to be solvable, Iop (Ires[k0])/2|In| must be inside the domain of arcsin(.) (i.e.,




In conclusion, to trip a line, a PMA must target a line terminal whose current meets (2.18).
During the PMA, ∆θn must satisfy (2.17). For example, the aforesaid values for LCDR I
in the test system indicate that Iop (Ires[k0]) /2 is smaller than |I6| and ∆θ6 must be within
[35.1◦ 324.9◦]. Fig. 2.4 shows that the trajectory of LCDR I’s operating point enters the
trip zone for a PMA with ∆θ6 = 35.1
◦.
• TSA: A TSA manipulates the sampling time of measurements. This type of attack has
been previously investigated for wide-area monitoring systems [64]. A TSA is equivalent
to changing the measurements’ phase angle. Therefore, to carry out a TSA, a ∆θn that
satisfies (2.17) must be selected, and the time stamps of current samples must be changed





In this equation, f is the system frequency. For example, choosing ∆θ6 = 35.1
◦ results in
∆t = 1.63 ms. Fig. 2.4 illustrates the effect of this TSA on LCDR I’s operating point.
• Hybrid Attacks : An LCDR can also be targeted by a combination of the above-
discussed attacks. For example, if both θn and |In| are changed to θn+∆θn and |In|+|∆In|,
Imdiff becomes
Imdiff [k] = |(|In|+ |∆In|)∠ (θn + ∆θn)− |In|∠θn| (2.20)
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Figure 2.5: The locus of solutions of (2.21) for Line 6-11 of the test system.
and Ires[k0] changes to Ires[k0] + |∆In|. Therefore, using (2.5) and (2.6), the following
equation must be satisfied to trip the line:
|(|I2|+ |∆I2|)∠ (θ2 + ∆θ2)− |I2|∠θ2| > Iop (Ires[k0] + |∆I2|) (2.21)
Fig. 2.5 shows the locus of solutions of (2.21) in the polar coordinates for Line 6-11.
For any point in this figure, the magnitude indicates |∆I6|, and the angle represents ∆θ6.
To trip the line, ∆θ6 and |∆I6| must be selected from the shaded area. For example,
for ∆θ6 ∈ [35.1◦, 324.9◦], the LCDR trips the line for any value of |∆I6|. However, for
∆θ6 ∈ [324.9◦, 35.1◦], |∆I6| must be selected outside the white area, e.g., for ∆θ6 = 0,
|∆I6| must be greater than 0.251 kA. Therefore, hybrid attacks can gives the same results
as MMAs and PMAs if ∆θ6 = 0 and |∆I6| = 0, respectively.
2.3.2 Targeting SV-Based AC LCDRs by Cyber-attacks
To cause malfunction of an SV-based AC LCDR that receives remote measurements from
terminal n of a line, an attack must manipulate in[k] such that (2.5) is met. Altering in[k]














As Idiff in normal conditions is ideally zero, using (2.3), the following equation holds for
terminal n: ∑
j∈{1,··· ,N}−{n}
ij[k] = −in[k] (2.23)
Substituting (2.23) into (2.22) results in
Imdiff [k] = ‖−in[k] + imn [k]‖ (2.24)
Additionally, the restraining current after the inception of the attack becomes
Ires[k] = Ires[k0]− ‖in[k]‖+ ‖imn [k]‖ (2.25)
where Ires[k0] is the restraining current before the start of the attack. To trip the line,
imn [k] must be selected such that I
m
diff [k] becomes greater than Iop(Ires) in (2.5) for the new
restraining current. Thus, to trip the line, imn [k] must be selected such that the following
equation is satisfied for SV-based AC LCDRs:
‖−in[k] + imn [k]‖ ≥ Iop (Ires[k0]− ‖in[k]‖+ ‖imn [k]‖) (2.26)
To satisfy this equation, cyber-attacks similar to those explained for phasor-based LCDRs
can be carried out.
2.3.3 Activating the DD Elements of Target LCDRs
As explained in Section 2.1, any event that changes the PS or ZS current’s magnitude
by 0.02 p.u. activates the DD element of LCDRs. Additionally, DD elements can also
pick up if the PS or ZS currents’ angle change by more than ±8◦. Although these criteria
are usually met during faults, other no-fault transients can pick up the DD element of
LCDRs as well. For example, Fig. 2.6 illustrates the PS current measured by LCDR I in
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Fig. 2.2 right after switching on the capacitor bank installed at Bus 12. The length of
the no-disturbance zone in Fig. 2.6 is 1 cycle, and its width is 0.04 p.u. and 16 degrees
in Figs 2.6a and 2.6b, respectively. The criteria for the pickup of LCDRs’ DD element
are thus satisfied if either the magnitude or its angle cross any horizontal side of the no-
disturbance zone. As seen in 2.6, both the magnitude and phase angle of the measured
current overstepped the no-disturbance zone from horizontal sides. Additionally, Fig. 2.7
illustrates the same variable after switching off the series capacitor bank installed in Line
5-8: in this case, however, only the magnitude of the measured current overstepped the
no-disturbance zone. Thus, in both cases, the DD element of LCDR I picked up.
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Figure 2.6: PS current measured by LCDR I after switching the shunt capacitor bank
installed on Bus 12, (a) magnitude, (b) angle.
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Figure 2.7: PS current measured by LCDR I after switching the series capacitor bank
installed in Line 5-8, (a) magnitude, (b) angle.
Additionally, large load changes in the system, real faults, deliberate physical distur-
bances are other examples of events that can activate the DD element of LCDRs. For
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instance, Fig. 2.8 shows the PS current measured by LCDR I after a 20% load change
at Bus 8: once the load changes, the magnitude of the PS current overstepped the no-
disturbance zone and thus the DD element picked up.
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Figure 2.8: PS current measured by LCDR I after 20% load change at bus 8, (a) magnitude,
(b) angle.
In conclusion, if a large-enough transient happens near an LCDR, the DD element
of the LCDR picks up. Consequently, if an FDIA or TSA fools the LCDR after such a
transient and moves its operating point into the trip zone, the line would be tripped.
2.4 Tripping DC Lines by Targeting LCDRs
To trip a DC line by FDIAs, an attacker must manipulate in,dc[k] such that (2.8) is met.
Altering in,dc[k] to i
m










As Idiff,dc[k] is ideally zero under normal conditions, the following equation holds for ter-
minal n: ∑
j∈{1,··· ,N}−{n}
ij,dc[k] = −in,dc[k] (2.28)
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Given that in,dc[k] is accessible by intruding into the communication system, I
m
diff,dc can be
calculated such that (2.8) is met. As a result, imn,dc[k] that satisfies (2.29) can be determined.
On the other hand, to trip a line protected by a DC LCDR through a TSA, time-stamps
of the LCDR’s remote measurements are manipulated such that (2.29) is met. Assuming
that a TSA changes the time stamps of remote measurements by ∆t, (2.29) is satisfied and
the line is tripped if an event, such as an external fault, changes the line’s current by more
than κInom over ∆t.
2.5 Attack Model and Analysis
2.5.1 Attackers’ Motives and Objectives
According to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) standards,
power systems must satisfy the N−1 security constraint, that is, the system is required
to continue its normal operation after any single element failure. Additionally, NERC
mandates operators to have contingency plans for all critical N−2 contingencies [65], and
so the system can sustain a maximum of two critical failures at the same time. This
situation might motivate attackers to carry out malicious activities, such as coordinated
attacks, in which attackers can simultaneously target multiple components and potentially
trip several critical lines at the same time—an event that the system is not normally
designed to withstand. LCDRs are suitable choices to target by cyber-attacks, because
they are highly dependent on the data received through the communication links [14, 61].
Therefore, coordinated attacks can impose severe consequences on the system, such as
cascading failures, if they target the LCDRs of more than two lines in the system. An
attacker’s objectives in targeting power systems include, but are not limited to, (i) gaining
financial benefit, (ii) causing maximal harm to the targeted power system without being
detected, and (iii) satisfying curiosity/building reputation, e.g., to increase the attacker’s
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reputation in the hackers community. This section focuses on objective (ii) and shows that
targeting LCDRs can lead to achieving such an objective, because LCDRs
• directly control lines’ circuit breakers, so they can trip lines if they pick up [14];
• are vulnerable to cyber-attacks, since they highly rely on synchronized measurements
received through communication links [14, 61];
• are increasingly used for protecting heavily loaded lines.
2.5.2 Assumptions and Attackers’ Capabilities and Constraints
This dissertation considers the following resource constraints and capabilities for attackers
who are aiming to achieve any of the above objectives by targeting LCDRs:
1. Attackers cannot physically trip transmission lines by opening circuit breakers. With-
out this constraint, it is a trivial exercise to trigger cascading failures across the power
grid.
2. An attacker’s resources are restricted, so a limited number of LCDRs can be targeted.
3. Only some of the lines in a power system are protected by LCDRs; thus, an attacker’s
options are limited.
4. For some AC LCDRs, the trip command relies only on the position of the operating
point in the differential-restraining plane, shown in Fig. 2.24 [1]. For further security,
some other AC LCDRs additionally require that the DD element of the relay also
picks up before a trip command is issued [66]. The AC LCDRs considered in this
section are the latter more-secure type.
5. Attackers can only tamper with remote measurements by intruding into the commu-
nication link between LCDRs, spoofing the GPS signal, or breaking into substations
networks. However, local measurements are secure, since they are recorded by cur-
rent and voltage transformers, located in substations’ yard, and are sent directly to
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LCDRs using copper wires. Therefore, LCDRs’ local measurements are secure, reli-
able, and immune to cyber-attacks. The proposed attack detection methods in this
dissertation work only if this assumption holds.
6. System data including loads, generation, and configuration are available for attackers.
Additionally, the lines that are protected by LCDRs are known. Selecting the optimal
attack strategy is dependent on accessing this information.
2.6 Case Studies
To corroborate the effectiveness of coordinated attacks against LCDRs and investigate
their consequences, this section presents three case studies on the IEEE 14-bus and 39-bus
new England networks and a 5-kV DC test system. In each case study, coordinated attacks
target some LCDRs in the system and the results are studied. The consequences of cyber-
attacks in all cases are indirect, i.e., cyber attacks only initiate a sequence of incidents.
These case studies show that although attack strategies are system-dependent and might
differ from one to another, the results are the same and a type of instability can happen.
Additionally, these case studies demonstrate that different kinds of instability can occur
as the consequences of coordinated attacks.
As will be explained and shown by attack trees, the attack strategies to achieve a
certain goal are not unique, and there are several ways to reach that goal. Additionally,
once the attack strategy is selected, any attack vectors that satisfy the selected strategy
can be picked. Therefore, to prove the dimensions of the problem, each case study presents
a selected attack strategy and its related attack vectors; however, there are lots of other
ones that end up the same results.
2.6.1 Case Study 1
In this case study, the IEEE 14-bus test system (Fig. 2.9) [67] is chosen to investigate
the consequences of coordinated attacks against AC LCDRs. Simulations are carried out
using the PSCAD/EMTDC program. Additionally, to obtain the small-signal and voltage
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instability margins, system Power-Voltage (PV) curves and eigenvalues are obtained using
the Power System Analysis Toolbox (PSAT). The static data of the test system—used
for obtaining PV curves—can be found in [68]. To obtain system eigenvalues, the data
related to dynamic modeling of generators—including the exciters and Automatic Voltage
Regulators (AVRs)—are chosen based on the typical data given in [69]. In this test system,
a 30 MVAr capacitor bank is installed at bus 5 to supply the required reactive power. Lines
1-5, -5, 2-4, 6-13, and 13-14 of this system are designated as critical lines, as they supply
critical loads or connect load centers to the generators; thus, they are protected by SV-based
LCDRs. These LCDRs are set based on [1]. The trip logic of LCDRs is also considered to
be similar to that of [1], in which the trip signals of differential, overcurrent, and distance
elements are sent to an OR gate whose output is sent to breakers. Therefore, if any element






















Figure 2.9: IEEE 14-bus test systems used for simulations.
The attack objective in this case study is considered to be a kind of instability, such


































C a s e  s t u d y 1
10-11 







2-5 2-4 1-5 6-13 13-14 
2-4 1-5
Small signal instability
6-13 1-5 2-4 13-14 2-5 
10-11 
C a s e  s t u d y 1
Figure 2.10: Attack tree showing intrusions that lead to voltage collapse and Small signal
instability.
blackout. To this aim, attack trees have been used in this case study to assess the impact
of cyber-attacks and to determine target LCDRs [70]. A main assumption considered here
in obtaining attack trees is that attackers’ resources are limited, so they can target and trip
maximum only two lines for cyber-attacks. On this basis, all possible attack scenarios were
simulated off-line, and the effect of each scenario was investigated. Fig. 2.10 illustrates
attack trees for intrusions that lead to voltage collapse and small signal instability. In this
figure, green and purple blocks show the targeted lines by cyber-attacks, and the lines that
are tripped by the overcurrent element of protective relays after power flow are redirected
due to the tripping of targeted lines. The rest of this study shows how targeting lines 1-5
and 2-5 can result in voltage collapse (and small signal instability as a byproduct).
The attack is initiated when the DD element of Line 2-5’s LCDRs pick up after the
capacitor bank installed at Bus 5 is switched on at t = 20 ms. Fig. 2.11 shows the
magnitude and angle of the current of line 2-5: after this event, the magnitude and angle
of the PS current increase by more than 0.02 p.u. and 8◦, respectively, in 1 cycle. Therefore,
the DD elements of Line 2-5’s LCDRs pick up after the capacitor bank is switched on.
In the first step, the LCDRs of Line 2-5 should pick up by an FDIA to trip the line.
Following the default settings given in [1], parameters I0, Ib, k1, and k2 of this line’s
LCDRs are set at 0.03 kA, 0.4 kA, 0.2, and 0.4, respectively. During normal operation, the
currents flowing into Line 2-5 from Buses 2 and 5 are 0.184∠− 90.3◦ kA and 0.164∠84.4◦
kA, respectively, so the restraining current is Ires[k0] = 0.348 kA (where [k0] is 20 ms in this
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Figure 2.11: PS current entering Line 2-5 from Bus 5 after switching on the shunt capacitor
bank installed at Bus 5 at t = 20 ms, (a) magnitude, (b) angle.
case study). During the FDIA, the current measurements sent from Bus 5 to Bus 2, i.e.,
i5[k], are going to be manipulated such that (2.26) is met. Any manipulation that satisfies
this equation can be chosen for this FDIA. This case study, targets current measurements
by an MMA, in which the true measurements are multiplied by a positive number, i.e., γ,
resulting in im5 [k] = γ×i5[k]. Given that in this case study ‖i5[k]‖ = 0.164 kA, the minimum
γ that satisfies (2.26) is 1.83. Fig. 2.12 shows the trajectory of the LCDR installed at Bus 5
during an FDIA with γ = 1.83: once the attack starts, the estimated phasor of manipulated
remote measurements, i.e., im5 [k], increases, so the LCDR’s trajectory moves toward the
trip zone. It takes about 1 cycle for the estimated phasor to settle down at its final value.
At this time, the operating point trajectory crosses Iop, and the line is tripped. The line
could have been tripped in a shorter time, if a greater γ had been selected. In this case, the
operating point would have been entered the trip zone before the phasor of the manipulated
measurements reaches its final value.
After Line 2-5 is tripped, as shown in Fig. 2.13, the magnitude of Line 2-4’s current
increases by more than 0.02 p.u. per cycle, so the DD elements of LCDRs protecting this
line also pick up. Thus, the second part of the coordinated attacks can be initiated to
trip Line 2-4. Carrying out a procedure similar to that done for Line 2-5 and selecting a
γ ≥ 1.92, e.g., γ = 2, the trip signal is issued by the LCDRs of Line 2-4 in about 0.8 cycle.
To investigate the voltage stability of the network after the above-discussed attacks,
and to determine the system’s instability margin, the PV curves of Bus 5 during normal
operation (base case), after tripping Line 2-5, and after tripping Line 2-4 are shown in
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Figure 2.12: The trajectory of targeted LCDR of Line 2-5 during the FDIA.














)   no-disturbance zone
  Line 2-4 Current
(a)















  no-disturbance zone
  Line 2-4 Current
(b)
Figure 2.13: PS current entering Line 2-4 from Bus 2 after the tripping of Line 2-5 at
t = 45 ms, (a) magnitude, (b) angle.
Fig. 2.14. In this figure, λ = P
P0
is the loading factor, where P and P0 denote the
actual and nominal active powers of the system [71]. These curves indicate the voltage
of Bus 5 at each operating point, as well as the Saddle-Node Bifurcation (SNB), i.e., the
point at which a voltage collapse happens. In fact, at SNB and afterwards, the Jacobian
and/or state matrix of the system becomes singular, resulting in no steady-state solution
for power flow. Fig. 2.14 also illustrates the Hopf Bifurcation (HB) node, which is the onset
of unstable poles. At HB point and beyond, the system parameters start to oscillate after
any small perturbation [71]. As Fig. 2.14 illustrates, the operating point of the system
is far enough from the SNB after tripping Lines 2-4 and 2-5. However, the HB node falls
behind the operating point of the system, leading to small signal instability. This happens
because, as shown in Fig. 2.15, the eigenvalues of the system after tripping these two lines
contain two unstable poles, i.e., 1.468 ± j7.781. As a result, if a perturbation occurs, the
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Figure 2.14: PV curves at Bus 5 during case study 1.
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Figure 2.15: Eigenvalues of the system when Lines 2-5 and 2-4 are tripped.
system parameters start to oscillate. The small signal instability is not a major issue if the
attack is detected on time, before oscillations become large enough to endanger the system
integrity.
After tripping Lines 2-5 and 2-4, the current flowing into Line 1-5 becomes 2.45 p.u.
This current is larger than the typical pickup current setting of this line’s overcurrent
elements. Consequently, Line 1-5 is also tripped. At this point, as shown in Fig. 2.16, the
operating point of the system falls behind the SNB, resulting in a voltage collapse. As a
result, coordinated attacks against LCDRs in this case study led to voltage instability.
2.6.2 Case Study 2
This case study also investigates the effect of coordinated attacks against AC LCDRs.
In this case study, the 39-bus new England test system (Fig. 2.2) [72] is chosen as the
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Figure 2.16: PV curve at Bus 5 after tripping Line 1-5.
target of coordinated attacks. The specifications of this test system are provided in Section
2.3 and Appendix A. The settings of frequency relays are also provided in Appendix A.
Simulations are carried out using the PSCAD/EMTDC program. LCDRs in this case study
are of phasor-based type and are set based on [1]. Additionally, he trip logic of LCDRs is
considered to be similar to that of [1], in which the trip signals of differential, overcurrent,
and distance elements are sent to an OR gate whose output is sent to breakers. Therefore,
if any element detects a fault, the line would be tripped, regardless of other elements’
outputs.
In this case study, the main objective is to create a frequency instability. Evaluating
all possible attack scenarios and creating attack trees similar to Fig. 2.10 for this objective
show that tripping Lines 6-11, 13-14, and 2-3 can achieve this objective. On this basis,
an attacker starts the coordinated attacks at t = 20 ms, right after the DD element of
LCDRs installed on Line 6-11 pick up due to a 20% load-change occurring at Bus 8. As
it was shown in Fig. 2.8, the magnitude and angle of Line 6-11’s current during one cycle
satisfy the disturbance-detection criterion explained at the beginning of this section, so the
DD element of Line 6-11’s LCDRs picks up. At this moment, the attacker targets remote
measurements received by the LCDR I installed on Bus 11 of Line 6-11 with the MMA
explained in Section 2.3. Fig. 2.17 presents the trajectory of LCDR I during the MMA
with |∆I6| = 0.251 kA: once the attack starts, the trajectory of the LCDR moves toward
the trip zone, so the trip signal is issued. When Line 6-11 is tripped at t = 45 ms, the
angle and magnitude of the current flowing into Line 13-14 change about 2.4◦ and 0.13 p.u.
in 1 cycle (as shown in Fig. 2.18), respectively, resulting in activation of the DD element
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of Line 13-14’s LCDRs. Similar to the MMA that was carried out for Line 6-11, at this
time the attacker manipulates the current measurements received by the LCDR installed
on Bus 14. As a result, the LCDR of Bus 14 also picks up, and Line 13-14 is tripped at
t = 70 ms. Tripping of Line 13-14 changes the magnitude and angle of Line 2-3’s current
by 0.193 p.u. and 6.25◦ in 1 cycle, respectively, as illustrated in Fig. 2.19. Since in 1 cycle
the magnitude of this line’s current changes by more that 0.02 p.u., the DD element of
LCDRs of Line 2-3 pick up. Thus, Line 2-3 is also tripped after the attacker modifies the
phase angle of measurements sent from Bus 2 to Bus 3 by ∆θ2 =40
◦.
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Figure 2.17: The trajectory of targeted LCDR of Line 6-11 during the FDIA.
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Figure 2.18: PS current entering Line 13-14 from Bus 14 after Line 6-11 is tripped at t = 45
ms, (a) magnitude, (b) angle.
Once the three above-mentioned lines are tripped by coordinated attacks, the power
flow is redirected to healthy lines, resulting in the over-loading of some. Fig. 2.20 shows the
current of over-loaded lines after the coordinated attacks (each line’s current is normalized
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Figure 2.19: PS current entering Line 2-3 from Bus 2 after Line 13-14 is tripped at t = 70
ms, (a) magnitude, (b) angle.
based on its nominal current). As seen in this figure, the current of 13 lines become initially
more than 2 p.u., and the situation even gets worse when the highly over-loaded ones (i.e.,
lines 17-27, 3-18, 25-26) are tripped by their overcurrent element or zone 3 of their distance
elements. Therefore, the cascading failures of all 13 overloaded lines happen. As a result
of these cascading failures, the system loses its synchronism and becomes unstable (Fig.
2.21). Consequently, the frequency of Generators 3, 4, 5, 8, and 10 reaches 61.8 Hz (Fig.
2.21a), so these generators are tripped by their Over Frequency Relays (OFRs). On the
other hand, the frequency of Generator 2 decreases steeply after the attack, such that the
Under Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) scheme operates. However, UFLS cannot stop
the frequency reduction, and the frequency of generator 2 reaches 57.8 Hz (Fig. 2.21b), so
it is tripped by its Under Frequency Relay (UFR). In conclusion, the coordinated attacks
in this case-study made the system unstable, tripped 6 generators, and disrupted energy
supply to 69% of the load.
2.6.3 Case Study 3
This case study investigates the effect of coordinated attacks against DC LCDRs. In
this case study, a 7-bus medium-voltage DC test system (Fig. 2.22), consisting of three
Distributed Generations (DGs), is chosen as the target of coordinated attacks. The specifi-
cations of this test system are provided in Appendix B. The main protection of lines in the
test system is the differential scheme. Accordingly, multiplexed channels and the GPS are
















Figure 2.20: Over-loaded lines and their currents after the coordinated attacks.
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Figure 2.21: Frequencies of generators after the coordinated attacks, (a) over-frequency,
(b) under-frequency (Generator 2).
respectively. The reliability coefficient of LCDRs is set at κ = 0.2 [16]. Given that LCDRs
share their measurements every 1 ms [17], and that proactive DC hybrid circuit breakers
trip the line in 1 ms [73], the fault detecting and clearing process takes at maximum 3 ms,
including the relay process time. Additionally, overcurrent relays are utilized in the test
system as the backup protection scheme [17]. The pickup current of each line’s overcur-
rent relay is selected as the line’s maximum current during normal operation plus a 50%
security margin [74]. In this dissertation, 120% of the line’s nominal current is considered
as the maximum overcurrent during normal operation.
To prevent voltage collapse and ensure stable operation of the test system during power
mismatch, a load management scheme is incorporated. This scheme sheds lower-priority
loads to prevent total system collapse and ensure secure power supply to higher-priority
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Figure 2.22: DC test system.
loads. This dissertation implements the load shedding scheme proposed in [75], in which
the load on Bus 1 has the lowest priority and is shed immediately if its voltage drops by
15%; loads on Buses 5 and 6 are the next priorities and are shed if their voltages drop by
20% and 25%, respectively, and remain under this threshold for 0.5 s. The load on Bus 3
has the highest priority.
In this case study, the main objective is to create a voltage collapse. Evaluating all
possible attack scenarios and creating attack trees similar to Fig. 2.10 for this objective
show that tripping Lines 2-5, and 3-4 can achieve this objective. On this basis, an attacker
starts coordinated attacks at t = 9 ms by spoofing the GPS signal of the substation
installed at Bus 3. Given that LCDRs’ measurements are sent every 1 ms, by changing
time-stamps of measurements from t to t + 1 ms, remote LCDRs, i.e., LCDRs at Buses 2
and 4 on Lines 3-2 and 3-4, assume that the packet that was supposed to be sent at t = 9
ms has been lost, so they suspend their functioning for time t = 9 ms, and get back to
normal operation at t = 10 ms, when both local and remote measurements are available
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Figure 2.23: (a) Current of Line 4-3 after tripping of Line 2-5, (b) differential current of
LCDR installed at Bus 4.
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Figure 2.24: (a) Current of Line 2-3 after tripping of Line 2-5, (b) differential current of
LCDR installed at Bus 2.
again. As a result, during this attack, the time stamps of Bus 3’s measurements exceed
the actual time by 1 ms. This attack can impact the operation of LCDRs of Lines 2-3
and 3-4 if a significant transient happens. During steady state, however, the differential
currents of remote LCDRs installed at buses 4 and 2 are not affected, since the currents
of Lines 2-3 and 3-4 are constant. Meanwhile, at t = 10 ms, the attacker intrudes into the
communication system and manipulates remote measurements of Line 2-5, sent from Bus
2 to Bus 5. During this FDIA, the measurements are increased by 25%, so this line’s trip
criterion, expressed in (2.8), is met, and the line is tripped at t = 13 ms.
Tripping of Line 2-5 creates a transient in nearby buses and changes the power flow in
neighboring lines, as shown in Figs. 2.23a and 2.24a. On the other hand, because the TSA
is still in progress during this transient and the remote measurements sent from Bus 3 to
LCDRs installed at buses 4 and 2 are incorrectly time-stamped, the differential currents of
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these LCDRs rise, as shown in Figs. 2.23b and 2.24b. Since the current of Line 3-4 changes
by a rate larger than κIn, (2.8) is met and the operating point of the LCDR installed on
Bus 4 enters the trip zone (Fig. 2.23b). Thus, Line 3-4 is tripped at t = 16 ms. However,
the differential current of Bus 2’s LCDR remains in the block zone (Fig. 2.24b).
When both Lines 2-5 and 3-4 are tripped, the power flow in healthy lines is redirected,
overloading Line 1-5 (Fig. 2.25). In this figure, the current is normalized based on the
nominal current of the line, and the pickup setting of this line’s OCR is set at 1.8 p.u.
As seen in Fig. 2.25, the current of Line 1-5 increases steeply, such that it exceeds the
pickup setting at t = 18 ms. As a result, the relay issues the trip command, and the line is
disconnected at t = 19 ms. Once this line is tripped, Buses 4 and 5 split from the rest of
the grid, resulting in a separate island, called Island 1. This island continues its operation
with the load on Bus 5 supplied by the DG on Bus 4. The DC grid, on the other hand,
gets shortchanged of power, so the system voltage starts to collapse (Fig. 2.26). However,
when the voltage at Bus 1 reaches 0.85 p.u. at t = 340 ms, the load on this bus—which has
the lowest priority—is shed, and the system voltage becomes stable again, as shown in Fig
2.26. However, as shown in Fig. 2.27, the current of Line 1-2 increases after tripping the
load on Bus 1. The increased current exceeds the pickup setting of this line’s overcurrent
relay at t = 341 ms; thus the trip signal of Line 1-2 is issued, and the line is tripped at
t = 342 ms. At this time, the rest of the test DC grid splits up into two separate islands
(i.e., Island 2 for Buses 1, 6 and 7, and Island 3 for Buses 2 and 3). In island 2, the
load on Bus 6 is supplied by the Photovoltaic (PV) DG installed on Bus 7. However, the
voltage in island 3 collapses due to the shortage in the generated power, as in Fig. 2.28,
which happens because the total generation in Island 3 is one MW less than the total load.
In conclusion, coordinated attacks in this case study resulted in the disruption of energy
supply to 70% of loads, tripping of half of the lines, and splitting of the system into 3
islands.
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Figure 2.25: Current of Line 1-5 after tripping of Lines 2-5 and 3-4.
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Figure 2.26: Voltage at Bus 1 after tripping Line 1-5, and the effect of load shedding
scheme on voltage stability.
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Figure 2.27: Line 1-2’s current after tripping Line 1-5 and disconnecting the load on Bus
1.
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Figure 2.28: Voltage at Bus 5 after tripping Line 1-2.
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2.7 Conclusion
This chapter first unveiled the vulnerabilities of AC and DC LCDRs to cyber-attacks, and
discussed how these relays can be targeted by FDIAs or TSAs. Then, the mathematical
formulation of cyber-attacks against both AC and DC LCDRs was presented. For AC
LCDRs in particular, four attack strategies were proposed and simulated next to shown
how cyber-attacks can move the operating point of AC LCDRs into the trip zone. It
was also shown how the more secured type of AC LCDRs, which are equipped with DD
elements, can be fooled into tripping the line they are protecting. Afterwards, through
three case studies, this chapter demonstrated the consequences of coordinated attacks
against AC and DC LCDRs. In all case studies, a kind of instability happened and the
system integrity collapsed. As a result, the cyber-security of LCDRs against cyber-attacks
is a crucial issue which must be addressed.
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Chapter 3
Attack Detection Method for
SV-based AC LCDRs
As shown in Chapter 2, AC LCDRs are vulnerable to FDIAs and TSAs. This vulnerabil-
ity can potentially lead to an instability if several attacks are coordinated against several
LCDRs in the system. To address this issue for SV-based AC LCDRs, this chapter pro-
poses a method to detect FDIAs using UIOs and to distinguish them from internal faults.
The proposed method is comprised of PS and NS submodules, each including a UIO to
estimate the local PS and NS voltages based on the state-space model of the faulty line in
each sequence. Immediately after an SV-based AC LCDR picks up, the proposed method
calculates the fault location to obtain the state-space model of the potentially faulty line,
and estimates each sequence’s local voltages using UIOs. The RF for each submodule, i.e.,
the difference between the measured and estimated local voltage for the sequence asso-
ciated with that submodule, remains close to zero during real internal faults, because in
this condition the state-space model based on which the UIOs operate correctly represents
the line. Nevertheless, the state-space model mismatch during FDIAs leads to large RFs.
Thus, a rise in the RFs after an LCDR pickup signifies an FDIA or a TSA, so the trip
signal of the LCDR is blocked.
The proposed method requires time-synchronized SVs of local and remote terminals, a
communication platform, and a fast-enough processor. Given that the proposed method is
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supposed to operate as a built-in function in SV-based microprocessor digital LCDRs, most
of these requirements are already in place; that is, commercial SV-based LCDRs already
share time-synchronized SVs of remote current measurements using a communication sys-
tem and utilize state-of-the-art processors for analyzing received measurements to detect
faults. Therefore, no extra hardware or communication equipment is required. Addition-
ally, the fast communication platforms that are already being used for sharing SVs enable
the proposed method to detect attacks and differentiate them from faults quickly, in less
than two cycles, which is in the range of commercial LCDRs’ operation time. However, the
proposed method needs remote voltage SVs as well, which are not currently being shared by
commercial LCDRs. Given that local voltage SVs are already available for LCDRs, sharing
them along with current SVs is possible by increasing the communication bandwidth.
On this basis, Section 3.1 describes the state-space model of transmission lines for both
PS and NS. Section 3.2 proceeds with a brief overview of UIOs and their design procedure.
The FDIA and TSA diagnosis idea and procedure is covered in Section 3.3. Afterwards,
the performance of the proposed method is evaluated and its effectiveness is corroborated
in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes this chapter.
3.1 State-Space Model of AC Transmission Lines Dur-
ing Internal Faults
This section presents the state-space representation of transmission lines for both PS and
NS during internal faults. The model is obtained from the perspective of LCDR I installed
at Terminal T1 in Fig. 2.1. A similar model can be also achieved for LCDR II installed
at Terminal T2. The obtained state-space models are used later in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 for
detecting FDIAs against LCDRs.
Fig. 2.1 shows the PS and NS models of a transmission line during an internal fault.
The fault is modeled by a current source at the fault location [76], and has occurred at a
distance of xL from terminal T1, where L is the length of the line and 0 < x < 1. To find
x, the fault location technique suggested in [77] for LCDRs is used. PS and NS voltages


































Figure 3.1: A two-terminal transmission line during internal faults.































where Φ denotes any voltage or current whose instantaneous PS or NS components is
required; subscripts a, b, and c represent the three phases; and fs and f are the sampling
and fundamental frequencies. Therefore, the delays introduced by fs/3f and 2fs/3f are
120◦ and 240◦, respectively [78].
Using the circuit of Fig. 3.1, the differential equations that relate the voltages and

















vs2(t)− (1− x)Ris22(t)− (1− x)L
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dt












where isf (t) is the current at the fault location, which is unknown. Using (3.2a)-(3.2e), the
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where, Xs is the state vector for sequence s; Ac, Bc,n, and Bc,u are the continuous state,
known input, and unknown input matrices; C is the output matrix; Usn is the known input
vector, which includes current measurements from terminals T1 and T2 for sequence s; Ys
is the output vector for sequence s, which includes voltage measurements; and T is the
transpose operator.
To make a pair of state-space equations, such as (3.3), suitable for numerical imple-
mentation, the continuous matrices Ac, Bc,n, and Bc,u in (3.3) are discretized using





where Ts denotes the discretization time step [79]. Bc,u should also be discretized by
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substituting it with Bc,n in (3.4b), resulting in Bu. Therefore, the discretized model of the
system in (3.3) is
Xs [k + 1] = AXs [k] + BnUsn [k] + Buisf [k] (3.5a)
Ys [k] = CXs [k] (3.5b)
where Xs [k] ∈ Rn, Un [k] ∈ Rm, and Y [k] ∈ Rp are the state, known input, and output
vectors at time step k, respectively, and ifs [k] ∈ R1 is the only unknown input. To deal
with the unavailability of isf , a UIO—which works independently from its unknown inputs—
should be used, as explained in the next section.
3.2 A UIO for State Estimation in the Presence of
Unknown Inputs
To estimate the states of the system in (3.3) accurately without requiring the value of
isf , a UIO can be used. A UIO estimates the states of a system by using its outputs Ys
and known inputs, i.e., Usn, without requiring its unknown inputs [80]. Such observers
are suitable for studying conditions that involve uncertain dynamics, faults, or attacks, as
well as when real-time values of system inputs are unavailable [81]. Therefore, as the fault
current isf is not normally available, a UIO is an appropriate tool for estimating the states
of the system.
As shown in [82], state estimation in the presence of unknown inputs is possible if
a delay, denoted by α, is introduced to the UIO. The value of α depends on system
parameters, as explained later. Thus, an (α+ 1)-samples-long window from time step k to
k+ α is considered for estimating the states of the system at time step k. In this window,
k + α is the most recent sampling instant. System outputs during this window, i.e., Ys [k]
to Ys [k + α], are used to estimate Xs [k].
To develop a UIO for (3.3), the system outputs given by this equation should be de-
veloped in a matrix form for the duration of the above window, i.e., from time step k to
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k + α, as follows
Ys [k : k + α] = OαXs [k] + Jn,αU sn [k : k + α] + Ju,αisf [k : k + α] (3.6)
where,
Ys [k : k + α] =
[











Op×1 Op×1 · · · Op×1












Op×m Op×m · · · Op×m









U sn [k : k + α] =
[
Usn [k]
T Usn [k + 1]
T · · · Usn [k + α]T
]T
(3.7e)




f [k + 1] · · · isf [k + α]
]T
(3.7f)
In these equations, O is the zero matrix.
For a reliable UIO, the estimation error should approach zero as k →∞. Accordingly,
a UIO that estimates the state vector Xs at time step k + 1 can be formulated as
X̂s [k + 1] = AX̂s [k] + BnUsn [k] + L
(
Ys[k : k + α]−OαX̂s [k]− Jn,αU sn [k : k + α]
)
(3.8)
where Xs [k] is the estimate for Xs [k] and L is the UIO’s gain, designed such that the UIO
is accurate and stable. Once L is determined, the UIO is fully developed.
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3.2.1 Accuracy of UIO
The UIO defined by (3.8) is accurate when X̂s [k] → Xs [k] as k → ∞. To satisfy
this condition without requiring the unknown input vector Un [k], the UIO’s error, i.e.,
es [k + 1]= X̂s[k + 1]− Xs[k + 1], is obtained using (3.5) and (3.8):
es [k + 1] = (A− LOα)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A′
X̂s [k] + LYs [k : k + α]− LJn,αU sn [k : k + α]− AXs [k]− Buisf [k]
(3.9)
By substituting Ys [k : k + α] from (3.6), (3.9) can be simplified to
es [k + 1] = (A− LOα)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A′
es [k] + LJu,αisf [k : k + α]− Buisf [k] (3.10)
It is clear from (3.10) that the accuracy condition is met and es [k + 1] approaches zero if
the last two terms on the right side of (3.10) cancel out each other, i.e.,
LJu,α =
[
Bu On×1 · · · On×1
]
(3.11)
Theorem 1 shown that there is an L that satisfies (3.11) if (3.12) is satisfied [81].
rank (Ju,α)− rank (Ju,α−1) = 1 (3.12)




Op×1 Op×1 · · · Op×1









Theorem 1. There is a matrix L that satisfies (3.11) if and only if (3.12) is satisfied.

Proof. As LJu,α must result in Γ =
[
Bu On×1 · · · On×1
]
, Γ can be constructed with
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a linear combination of rows of Ju,α. Therefore, there exists an Ju,α that satisfies (3.11)
if and only if Γ is in the space spanned by the rows of Ju,α. Based on the matrix rank






= rank (Ju,α) (3.14)







where Ju,α−1 is given in (3.13), and Θα−1 is as follows
Θα−1 =
[
CT (CA)T · · · (CAα−1)T
]T
(3.16)


















Multiplying the first row of the right side of (3.17) by Θα−1 and subtracting the product
























= 1 + rank (Ju,α−1) (3.19)
Thus, by substituting (3.14) in (3.19), (3.12) is obtained.
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Equation (2.2) is the necessary condition for development of a UIO for (3.5). In other
words, if this condition is not met, it will not be possible to estimate the states of a system
without requiring its unknown inputs. By substituting matrices A, Bu, and C in (3.7c)
and (3.13) and finding the rank of Ju,α and Ju,α−1, it can be shown that α = 2 satisfies
the condition of (3.12). Thus, by selecting α = 2, there is an L that satisfies (3.12). As
Theorem 2 proves, such an L can be formed as follows:
L = [L1 L2]×Q (3.20)








Theorem 2. A matrix L that satisfies (3.11) can be obtained using (3.20).

Proof. A matrix L that satisfies (3.11) must (i) be located in the left null-space of the last
α columns of Ju,α, and (ii) result in Bu if multiplied by the first column of Ju,α. To satisfy
these conditions, L is considered as a multiplication of two matrices λ and Q as L = λ×Q.
The goal is to design a Q that satisfies (i), and a λ that satisfies (ii).
To design Q, the last α columns of Ju,α must be determined first. Using (3.15), the last




. By choosing ε ∈ R(αp)×(αp) as a matrix

















































where “+” denotes the Pseudo inverse [83], and Ξ1 ∈ R(α−1)×(p) and Ξ2 ∈ R1×p are free
matrices. Therefore, choosing Q as in (3.23) and multiplying it by Ju,α results in the right
side of (3.23), and thus (3.21) is proved.
To satisfy condition (ii), λ is designed such that λQJu,α =
[
Bu On×1 · · · On×1
]
.








By equating (3.24) with
[
Bu On×1 · · · On×1
]
, it is clear that L2 must equal Bu. Ad-





are zero, L1 is an n× (α− 1)
free matrix with no impact on the conditions of (3.11). Therefore, an L in the form of
(3.20) can satisfy (3.11).
As shown by Theorem 2, by choosing L according to (3.20) and designingQ according to
(3.21), equation (3.11) is satisfied for any L1, and the estimation error in (3.10) approaches
zero as k → ∞. As a result, L1 is a free n × (α − 1) matrix from the perspective of the
UIO’s error, and can be designed to make the UIO stable.
3.2.2 Stability of UIO
A UIO is stable when all the eigenvalues of A′ in (3.10) are located in the unit circle in
the complex plane [79]. In addition, the locations of the eigenvalues of A′ affect the rate
at which es [k] approaches zero—or equivalently, the estimated states approach the actual
ones. For instance, all entries of es [k] approach zero at rates faster than σk, where σ is the
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maximum magnitude of all eigenvalues of A′. Therefore, even if a large error exists between
Xs and X̂s when the UIO starts to operate, by selecting sufficiently small eigenvalues for A′,
the estimated states approach the actual states rapidly, and the estimation error remains
zero thereafter [84].
As shown in Section 3.2.1, L1 is a free matrix from the UIO’s error perspective. There-
fore, it can be used for satisfying the stability condition. Substituting L from (3.20) into
A′ and breaking QOα into two sub-matrices S1 and S2, with α−1 and 1 rows, respectively,
result in
A′ = (A− BuS2)− L1S1 (3.25)
where S1 and S2 include the first α − 1 rows and the last row of QOα, respectively. As






= n+ 1, ∀z ∈ C, |z| > 1 (3.26)
in which C is the set of all complex numbers. Thus, if (3.26) is satisfied, L1 can be designed
to stabilize the UIO’s poles. The following theorem proves that (3.26) is satisfied for the
state-space model of equation (3.5).
Theorem 3. By selecting α = 2, the condition given by (3.26) is satisfied for the state-
space equation of a faulty transmission line, given in (3.5). 
Proof. Condition (3.26) states that for any complex z whose magnitude is greater than





equals n + 1. To find the rank of (3.26),
this matrix can be written as the multiplication of three matrices, and its rank can be













































To evaluate (3.29), the two ranks on the right-hand side of this equation must be found.
To find the rank of (A− zIn×n), Lemma 1 must be used.
Lemma 1. For any z /∈ σ(A), where σ(A) is the set of all eigenvalues of A, the rank of
A− zIn×n is equal to n [86]. 
For a stable state-space system, the eigenvalues of A are located inside the unit circle,
and thus |λj| < 1 for j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. As a result, according to Lemma 1, the rank of
A− zIn×n is equal to n for |z| ≥ 1.




, the following lemma must
be used.
Lemma 2. Consider 〈S〉 as a state-space model represented by A ∈ Rn×n, Bu ∈ Rn×1, and
C ∈ Rp×n. This system has a transfer function G(s) = C (zIn×n − A)−1 Bu with rank 1
over the field of rational functions in z if and only if 〈S〉 is invertible, i.e., equation (3.12)
holds [87]. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, condition (3.12) holds for a faulty transmission line by
selecting α = 2. Therefore, according to Lemma 2, the rank of C (zIn×n − A)−1 Bu is equal
to 1 for α = 2. As a result, (3.29) equals n+ 1, and (3.26) is satisfied.
As Theorem 3 proved, (3.26) is met for the system; thus there exists an L1 that stabilizes
the system poles. Such an L1 can be designed using a pole-placement method, such as
the algorithm proposed in [88]. This algorithm considers n desired stable eigenvalues and
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designs L1 such that the eigenvalues of A′ are equal to those eigenvalues. In this design,
the algorithm assigns n linearly independent eigenvectors to the desired eigenvalues such
that the eigenvector matrix is as well-conditioned as possible [89]. Then, L1 is obtained
using these eigenvalues and eigenvectors. Once L1 is designed the UIO’s gain expressed in
(3.20) is fully designed and the system states can be estimated using (3.8).
In conclusion, a system is observable and its states can be estimated by a UIO, if
conditions (3.12) and (3.26) are met. These conditions were both satisfied by the state-
space model of a faulty lines shown in equation (3.5) and Fig. 3.1. As a results, UIOs
can be used to estimate the states of a faulty line, and their development procedure is as
follows [81]:
1. the UIO’s delay is chosen as α = 2.
2. The UIO’s gain, i.e, L, is developed as follows:
(a) Q is obtained such that it satisfies (3.21).
(b) L2 is equated with Bu.
(c) L1 is designed using a pole-placement method such that it stabilizes the eigen-
values of (3.25).
(d) L1, L2, and Q are substituted in (3.20) to form L.
After designing a UIO’s gain, the states of the system in (3.5) at each time step can be
estimated using (3.8) and system outputs. The estimated states of the system are used in
the Section 3.3.2 to detect FDIAs and TSAs against LCDRs.
3.3 Attack Diagnosis Using UIO
Using the obtained state-space equation for faulty lines and the developed UIO, this section
presents a method for detecting FDIAs and TSAs targeting LCDRs. To this aim, first the
mismatch between the state-space models of a line during faults and attacks is shown in
Section 3.3.1. Afterwards, the obtained mismatch is used in Section 3.3.2 to detect attacks
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Figure 3.2: A two-terminal transmission line during FDIAs.
3.3.1 State-space Model of AC Lines During FDIAs and TSAs
This section proves that there exists a mismatch between a line’s state-space model during
faults, i.e., (3.5), and its model in the presence of attacks. During an FDIA or a TSA, the
values or time stamps of remote measurements received by an LCDRs are manipulated.
These manipulations are modeled by two inputs, i.e., hsv and h
s
i , which target remote
voltage and current measurements, i.e., vs2(t) and i
s
2(t), respectively, and are shown in Fig.
3.2. Writing differential equations similar to (3.2) for the under-attack line in this figure

































































































To differentiate between the state-space model of the line under faults and attacks, the pa-
rameters of the state-space model under attacks are presented by an over-line in (3.30). As





As a result, manipulating this parameter only affects vs2(t) in Ys(t), without influencing
the states of the system. However, targeting the remote current measurements modifies
is2(t) to h
s
i (t) + i
s
2(t) in (3.30a), so the states are all affected.
For each sequence, discretizing (3.30) using (3.4)—by replacing Bc,ca and Bc,n with Bc,n,
and Ac with Ac—yields the discretized state-space model of the line during FDIAs or TSAs:
Xs [k + 1] = A Xs [k] + BnUsn [k] + BcaU
s
ca [k] (3.31a)
Ys [k] = C Xs [k] + DcaU
s
ca [k] (3.31b)
where A, Bn, and Bca are the discretized versions of Ac, Bc,n and Bc,ca during attacks, and
Uca [k] is the attack input at time step k. Apart from other differences, (3.22) contains
two extra components than (3.5), i.e., BcaU
s
ca [k] and DcaU
s
ca [k], which are added due to
FDIAs or TSAs. Therefore, the state-space equations of a line under faults and attacks
differ. This differences enables discriminating between faults and attacks, as explained in
the next subsection.
3.3.2 Attack Detection Scheme
As explained in Section 3.3.1, the state-space models of a line during attacks and faults
differ. This difference is used in the proposed method to detect FDIAs or TSAs. To this
aim, a submodule is created for each sequence in the proposed method, i.e., PS and NS
submodules, each including a UIO designed based on the state-space model of the faulty
line for that sequence. In the proposed method, when the LCDRs of a line pick up, instead
of immediately tripping the line, they first determine the location of the fault (the obtained
fault location is incorrect during FDIAs or TSAs, since there is no actual fault and only the
57
measurements are compromised). Then, the PS and NS submodules estimate the states of
the system using their associated UIOs. Since during faults the line’s actual model and the
model used to design the UIO are the same, the UIOs’ error for both sequences, i.e., es[k],
approach zero, as explained in Section 3.2. However, during attacks, these two models are
no longer the same, generating a large estimation error, as explained in the following.
To obtain each submodule’s estimation error during FDIAs or TSAs, i.e., es [k + 1] =
X̂s[k + 1] − Xs[k + 1], X̂s[k + 1] should be found using (3.8) during FDIAs or TSAs. In
this equation, everything remains the same during FDIAs or TSAs, except for the system
outputs, i.e., Ys [k : k + α], which should be obtained using under-attack state-space model
of the system, given in (3.31). To modify Ys [k : k + α] for the attack condition, the system
outputs given by (3.31b)—which include manipulated measurements—should be developed
in a matrix form, from time step k to k + α, as follows:
Ysca [k : k + α] = OαX
s
[k] + J n,αU sn [k : k + α] + J ca,αU
s
ca [k : k + α] (3.32)














0 0 · · · 0
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U sca [k : k + α] =
[
Usca [k]
T Usca [k + 1]






Dca 0 0 · · · 0
C Bu Dca 0 · · · 0






C A(α−1)Bu C A
(α−2)Bu C A




Thus, to find each submodule’s estimation error during FDIAs or TSAs, Ys[k : k + α] in
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(3.8) is substituted by Ysca[k : k+α]. Using (3.32) and (3.5a), the error for each submodule
during FDIAs or TSAs becomes
es [k + 1] = Aes[k] + LJ ca,αU sca [k : k + α] + LOαX
s
[k]
− LOαXs[k] + L
[
J n,α − Jn,α
]
U sn [k : k + α] (3.34)
As seen in (3.34), the addition of new terms to the UIO’s error during FDIAs and TSAs
deviates it from zero, resulting in erroneous estimated states for both PS and NS sub-
modules. The increased estimation error is utilized for detecting attacks by defining the
following residual function for each submodule:
rs [k] =
vs1 [k]− v̂s1 [k]
‖vs1[k]‖
(3.35)
where v̂s1 [k] denotes the estimated local voltage. The reason for choosing such a residual
function is that vs1[k] is the only system state that is measured locally. Therefore, its
estimated value can be compared with the measured one, which is reliable due to being
local. As a result, in the absence of attacks, es [k] approaches zero, resulting in rs[k]→ 0.
However, rs [k] grows during FDIAs due to the increased estimation error. Attacks can
thus be detected by monitoring the residual function of each submodule and comparing it
with a detection threshold. An FDIA or a TSA is thus in progress if
|rs [k]| > trs (3.36)
where |.| denotes the absolute value, and trs is the detection threshold for sequence s.
Detection thresholds should be found such that false-positive alarms during internal faults
and false-negative alarms during attacks are minimized. The procedure used for obtaining
the thresholds is explained in the next section.
To avoid false attack-detection during faults, the NS submodule must be deactivated
during balanced conditions. To this aim, similar to what 67NEG element does, small NS
currents can be detected by obtaining the ratio of current magnitudes for both sequences
and comparing the result with a predetermined threshold. Hence, the NS submodule is
deactivated if the following condition is satisfied for both terminals, using the remote and
59






















NS attack detection 
Submodule















Figure 3.3: Tripping logic of LCDRs after implementing the proposed method.
local measurements: ‖i−n [k]‖
‖i+n [k]‖
≤ trneg n ∈ {1, 2} (3.37)
where trneg is the deactivation threshold for the NS submodule, and is set to 2% [90]. Fig.
3.3 shows LCDRs’ tripping logic after implementing the proposed method.
3.4 Performance Evaluation
This section first determines the attack detection thresholds, i.e., tr+ and tr−, and then
investigates the performance of the proposed attack-detection method. Simulations are
carried out using PSCAD/EMTDC program on the 39-bus new England system of Fig.
2.2. In this test system, Line 6-11, with 100 km length, is protected by LCDRs—which
are set based on the default settings of [1]. The proposed method is incorporated as a
built-in function in the LCDR installed at Bus 11. Hence, for evaluating its performance,
the remote measurements coming from Bus 6 are targeted.
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3.5 Determining tr+ and tr−
To accurately detect attacks targeting Bus 11’s remote measurements, and to avoid false-
positive and false-negative alarms, tr+ and tr− must be determined for both submodules
of the LCDR installed on Bus 11. Given that the proposed method is implemented in
LCDRs, it starts operating only when an LCDR picks up. On the other hand, thanks to
the considered restraint in the differential characteristic of LCDRs and their implemented
state-of-the-art built-in functions, commercial LCDRs do not normally pick up during
fault/non-fault external events, such as connection/disconnection of generators/DGs. In
other words, the proposed method operates only during faults on Line 6-11, or during
attacks targeting remote measurements of the LCDR at Bus 11. On this basis, tr+ and
tr− are obtained during internal faults, in the presence of various possible sources of error
and nonlinearities, including
• Measurement noise (Fig. 3.4): This noise is modeled as independent, white and
Gaussian, with a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 35 dB.
• Process noise: This noise is modeled as independent, white and Gaussian, with an
SNR of 35 dB.
• CT saturation: three saturation levels are considered for the CTs installed at Buses
6 and 11: 1) Very Fast Saturation (VFS), which is defined to occur in less than 3
ms, 2) Fast Saturation (FS), which occurs before the fault current reaches its first
extremum, and 3) Mild Saturation (MS), which occurs after the first extremum of
the fault current [91]. Fig. 3.5 shows the primary and secondary currents of the CTs
installed at Buses 6 and 11 during these three saturation levels.
• Coupling Capacitor Voltage Transformer (CCVT) transients: to consider the effect
of CCVTs’ transients, the equivalent model shown in Fig. 3.6 is utilized [92]. The
CCVT model consists of two series capacitances C1 = 135 mF and C2 = 292 µF; a
compensating inductor Lcomp = 42 H, which controls the voltage lag in the capacitive
divider; a step-down transformer with Lt = 0.94 mH, Rt = 0.23 Ω, and N = 40; a
ferro-resonance filter to damp out ferro-resonance oscillations with parameters Lf1 =
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Figure 3.4: Added noise to voltage and current waveforms.
0.394 H, Rf1 = 3.9 Ω, Lf2 = 0.01 H, Rf2 = 5.5 Ω, Cf2 = 8 F, and Rf3 = 40 Ω; and
Rburden = 52 kΩ, which represents an LCDR’s burden, and is set based on [66].
To determine tr+ and tr−, 500 case of internal faults—with various types, resistances
and locations—were simulated in the presence of above-mentioned sources of error. For
each case, the maximum r+[k] and r−[k] were recorded. The largest recorded r+ and
r− plus a 10% security margin were assigned to tr+ and tr−. Afterwards, to verify the
obtained thresholds, the above-mentioned procedure was repeated two more rounds, each
for 500 cases of internal faults with random types, resistances and locations. If the obtained
thresholds in the test rounds are more than the initial ones, tr+ and tr− are replaced by
the largest recorded thresholds for each sequence. This procedure was continued until the
test rounds verified the obtained thresholds.
In the above-mentioned procedure, the maximum obtained r+[k] was related to a three-
phase ABC fault occurred at x = 0.2 with the resistance 0f 0.5 Ω. During this fault,
saturation level for both local and remote CTs were VFS, Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) was
30 dB, and parameters uncertainty was as described above. The estimated and measured
local voltages during this fault are shown in Fig. 3.7a. Additionally, r+[k] is shown in Fig.
3.7b. As seen in Fig. 3.7, the maximum r+[k] is 9%. Thus, tr+ was selected equal to 10%.
The maximum r−[k] was achieved during a two-phase AC fault, occurred at x = 0.4
with the resistance of 0.5 Ω. Similarly, saturation level for both local and remote CTs were
VFS, SNR was 30 dB, and parameters uncertainty was as described above. The estimated
and measured local voltages associated with NS during this fault are shown in Fig. 3.8a.
Additionally, r−[k] is shown in Fig. 3.8b: the maximum r−[k] is 11.3%. Thus, tr− was
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Figure 3.5: Primary and secondary currents of CTs installed at Buses 6 and 11 for different






































Figure 3.6: Equivalent model for utilized CCVTs.
selected equal to 12.4%.
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+ | = 9 %
(b)
Figure 3.7: PS results for the case in which maximum r+[k] occurred, (a) Estimated and
measured voltages for Bus 11, (b) RF.
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+ | = 11.3 %
(b)
Figure 3.8: NS results for the case in which maximum r−[k] occurred, (a) Estimated and
measured voltages for Bus 11, (b) RF.
3.6 Evaluation Scenarios
To evaluate the performance of the proposed method, this section presents seven scenarios:
Scenarios 1 to 4 include 4 different internal faults, all happening at t = 10 ms on Line 6-11;
Scenarios 5-7, on the other hand, include FDIAs against Bus 11’s LCDR. All the FDIAs
are initiated at t = 10 ms, after the DD element of the LCDR is already activated. Given
that each LCDR detects attacks and differentiates them from faults independently, without
being affected by other LCDRs’ operation, only one LCDR is targeted in each scenario.
Additionally, to be able to compare the performance of the proposed method during various
fault/attack conditions, all presented scenarios focus on the same LCDR. Therefore, all the
results are presented from the perspective of the LCDR installed at Bus 11.
• Scenario 1: This scenario evaluates the performance of the proposed method during
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t = 30 ms
x = 0.603
Figure 3.9: The location of the fault obtained by the utilized fault location technique.
a high-impedance AG fault occurring 60 km away from Bus 11 on Line 6-11. The fault
resistance is 100 Ω. Once the fault happens, at t = 10 ms, the operating point of LCDRs
protecting this line enters the trip zone, so they pick up. At this time, the utilized fault
location technique calculates the fault location using remote and local measurements (Fig.
3.9). About 20 ms after the fault occurs, its location—defined as the distance between









∥∥ become 1.94% and 2.54%,
respectively, indicating that both the PS and NS submodules should operate. After obtain-
ing x, UIOs of submodules estimate v+11[k] and v
−
11[k], and compare them with the measured
ones to find the RFs. Fig. 3.10 illustrates the estimated and measured PS and NS volt-
ages for Bus 11. For both sequences, rs[k] is relatively large at the beginning; however,
in around 2 ms, r+[k] and r−[k] become less than 0.30% and 3.31%, respectively (Figs.
3.11). Since r+[k] and r−[k] remain less than tr+ and tr− for t ≥ 32 ms, respectively, the
proposed method confirms that the pickup of the LCDR was due to a real internal fault,
so the trip command is issued 25 ms after the inception of the fault.
• Scenario 2: To investigate the effect of fault resistance on UIOs’ RF during high
impedance faults, this scenario also simulates a high-impedance AG fault occurring 60 km
away from Bus 11 on Line 6-11. Yet, in this scenario fault resistance is 200 Ω. In contrast









both smaller than the defined deactivation threshold for NS. Thus, only the PS submodule
operates in this scenario. Fig. 3.12a illustrates the estimated and measured PS voltages
for Bus 11. Additionally, Fig. 3.12b shows the RF of PS submodule. Similar to Scenario
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Figure 3.10: Estimated and measured voltages for Bus 11 in Scenario 1, (a) PS, (b) NS.
































Figure 3.11: RFs of Scenario 1, (a) PS, (b) NS.
1, r+[k] in this scenario is less than tr+ for t ≥ 32 ms, thus the proposed method confirms
that the pickup of the LCDR was due to a real internal fault, and the line is tripped.
• Scenario 3: A low-impedance ABG fault with the resistance of 1 Ω happens 90 km
away from Bus 11 on Line 6-11. Similar to the previous scenarios, the fault occurs at t = 10









∥∥ in this scenario are 12.66% and 22.66%, respectively, indicating that
both the PS and NS submodules should be active. The estimated and measured v+11[k] and
v−11[k] are shown in Fig. 3.13, and the RFs of this scenario are illustrated in Fig. 3.14 for
both sequences. As these figures represent, 2 ms after initiation of the state estimation,
r+[k] and r−[k] become and remain less than 0.70% and 4.24%, respectively, both of these
values being less than the defined detection thresholds. As a result, the proposed method
truly confirms the occurrence of an internal fault, and the trip command is issued by the
LCDR at t = 35 ms.
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Figure 3.12: PS results obtained for Scenario 2, (a) Estimated and measured voltages for
Bus 11, (b) RF.


































Figure 3.13: Estimated and measured voltages for Bus 11 in Scenario 3, (a) PS, (b) NS.
• Scenario 4: This scenario investigates the performance of the proposed method during
a symmetrical ABC fault with the resistance of 1 Ω. This fault occurs 20 km away from







∥∥ are both close to zero, indicating that the NS submodule does not take
part in attack-detection during this scenario. Hence, only PS submodule estimates the
local voltage (Fig. 3.15a). The RF of the PS submodule is also shown in Fig. 3.15b:
after t = 32 ms, the obtained RF becomes and remains less than 0.8%, which is smaller
than tr+. As a result, the proposed method indicates that the event in this scenario is an
internal fault; the line is thus tripped.
• Scenario 5: This scenario investigates the performance of the proposed method during
the FDIA targeted Line 6-11 in Case Study 2 of Section 2.6.2 in Chapter 2. In this attack,
the healthy remote current measurements, i.e., i6[k], are multiplied by γ = 1.96, before
they are received by the LCDR installed at Bus 11. Therefore, the LCDRs are fooled into
67


































Figure 3.14: RFs of Scenario 3, (a) PS, (b) NS.

































Figure 3.15: PS results obtained for Scenario 4, (a) Estimated and measured voltages for
Bus 11, (b) RF.
an unwarranted pickup, as indicated in Case Study 2 of Section 2.6.2 in Chapter 2. At this
time, the proposed method assumes that a fault has happened, so it runs the fault location
technique to obtain its location. However, because only the remote measurements are
manipulated and no real fault is in progress, the fault location technique yields an incorrect
meaningless x. On the other hand, since in this scenario the remote current measurements







∥∥ both remain around zero; thus, only the PS submodule functions. Fig.
3.16a shows the estimated and measured voltages at Bus 11: the wrong x and manipulated
remote current measurements result in an erroneous local-voltage estimation; hence the RF
of the PS increases (Fig. 3.16b). The RF in this scenario increases up to 24.45%, which
is greater than tr+. Consequently, the proposed method detects the attack, and the trip
signal is blocked.
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Figure 3.16: PS results obtained for Scenario 5, (a) Estimated and measured voltages for
Bus 11, (b) RF.
• Scenario 6: This scenario targets the LCDR installed at Bus 11 by a replay attack—
defined here as an FDIA in which a valid previously-recorded data transmission is mali-
ciously repeated. In this scenario, the authentic remote measurements are replaced by ones
pertaining to an internal BC fault, with a resistance of 10 Ω and at 70 km from Bus 11 on
Line 6-11. The attacker starts manipulating the measurements at t = 10 ms, so the LCDR’s
operating point enters the trip zone and it picks up. The ratio of the NS and PS currents




∥∥, remains around zero, because local measurements are
related to a normal condition, which is balanced. Nonetheless, the remote measurements




∥∥ = 2.28%. Thus, in
this scenario, both submodules are active, and their results are shown in Fig. 3.17. The
RFs of the PS and NS are illustrated in Fig. 3.18. As seen in these two figures, manipu-
lating the remote measurements results in the increase of r+[k] and r−[k] up to 38.7% and
2000%, respectively, both values being greater than the determined thresholds. Therefore,
the proposed method blocks the trip signal, and the line continues its normal operation.
• Scenario 7: In this scenario, another replay attack targets remote measurements of
the LCDR installed at Bus 11. The replay attack in this scenario is pertinent to the high-
impedance fault discussed in Scenario 1. When the attack is initiated at t = 10 ms, the
authentic remote measurements are replaced by faulty measurements of Scenario 1. Thus,∥∥i−11[k]
∥∥ /
∥∥i+11[k]




∥∥ changes from zero to 2.54%
due to the attack, indicating that both submodules are active in this scenario. Fig. 3.19
illustrates the estimated and measured local voltages at Bus 11 obtained by the PS and
NS submodules of the LCDR installed at this bus: there are significant errors, specifically
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Figure 3.17: Estimated and measured voltages for Bus 11 in Scenario 6, (a) PS, (b) NS.































Figure 3.18: RFs of Scenario 6, (a) PS, (b) NS.
for the NS, between the measured and estimated voltages. These errors are shown in Fig.
3.20: the r+[k] for the PS grows up to 12.5%, while r−[k] increases up to 2090%. As a
result, both r+[k] and r−[k] are greater than the defined thresholds, indicating an FDIA.
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Figure 3.19: Estimated and measured voltages for Bus 11 in Scenario 7, (a) PS, (b) NS.






























Figure 3.20: RFs of Scenario 7, (a) PS, (b) NS.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter proposed an attack-detection method for AC LCDRs that are working based
on SVs of remote measurements. To differentiate between faults and attacks, the proposed
method is initiated immediately after the operating point of LCDRs enters the trip zone.
This method uses the local and remote measurements, the state-space model of the faulty
line, and UIOs to estimate the local voltage for both PS and NS. The RF of each sequence
was then defined as the difference between the measured and estimated local voltages. The
defined RFs for both sequences are small during internal faults, since in such situations the
state-space model based on which the UIO operates and the actual system model are the
same. Nevertheless, these two models differ during FDIAs, the RFs thus grow. As a result,
a rise in the RF of any submodule over a predefined threshold along with the pickup signal
of the LCDR indicate the occurrence of an attack. The proposed method was then tested
on the 39-bus new England system for different fault and attack scenarios. The results of
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scenarios corroborated the effectiveness of the proposed method in detecting attacks and
differentiating them from faults.
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Chapter 4
Attack Detection Method for
SV-based and Phasor-based AC
LCDRs
Chapter 3 presented an attack detection method for SV-based AC LCDRs. This chapter,
however, proposes a technique for detecting FDIAs and TSAs against both SV-based and
phasor-based AC LCDRs. This method works for two-terminal lines, and utilizes phasor
values of local and remote current and local voltage measurements, i.e., the measurements
available for an AC LCDR. Therefore, if it is implemented in SV-based type, the phasor
values should be extracted from SVs. In this method, when an AC LCDR picks up, instead
of immediately tripping the line, it calculates and measures the superimposed voltage at
its local terminal, using the proposed PS and NS submodules. To calculate these voltages,
the LCDR models the protected line in detail and replaces the rest of the system with a
Thevenin equivalent that produces accurate responses at the line terminals. Afterwards,
remote current measurements are utilized by the PS and NS submodules to compute each
sequence’s superimposed voltage. A difference between the calculated and the measured su-
perimposed voltages in any sequence reveals that the remote current measurements are not
authentic. This is because local measurements cannot be manipulated by cyber-attacks,
thus any difference between the calculated and measured superimposed voltages in either
sequences is due to the inauthenticity of remote current measurements. Hence, the LCDR’s
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trip command is blocked. The effectiveness of the proposed method is corroborated us-
ing simulation results for the 39-bus new England test system. The performance of the
proposed method is also tested using an OPAL Real-Time Simulator (RTS).
On this basis, Section 4.1 illustrates the system model and explains the procedure used
to obtain its parameters. Section 4.2 elaborates on calculating superimposed voltages at
the local terminal of LCDRs, as well as the proposed attack diagnosis method. Afterwards,
the performance of the proposed method is evaluated and its effectiveness is corroborated
in Section 4.3. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes this chapter.
4.1 System Model
To detect attacks targeting a specific line in the grid, the line and the rest of the system
should be modeled. To this end, the grid is divided into two main subsystems, i.e., the
study and external. The study subsystem contains the line protected by AC LCDRs and
so is modeled in detail, using the PI model, as shown in Fig. 4.1. In this figure, Zc is
the characteristic impedance, γ is the propagation constant, and l is the length of the
transmission line in meters. On the other hand, the external subsystem contains the rest
of the grid, and should be modeled to produce an accurate response at line terminals.
According to the Thevenin theory, the external system seen at both 2 boundary terminals
can be represented as a multi-terminal Thevenin circuit, including 2 equivalent voltage
sources and 4 impedances—where 2 of them are mutual impedances between different
terminals [93, 94]. Fig. 4.1 represents the External System Thevenin Equivalent (ESTE)




























in which, It and Vt are the voltage and current vectors for line terminals, and all other
parameters are shown in Fig. 4.1. To fully model the system, the impedance and voltage
source values in ESTE should be obtained. For passive networks consisting of linear, bilat-
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eral, lumped or distributed elements, Open-Circuit Transfer Impedances (OTIs) between
two terminals, e.g., Z1,2 and Z2,1, are equal. Thus, to model the external network in Fig.




















                       Thevenin equivalent Impedances: 
E th 1 E th 2
The rest of the system excluding the
 protected line by LCDRs
Z1,1      Z1,2
Z2,1      Z2,2
Figure 4.1: The equivalent model of the test system.
If an AC LCDR picks up (due to a fault or an attack), it can calculate ESTE parameters
using the available voltage and current measurements before and after its pickup, as will
be shown in the rest of this section.
• Before-pickup voltage equations: Since the Thevenin equivalent of large power systems
do not change considerably during short periods of time (e.g., a few milliseconds), current
and voltage samples taken before LCDRs pickup time can be used to estimate ESTE
parameters [95, 96]. Meanwhile, no significant change in the configuration of the system
must happen between these samples. Such changes can be detected by commercial LCDRs
using the traveling waves generated after their occurrence [66]. Using the obtained samples,
each LCDR finds the equations for before-pickup PS voltage at all terminals. For instance,
























                       Thevenin equivalent Impedances: 




Z1,1      Z1,2










Z1,1      Z1,2
Z2,1      Z2,2
(b)
Figure 4.2: Model of the test system during internal faults (a) PS, (b) NS.
in which, subscripts bp and superscript “+” denote the quantities measured before pickup









1,bp[α] and the following
equation:













A higher number of samples yield more accurate results.
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• Post-pickup voltage equations: Since in attack-free conditions LCDRs must pickup
only when internal faults occur, post-pickup conditions are modeled in the presence of an
internal fault. Fig. 4.2 presents the PS and NS models of the system during a fault. In
these models, the PS and NS impedances are similar [97], and the fault is represented by a
current source located xl meters away from terminal 1 [76]. Short-circuit studies commonly
assume that variations in large systems in the short term (a few cycles) are not expected
to cause a significant change in the parameters of the ESTE. As a result, the ESTE before
and during an internal fault are considered to be the same [98], and during-fault equations
can also be used for finding the ESTE parameters. Hence, another equation can be written
for the PS voltage at LCDR locations. For example, for LCDR I in Fig. 4.2a, the following
equation holds:
V +1,pp = Eth1 − Z11I+1,pp − Z12I+2,pp (4.4)





through measurement. In cases of non-zero NS fault current, another equation can be
written for the post-pickup NS local voltage measured by LCDRs. This equation for
LCDR I is
V −1,pp = −Z11I−1,pp − Z12I−2,pp (4.5)
where, superscript “−” denotes NS values.
Once before-pickup and post-pickup equations (4.2), (4.4), and (4.5) are found, they
can be written in the following matrix form:


1 0 −I+1,bp[1] −I+2,bp[1] 0






1 0 −I+1,bp[m] −I+2,bp[m] 0
0 1 0 −I+1,bp[1] −I+2,bp[1]






0 1 0 −I+1,bp[m] −I+2,bp[m]
1 0 −I+1,pp −I+2,pp 0































in which, X is the unknown vector that should be obtained. The set of equations in (4.6)
can be solved using the Least Square Method (LSM) [99]. Once vector X in (4.6) is ob-
tained, the external subsystem model is fully identified, and can be used for differentiating
between faults and attacks.
4.2 Proposed Attack Detection Method
This section first explains how to obtain the OTI between an LCDR’s terminals and a
fault location. After estimating the fault current, Section 4.2.2 elaborates on computing the
superimposed voltage at the LCDR’s terminal using the obtained OTI and the fault current.
Finally, Section 4.2.3 explains the proposed method utilizes the calculated superimposed
voltages to detect FDIAs and TSAs.
4.2.1 OTI between LCDR’s terminals and fault location
To find the local superimposed voltage, an LCDR must find the OTI between its terminal
and the fault location (i.e., virtual bus k in Fig. 4.2) after the LCDR picks up. To find
a fault location, the technique suggested in [77] for LCDRs is used. This fault location
technique utilizes only the measurements available for LCDRs, and does not require any
extra input. The OTI between buses i and k is the element at row i and column k of the
system impedance matrix [100]. This impedance can be calculated using the fault location
and the before-pickup impedance matrix. To find this impedance matrix, the equation that
relates currents and voltages of the line’s terminals should be determined first. Given that
the current flowing into line terminals from the external subsystem is It and the terminal’s
voltage is Vt—as explained in (4.1)—It can be described by
It = YLVt (4.7)
where, YL is the admittance matrix of the line, when separated from the rest of grid. On
the other hand, multiplying Z−1th in both sides of (4.1) results in
It = Z
−1
th E − Z−1th Vt (4.8)
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Equating (4.7) and (4.8) yields
YLVt = Z
−1
th E − Z−1th Vt (4.9)








in which, Iinj= Z
−1
th E, and is the injected current to terminal buses. Using the obtained







In the next step, post-pickup impedance and admittance matrices—i.e., Zbus,pp and Ybus,pp,
respectively—should be found using Zbus,bp and Ybus,bp. Since impedance (admittance)
matrix is the same for both the PS and NS [97], the following equation holds for both
sequences


















and k denotes the fault virtual bus. The OTI between terminal n and bus k is found by
multiplying row n of Zbus,pp by column k of Ybus,pp in (4.12), resulting in
Zn,1,ppY1,k,pp + Zn,2,ppY2,k,pp + Zn,k,ppYk,k,pp = 0 (4.15)
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Since the addition of bus k does not change Zn,1 and Zn,2 elements in Zbus,bp [76], the OTI
between terminal n and fault virtual bus k can be obtained by
Zn,k,pp =
− (Zn,1,bpY1,k,bp + Zn,2,bpY2,k,bp)
Yk,k,pp
(4.16)
For example, to obtain the OTI between terminal 1 and fault bus k in Fig. 4.2, Y1,k,pp,








































































4.2.2 Calculating Local Superimposed Voltage
When an internal fault happens, the voltage at all terminals of the line are affected. The
PS and NS superimposed voltage at terminal n can be calculated using
∆V sn,c = −Zn,k,pp × Isk,pp n ∈ {1, 2} , s ∈ {+,−} (4.22)
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where, Isk,pp is the s-sequence fault current phasor, shown in Fig. 4.2 [101]. This current can
be found using LCDR current measurements, fault location, and the relations describing

























































× sinh (γl [1− x])
(4.25)
The PS and NS submodules of LCDRs I and II thus calculate the PS and the NS
superimposed voltages at their terminals using (4.20)-(4.25).
4.2.3 Detecting Attacks
As explained in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, remote current measurements were used in calcu-
lating the PS and NS superimposed voltages, i.e., ∆V sn,c. As a result, in case of an FDIA
or a TSA against remote current measurements, ∆V sn,c in (4.22) differ from their values
obtained by local measurement. These differences are used for detecting FDIAs, i.e., an
FDIA happens if






×100 ≥ trsn n ∈ {1, 2} s = {+ or −} (4.26)
in which, ∆V sn,m is the superimposed voltage measured by the LCDR locally, δ
s
n is the
difference between the measures and calculated superimposed voltages at terminal n in



















































Figure 4.3: Tripping logic of LCDRs after implementing the proposed method.
will be discussed in Section 4.3.1. Since δsn in (4.26) must ideally be zero during attack-free
conditions for both PS and NS, exceeding δsn from tr
s
n for either sequence implies an FDIA
or a TSA. However, for the reliable function of the proposed method under unbalanced
conditions, the NS submodule can be deactivated if the ratio of the NS current over the
PS current falls bellow a certain threshold, similar to what 67NEG element carries out in
case of small NS currents [90]. As a result, in the proposed method, the NS submodule is




∣∣∣∣ ≤ trneg n ∈ {1, 2} (4.27)
where trneg is the NS deactivation threshold, and is set to 2% [90]. Such a formulation
deactivates the NS when a real symmetrical internal fault happens, as will be shown in
Section 4.3.1. The tripping logic of LCDRs after implementing the proposed method is
illustrated in Fig. 4.3. Additionally, Fig. 4.4 is the flowchart of the procedure carried out





               Measure           for both the PS and NS.             
Yes
Locate the fault using remote and local measurements.
Find the ESTE parameters and calculate the OTI between the 
LCDR terminal and the fault location using (4.20)-(4.21).
Compute          using (4.22)-(4.25) for the PS, and for the NS 
if (4.27) is not satisfied.
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Figure 4.4: Flowchart of the proposed method
4.3 Performance Evaluation
4.3.1 Off-line Simulations
This section investigates the performance of the proposed method for LCDR I in the
test system shown in Fig 2.2 using PSCAD/EMTDC program. LCDRs I and II in the
test system have been installed at terminals 1 and 2 of Line 6-11 (or on buses 11 and 6,
respectively). To differentiate between attacks and faults, the detection thresholds tr+1 and
tr−1 must be determined for both PS and NS submodules, so that false diagnosis during
fault and attack conditions is avoided. To this aim, trs1 was obtained in the presence
of different sources of error, e.g., measurement noise, CT saturation, and line-parameter
uncertainty during internal faults. The measurements used by LCDR I were combined
with white Gaussian noise with a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 30 dB. The CTs were sized
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based on the specifications in [102]. Parameter uncertainty was modeled, using a Gaussian
percentage error that is normally distributed around zero, with a standard deviation of 2%.
About 200 simulations of internal faults with different types, resistances and locations were
run. For each, δs1 was derived. The maximum recorded δ
s
1 plus a security margin of 10%
were assigned to trs1. Afterwards, to verify the obtained thresholds, the above-mentioned
procedure was repeated two more rounds, each for other 200 cased of internal faults with
random types, resistances and locations. If the obtained thresholds in the test rounds are
greater than the initial ones, tr+1 and tr
−
1 are replaced by the largest recorded thresholds
for each sequence. This procedure was continued until the test rounds verified the obtained
thresholds, and resulted in tr+1 and tr
−
1 equal to 11% and 9%, respectively.
This section defines seven scenarios to evaluate the performance of the proposed method:
Scenarios 1 to 3 include 3 different internal faults; Scenarios 4 and 5 include the basic
FDIAs studied in Section 2.3; and Scenarios 6 and 7 involve two replay attacks. All faults
or FDIAs start at t = 50 ms on/against Line 6-11. Attacks are initiated after the DD
element of Bus 11’s LCDR picks up. All the results are presented from the perspective
of this LCDR. In these scenarios, line terminals connected to Buses 11 and 6 are called
Terminals 1 and 2, respectively.
• Scenario 1: This scenario includes a high-impedance internal AG fault 30 km away
from Bus 11 on Line 6-11, with a fault resistance of 300 Ω. Immediately after the fault
happens, the operating points of LCDRs I and II enter the trip zone, and the proposed
method is initiated. The results for the PS are illustrated in Fig. 4.5a: at t = 75 ms—
i.e., 1.5 cycles after the fault occurs—∆V +1,c and ∆V
+
1,m are 1.56 and 1.44 kV, respectively,
resulting in δ+1 = 8.33%. The non-zero value of δ
+
1 is due to the above-discussed sources of
error. On the other hand,
∣∣I−n,pp/I+n,pp
∣∣ for terminals 1 and 2 are 76% and 186%, which are
both greater than 2%. As a result, the NS submodule of the proposed method should be
active. For the NS, ∆V −1,c = 1.53 kV, ∆V
−
1,m = 1.45 kV, and thus δ
−
1 = 5.5%, as shown in
Fig. 4.5b. The below-threshold δ+1 and δ
−
1 confirm that the occurred event is an internal
fault.
• Scenario 2: An AB fault with a fault resistance of 1 Ω happens 75 km away from Bus
11 on Line 6-11. As shown in Fig. 4.6a, at t = 75 ms, ∆V +1,c and ∆V
+
1,m are 30.46 and 27.86


































Figure 4.5: Superimposed voltages at bus 11 during Scenario 1, (a) PS, (b) NS.
1 and 2 are 67% and 46%. As a result, the NS submodule is active in this scenario as well.
As Fig. 4.6b shows, ∆V −1,c and ∆V
−
1,m are 24.44 kV and 22.71 kV, respectively, at t = 75
ms, resulting in δ−1 = 7.6%. Being smaller than the defined thresholds, the obtained δ
−
1
and δ+1 confirm that an internal fault has happened.





























Figure 4.6: Superimposed voltages at bus 11 during Scenario 2, (a) PS, (b) NS.
• Scenario 3: An ABCG fault occurs 10 km away from Bus 11 on Line 6-11 in the test
system, with a 1 Ω fault resistance. Fig. 4.7a displays the measured and calculated PS
superimposed voltages: at t = 75 ms, ∆V +1,c and ∆V
+
1,m are 114.9 and 109.8 kV, respectively.
Therefore, δ+1 is 4.64%, which is less than tr
+
1 , indicating an internal fault. In this scenario,
since
∣∣I−n,pp/I+n,pp
∣∣ = 0.3% for each terminal, due to the symmetrical nature of the fault, the
NS submodule of the proposed method is inactive.
• Scenario 4: In this case, LCDR II’s measurements for all phases are targeted by an
MMA with |∆I6| = 0.251 kA. As explained in Section 2.3, this is the minimum |∆I6| that
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Figure 4.7: PS Superimposed voltages at bus 11 during (a) Scenario 3, (b) Scenario 4.
can move LCDR I’s operating point into the trip zone. Fig. 4.7b illustrates the measured
and calculated superimposed voltages during this FDIA: at t = 75 ms, δ+1 is 127% for
PS. Therefore, the PS submodule of the proposed method detects the attack, and the
trip signal for all differential elements (i.e., phase and sequence 87L) are blocked. In this
scenario, the NS submodule is inactive, since the FDIA is symmetrical and
∣∣I−n,pp/I+n,pp
∣∣ for
both terminals are 0.01%. It should be mentioned that, once the FDIA of this scenario
starts, ∆V +1,c immediately changes from zero to 21.56 kV in one step, due to the sudden
initiation of false data injection, which changes Idiff from zero to 0.251 kA.
• Scenario 5: This case involves a PMA with ∆θ6 = 35.1◦. As explained in Section 2.3,
this ∆θ6 is the smallest one that moves the operating point of the LCDR into the trip zone.
Thus, LCDR I falsely picks up. Fig. 4.8a illustrates that at t = 75 ms, ∆V +1,m = 0.375 kV,




1 and the attack is detected. The NS submodule, on
the other hand, is inactive during this scenario, since
∣∣I−n,pp/I+n,pp
∣∣ for both terminals are
almost zero. Additionally, converting this ∆θ6 to a time delay results in ∆t = 1.625 ms.
A TSA associated with the obtained ∆t is developed by modifying the true measurement
times from t to t + ∆t. Superimposed voltages at Bus 11 during such a TSA are shown
in Fig. 4.8b: ∆V +1,c is much greater than ∆V
+




1 and indicating an
attack.
• Scenario 6: By intruding into the communication system, an attack changes I6 re-
ceived by LCDR I to the currents pertaining to a real internal AC fault—in the middle of
Line 6-11 with 5 Ω fault resistance. As a result, LCDR I’s operating point moves into the
trip zone. As Fig. 4.9a shows, ∆V +1,c is 4.22 times larger than ∆V
+
1,m, which results in a sig-
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Figure 4.8: PS superimposed voltages at bus 11 during Scenario 5, (a) PMA, (b) TSA.
nificantly greater δ+1 than tr
+
1 . On the other hand,
∣∣I−1,pp/I+1,pp
∣∣ is 0.01%, while
∣∣I−2,pp/I+2,pp
∣∣ is
105%, due to manipulated remote measurements. As a result, the NS submodule is active
in this scenario. In spite of ∆V −1,m, which is zero, ∆V
−
1,c is about 8.37 kV (Fig. 4.9b). This
difference implies δ−1 =∞. As a result, both NS and PS submodules detect the FDIA.




























Figure 4.9: Superimposed voltages at bus 11 during Scenario 6, (a) PS, (b) NS.
• Scenario 7: This scenario investigates the performance of the proposed method during
high-current external faults that saturate the measurement CTs of Line 6-11. External
faults accompanied by CT saturation can incorrectly move the operating point in the
differential-restraining plane of an LCDR into the trip zone. Therefore, LCDRs are always
equipped with CT saturation detector to prevent false tripping during external faults [1,
66, 102]. Given that the proposed attack-detection method is activated only if an LCDR
picks up, this scenario simulates a case in which the CT saturation detector fails to operate
correctly during an external fault and thus the LCDR picks up incorrectly. This scenario
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takes into account the worst CT-saturation case, in which only one of the CTs saturates.
During this scenario, an ABG fault with a resistance of 1 Ω occurs at the middle of line
5-6 at t = 50 ms. This scenario involves three saturation levels for the CT installed at Bus
6: 1) VFS, which is defined to occur in less than 3 ms, 2) FS, which occurs before the fault
current reaches its first extremum, and 3) MS, which occurs after the first extremum of the
fault current [91]. Fig. 4.10 shows the primary and secondary currents of the CT installed
at Bus 6 during these three cases. When the measured current is not distorted by CT
saturation, the current defined in (4.23) is zero, resulting in zero calculated superimposed
voltage. However, when the CT saturates, an error is created in Isk,pp; the faster the
saturation level, the larger the error would be. This error leads to non-zero calculated PS
and NS superimposed voltages at bus 11. Fig. 4.11 shows these voltages for VFS, FS, and
MS. For both sequences and all saturation levels, there is a large difference between the
measured and calculated superimposed voltages, indicating that the trip signal should be
blocked. Therefore, a byproduct of the proposed method is blocking nuisance trip signals
due to CT saturation during external faults.
4.3.2 Real-Time Simulation
This subsection utilizes an OPAL RTS to investigate the real-time performance of the
proposed method. This approach utilizes a microprocessor that implements the proposed
method and is connected to an RTS, thereby it constitutes a Hardware-In-The-Loop (HIL)
verification environment. In the HIL setup (Fig. 4.12), a microprocessor emulates an LCDR
that implements the proposed method, and verifies its performance using simulation signals
obtained in real time. In addition to a new scenario, referred to as Scenario 8, Scenarios 1
and 6 of the previous subsection have been also carried out again using the HIL setup.
• Scenario 1 of the previous subsection is tested again by the HIL setup. After the
relay picks up, the proposed method calculates ∆V +1,c and ∆V
−
1,c, and measures ∆V
+
1,m and
∆V −1,m. To illustrate these quantities using an oscilloscope, they are scaled down by a factor
of 1/1000. Fig. 4.13 shows the PS and NS superimposed voltages at bus 11 obtained from
the RTS. The green and purple curves represent the calculated and measured superimposed



















































CT primary CT secondary
(c)
Figure 4.10: Primary and secondary currents of the CT installed at Bus 6 for different
levels of saturation, (a) VFS, (b) FS, (C) MS.
10 ms and 500 mV. Comparing Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.13 reveals that the HIL testing of
the proposed method yields the same results as obtained for Scenario 1 in the previous
subsection, and indicates that the relay’s pickup is due to an internal fault.
• For Scenario 6 of the previous subsection, immediately after the LCDRs picks up,
the PS and NS superimposed voltages at local terminals are calculated. Fig. 4.14 shows
the PS and NS superimposed voltages at bus 11 obtained from the RTS. The green and
purple curves represent the calculated and measured superimposed voltages, respectively.
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Figure 4.11: Superimposed voltages at bus 11 during Scenario 7, (a) PS, (b) NS.















Figure 4.12: HIL setup.
The scaling factor for this scenario is 1/10000. The time division for both sub-figures is
10 ms; the voltage division for sub-figures 4.14a and 4.14b are 1 V and 2V, respectively.
The obtained differences between the measured and calculated superimposed voltages for
both sequences (δ+1 ≈ 200% and δ−1 ≈∞) indicate that the pickup is due to an attack, so
the trip signal should be blocked.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.13: Superimposed voltages at bus 11 obtained from RTS during Scenario 1, (a)
PS, (b) NS.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.14: Superimposed voltages at bus 11 obtained from RTS during Scenario 6, (a)
PS, (b) NS.
• Scenario 8: In this scenario, an FDIA replaces real measured I6 by the I6 pertaining
to an internal AG fault—with a resistance of 250 Ω happening at 90 km away from Bus
11 on Line 6-11. Fig. 4.15 illustrates the superimposed voltages obtained by measurement
and calculation, shown by the green and purple curves, respectively. The voltage scaling
factor is 1/1000 for this scenario. The time and voltage divisions for both channels are 10
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ms and 1 V, respectively. As shown in Fig. 4.15a, ∆V +1,c is about 53% greater than ∆V
+
1,m,
indicating the occurrence of an attack. On the other hand,
∣∣I−2,pp/I+2,pp
∣∣ is 154%, because the
FDIA emulates an asymmetrical fault. However, since only the remote measurements are
manipulated,
∣∣I−1,pp/I+1,pp
∣∣ remains about zero. Therefore, the NS submodule is also active
in this scenario. As ∆V −1,m ≈ 0, calculating δ−1 for this scenario yields a very large number,
which implies an attack. Thus, both the PS and NS submodules successfully detect the
attack.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.15: Superimposed voltages at bus 11 obtained from RTS during Scenario 8, (a)
PS, (b) NS.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented a method to detect FDIAs and TSAs targeting AC LCDRs. The
proposed method can be implemented by both SV-based and phasor-based AC LCDRs,
and requires only local and remote current and local voltage measurements, which are
all available in today’s commercial relays. In the proposed method, when an AC LCDR’s
operating point enters the trip zone, instead of immediately tripping the line, its PS and NS
submodules derive the superimposed voltages at the LCDR’s terminal from two different
ways, i.e., by measurement and calculation. Attacks are then detected if the difference
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between the calculated and measured superimposed voltages in any sequence exceeds the
defined threshold for that sequence. Off-line and real-time simulation results and case




Attack Detection Method for DC
LCDRs in Medium-Voltage DC
Systems
In previous chapters, two methods were presented to detect cyber-attacks against AC
LCDRs. This chapter, however, presents a method to detect attacks against DC LCDRs.
The proposed method is comprised of POCs installed in series with each converter. During
faults, the resultant RLC circuit causes the POCs to resonate and generate a damped
sinusoidal component with a specific frequency, i.e., fd. However, fd is not generated
during cyber-attacks or other events. Thus, LCDRs’ pickup without detecting the fd
denotes a cyber-attack. Given that fd is locally measured and analyzed by each LCDR,
the attack-detection approach cannot be targeted by cyber-attacks.
On this basis, Section 5.1, explains the proposed attack detection method. Afterwards,













































Figure 5.1: Attack Detection scheme for LCDRs of a DC Line after including POCs.
5.1 The Proposed Attack Detection Method for DC
LCDRs
The proposed method’s objective is to verify DC LCDRs’ tripping decision via uncom-
promisable locally measured signals, while maintaining the LCDRs’ high-speed response
to faults. After implementing the proposed method, a DC LCDR trips the line that is
protecting only if the LCDR picks up and its attack detection submodule verifies that the
pickup is due to a real fault. To detect attacks accurately, the proposed method installs a
POC on each converter’s terminal, as discussed next.
5.1.1 Augmenting DC LCDRs with POCs
To verify the occurrence of faults, the proposed method installs two simple POCs—
comprised of an inductor Lp in parallel with a capacitor Cp—on both poles of each con-
verter’s terminal in a DC system (Fig. 5.1). Therefore, LCDRs of all lines connected to a
bus can measure the voltage across the POC installed on that bus locally. For example,
a total of 2 × 7 = 14 POCs are required for the DC system of Fig. 2.22. When a fault
occurs on the line between converters m and n in Fig 5.1, the RLC fault circuits shown in
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Figure 5.2: System model during capacitor discharge stage, (a) PG fault, (b) PP fault.
Fig 5.2 are formed [103]. These figures illustrate the equivalent RLC circuit from the per-
spective of converters m and n under Pole-to-Ground (PG) and Pole-to-Pole (PP) faults
in a DC system after the addition of POCs. The illustrated fault circuits are active during
the capacitor discharge stage [103]. In these circuits, a fault with the resistance of Rf is
located at a distance of xLdc from converter m in Fig. 5.1, where Ldc is the length of the
DC line and 0 < x < 1. Each POC in Fig. 5.2 adds a set of complex poles, i.e., ζ ± j2πfd.
Thus, POCs resonate during faults and generate a damped sinusoidal component with the
frequency of fd [104]. Therefore, attack detection submodules of LCDRs on converters m
and n can detect fd by measuring the voltage across their associated POCs in Fig. 5.2.
On the other hand, at steady state, Lp and Cp behave like a short-circuit and an
open-circuit, respectively, causing no effect on the grid operation. Similarly, POCs do
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not resonate during load and generation changes, since the DC link capacitor filters the
propagation of high-frequency components from the load and generation side to the DC
grid. This will be shown later in Scenario 6 in Section 5.2. Thus, detecting fd by measuring
the voltage across POCs locally indicates the existence of a fault in neighboring lines, and
is used to verify the occurrence of faults and detect attacks.
5.1.2 Selection Criteria for fd
As explained in the previous section, adding POCs to the terminals of converters m and
n in Fig. 5.1 results in generating a damped component with the frequency of fd during
faults. Because detection of fd is going to be used to verify the occurrence of faults, fd
should be in a frequency range that does not overlap with any non-fault transient that can
arise in a DC system. Doing so guarantees that fd detection is by fault signature only, and
thus can be used to verify LCDRs’ pickup.
Since DC systems are usually fully interfaced with AC/DC Voltage-Source Converters
(VSCs) and DC/DC converters, frequencies generated in DC line currents are defined
by VSCs’ switching frequency and the harmonics existing on the AC side. For AC/DC
VSCs, the second and sixth harmonics are the most dominant ones [105]. Accordingly, 360
Hz is the highest frequency that can be imposed on a DC system by AC-side transients.
For DC/DC converters, the generated angular frequencies are 1/(2π
√
LconvCconv) or (1 −
D)/(2π
√
LconvCconv), depending on the converter type, where D, Lconv, and Cconv are the
duty-cycle, inductance, and capacitance of the converter [106]. For example, for the DC
system of Fig. 2.22, 125 Hz is the highest frequency component that can be generated by
transients from the DC/DC converters. Hence, taking into account a 10% security margin,
fd should be higher than 400 Hz. fd should also be different than the switching frequency of
Insulated-Gate Bipolar Transistors (IGBTs), which is 5 kHz in the test system of Fig. 2.22,
and its harmonics. Additionally, fd should be lower than half of the maximum sampling rate
of LCDRs, i.e., the Nyquist frequency, to adhere to the recommended sampling standards.
Currently, commercially available LCDRs can sample up to 8 kHz [66].
On the other hand, given that fd is generated due to the addition of POCs, the relation
between fd and POC parameters should be obtained. By doing so, Cp, and Lp can be
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designed such that the desired fd is generated during faults. In general, fd is a function of
the natural frequency f0 = 1/(2π
√
LpCp) and the damping factor, ζ [104]. For high order
circuits, obtaining the exact relation between ζ, f0, and fd is mathematically intractable.
In Section 5.1.3, it is shown that if f0 for the circuits of Fig. 5.2 is large enough, ζ would
be negligible and fd can be approximated by f0. On the other hand, as stated above, f0
is inversely proportional to Cp and Lp. Therefore, considering all the above-mentioned
criteria, f0 is selected to be 4 kHz, i.e., the upper frequency bound defined earlier, to
maximize f0 and to minimize the footprint and cost of the utilized passive elements. This
selected f0 can be achieved by choosing Cp = 40 µF and Lp = 40 µH. It is worth noting that
any other combinations of Lp and Cp that results in this fd can also be considered. The
state-space analysis performed in Section 5.1.3 proves that selecting the above-mentioned
values for Lp and Cp results in fd ≈ 4 kHz.
5.1.3 Relation between fd and f0
This section shows that if the selected Cp and Lp are small enough, the damping factor
can be ignored, and thus fd can be approximated by f0. To prove the validity of this
approximation, first the state-space models of the circuits of Fig. 5.2 during faults is found
and their eigenvalues are obtained. Then, the fd generated due to POCs is determined.
Afterwards, the sensitivity of fd to fault location and resistance, and to the variation of
different parameters is studied, and the maximum error between fd and f0 during different
cases is investigated. In the following, for the sake of brevity, detailed analysis is presented
only for PG faults, yet the results are presented for both fault types.
To find the state-space model of the faulty line in Fig. 5.2a, the voltages of DC link
capacitors of converters m and n, i.e., vcm and vcn, the currents of DC link capacitors of
converters m and n, i.e., icm and icn, the voltages of POCs installed on the terminals of
converters m and n, i.e., v+POC,m and v
+
POC,n, and the currents of both POCs’ inductors, i.e,
i+POC,m and i
+
POC,n, are chosen as system states and their respective differential equations
are obtained and formed in a matrix form, as follows:
Ẋ = AX (5.1)
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Figure 5.3: Eigenvalues of the system during capacitor discharge stage when a fault with





0 0 0 0 −1
2Cc1
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1
2Cc2
0 0

































0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
Lp

















in which T denotes the transpose operator.
In the next step, the system’s eigenvalues are found, and their behavior is investigated
when system parameters change. The symbolic analysis of poles is intractable, since the
mathematical expressions are large and complicated. Alternatively, this study uses numer-
ical analysis. In order to mimic a typical MVDC line of Fig. 5.1, the cable parameters Rl,
Ll, and Ldc are set as 0.017 Ω/km, 2 mH/km, and 1500 m, respectively. Additionally, 2Ccm
and 2Ccn are set to 10 mF, representing the dc link capacitors of converters m and n. The
POC elements are set as per the designed values, i.e., L = 40 µH and C = 40 µF. Under
a PG bolted fault (Rf = 0 Ω) happening at x = 0.25 from converter m on line m − n,




Figure 5.4: fd generated during PG faults when, (a) only x and Rf change, (b) x, Rf , and
line length (Ldc) change, (c) x, Rf , and converters’ capacitors (Cc1 and Cc2) change, and
(d) x, Rf , and f0 change.
of Fig. 5.2a are equal to (ζ1 = −0.16, fd1 = 4058 Hz) and (ζ2 = −0.06, fd2 = 4006 Hz).
Therefore, given that f0 = 1/
√
LpCp = 4 kHz and alpha is negligible, fd approximately
equals f0.
To assess the effect of various fault and system parameters on fd during PG faults,
a sensitivity analysis is conducted (Fig. 5.4). Fig. 5.4a shows fd generated during PG
faults, where Rf and x range from 0 to 300 Ω and 0 to 1, respectively: fd changes between
3979 and 4018.5 Hz during different fault scenarios, where the maximum fd is generated
when the fault happens at x = 0.5 and Rf = 0 Ω. Thus, approximating fd by f0 causes
maximum 0.46% error during PG faults. Additionally, the effect of line length on fd should
be investigated. To this aim, the original line length (1.5 km) is multiplied by a multiplier
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k ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and for each k, (fd)s are obtained and plotted
for all fault scenarios. As Fig. 5.4b illustrates, fd for each line length remains almost the
same, with the maximum fd attained during a fault with 0 Ω resistance at the middle of the
line. Moreover, the longer the line, the more accurate the approximation of fd by f0 would
be. For example, for k = 0.5 and k = 5, the maximum errors are 1% and 0.1%, respectively.
Similarly, the sensitivity of fd during PG faults to variation of converters’ capacitors (Cc1
and Cc2) should be investigated as well. To do so, converters’ capacitors are multiplied by
the defined k multipliers, and (fd)s are obtained and plotted for each k during all fault
scenarios. As Fig. 5.4c shows, converters’ capacitors do not affect fd during faults, and
the maximum attained error between fd and f0 for all fault scenarios is 0.46%. Finally,
Fig. 5.4d investigates the effect of selecting different (f0)s on the approximation error.
To this aim, Lp and Cp are multiplied by the defined k multipliers, which is equivalent
to multiplying f0 by 1/k. The (fd)s generated during all fault scenarios are obtained and
plotted in Fig. 5.4d: (fd)s during all fault scenarios are very close to each other for each
k. The approximation error, however, increases when k grows; for example, the maximum
recorded errors between fd and f0 for k = 0.5, 1, and 5 are 0.2%, 0.48%, and 2.5%,
respectively. This figure also confirms that if f0 is large enough, ζ can be ignore, and so
fd ≈ f0.
To do the same analysis for PP faults, the state-space model of the circuit in Fig. 5.2b







POC,n. Hence, fd can be calculated by finding the new
state matrix A and its eigenvalues. Fig. 5.5 investigates the sensitivity of fd during PP
faults to variation of different parameters. Similar to Fig. 5.4a, Fig. 5.5a shows (fd)s
during PP faults with Rf and x, ranging from 0 to 300 Ω and 0 to 1, respectively: fd
changes between 3980 and 4018.5 during different fault scenarios. Thus, approximating
fd by f0 creates a maximum 0.5% error during various PP faults. Fig. 5.5b investigates
the effect of different line lengths on the fd generated during PP faults. To this aim, the
defined k multipliers for PG faults are multiplied by the original line length (1.5 km), and
for each k, fd is obtained during various fault scenarios: for each k, fd remains almost the
same and very close to f0 during all faults, and the approximation error decreases when k
grows. For example, the maximum error of 1% occurs for k = 0.5. Fig. 5.5c indicates that




Figure 5.5: fd generated during PP faults when, (a) only x and Rf change, (b) x, Rf , and
line length (Ldc) change, (c) x, Rf , and converters’ capacitor (Cc1 and Cc2) change, and
(d) x, Rf , and f0 change.
PG faults—and a maximum error of 0.5% occurs for all values of k. Finally, Fig. 5.5d
investigates the effect of selected f0 on the approximation error. To obtain this figure, Lp
and Cp are multiplied by the defined k multipliers, which is equivalent to multiplying f0 by
1/k. As this figure shows, during all faults, fd does not change much for each k. However,
the smaller the k, the lower the the approximation error, as previously concluded for PG
faults as well. For instance, the maximum recorded errors between fd and f0 for k = 0.5,
1, and 5 are 0.2%, 0.5%, and 2.4%, respectively. Thus, as previously concluded for PG
faults, the larger the f0, the less the error between fd and f0.
In conclusion, the analytical discussion and the sensitivity analysis presented in Sec-
tions 5.1.1, 5.1.2, and 5.1.3 show that fd, i.e., the frequency of the damped sinusoidal
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component generated by POCs during PG and PP faults, approximately equals f0, which
is independent from the system parameters and fault-conditions. Therefore, detecting fd
can be used to verify the pickup of LCDRs and detect cyber-attacks.
5.1.4 fd Detection for Attack Diagnosis
As discussed in the previous section, generation of fd can be used by the attack-detection
submodule of LCDRs to verify the occurrence of faults and differentiate them from attacks.
To detect fd locally and determine the magnitude of the component that oscillates with this
frequency, LCDRs can examine frequency content of the voltage across their local POCs
using the FFT. To this aim, FFT computations are performed online, at each sampling
instance, and are based on a sampled data window of the preceding input signal cycle. The
length of the window should at least represent a period of 1/fd. On this basis, for a DC
LCDR protecting a line connected to Bus b, the pickup for pole p ∈ {+,−} is validated
and a trip signal is sent to corresponding circuit breakers if the FFT element incorporated
in the attack-detection submodule detects a component, with the frequency of fd, whose
magnitude satisfies the following equation:
V pFFT,b > tr
p
b (5.3)
where V pFFT,b is the magnitude of the component with the frequency of fd obtained from
the voltage across the POC installed at Bus b on pole p, and trpb is its associated threshold.
On the other hand, a cyber-attack is flagged and an LCDR’s trip signal is blocked if the
LCDR picks up and (5.3) is not met. The tripping logic of LCDRs after implementing the
proposed method is illustrated in Fig. 5.6. The attack detection threshold in Fig. 5.6 and
(5.3) should be found so as to minimize false attack detection during internal faults. The
procedure for determining this threshold is explained in Section 5.2.
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Figure 5.6: Tripping logic for each pole after implementing the proposed method.
5.2 Performance Evaluation
This section first determines thresholds associated with positive and negative poles for the
LCDRs of Line 2-5 in the DC system of Fig. 2.22, and then investigates the performance
of the proposed method during steady-state, faults, and cyber-attacks. Simulations are
carried out using the PSCAD/EMTDC program on the test system of Fig. 2.22. To
implement the proposed method as an extra layer of security against cyber-attacks, POCs
are installed on each pole in series with converters, and LCDRs’ tripping logic is modified as
depicted in Fig. 5.6. Additionally, in accordance with the Nyquist criteria, fd is selected to
be equal to half of the sampling frequency, which is considered to be 8 kHz in this chapter
[66]. Thus, fd = 4 kHz is selected by choosing Lp=40 µH and Cp=40 µF, as discussed in
Section 5.1.2.
In the first step, tr+b and tr
−
b must be determined for all LCDRs from POCs’ voltages.
This section explains the procedure only for determining tr+2 and tr
−
2 for the LCDR of Line
2-5 installed on Bus 2 using the voltage across the POCs installed on this Bus, yet the same
procedure can be carried out for the remaining LCDRs. To accurately differentiate between
attacks and faults, and to avoid false-positive and false-negative alarms, tr+2 and tr
−
2 are
selected such that they are (i) smaller than the least V +FFT,2 and V
−
FFT,2 that are generated
during faults occurring on Line 2-5, and (ii) higher than non-fault measurement noise,
which is modeled as white and Gaussian with the SNR of 85 dB [107]. To obtain the least
V +FFT,2 and V
−
FFT,2 during faults, PP and Positive Pole-to-Ground (PPG) high-resistance
far-end faults are simulated on Line 2-5. Considering Rf = 200 Ω as the maximum fault
resistance that could occur, V +FFT,2 = V
−
FFT,2 = 6.5 v are the least values obtained for
these parameters, which are recorded during a 200 Ω PPG fault happening at x = 5%
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from Bus 5 on Line 2-5. Given that the measured error tolerance in commercial protective
devices is often specified as ±5% of the measured value [108], a 5% security margin is also
considered. Thus, tr+2 and tr
−
2 for Line 2-5 are selected equal to 6.1 v. Considering the
above-mentioned noise model and the determined thresholds, the false-negative alarm rate
due to noise, i.e., the probability of |noise| ≥ trp2, is obtained to be practically zero. Thus,
conditions (i) and (ii) are met if tr+2 = tr
−







4 , are obtained to be 6.1 v, 6.1 v, 5.8 v, and 5.9 v, respectively.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed method, this section presents six scenarios:
Scenarios 1 and 2 show how the proposed method thwarts cyber-attacks of Case Study 3
presented in section 2.6.3 of Chapter 2; Scenarios 3 and 4 investigate the effect of fault
parameters; Scenario 5 investigates the effect of installed POCs on VSCs’ transients; and
Scenario 6 evaluates the performance of the proposed method during non-fault events.
• Scenario 1: This scenario shows how the proposed method can detect the FDIA that
targeted Line 2-5 in Case study 3 in Section 2.6.3 of chapter 2, and thus prevent the voltage
collapse happened in that case study. To this aim, this cyber-attack is carried out again;
however, this time, the proposed method has been implemented for LCDRs of Line 2-5,
and the POCs have already been installed on the terminals of the converters of Buses 2
and 5. When the attacker manipulates the remote measurements of Line 2-5, sent from
Bus 2 to Bus 5, the operating point of the LCDR installed at Bus 5 enters the trip zone,
thus it picks up. Yet, as Fig. 5.6 shows, after implementing the proposed method, the
LCDR’s pickup is not adequate to trip Line 2-5, and the proposed method’s verification,
i.e., satisfaction of (5.3), is also required. Fig. 5.7 shows v+POC,5, i.e., the voltage across
the POC of Bus 5’s converter on the positive pole, and the extracted V +FFT,5 from this
voltage: V +FFT,5 does not exceed its associated threshold, so no fault is detected by the
proposed method. The same result is obtained for the negative pole as well. Therefore,
the relay flags a cyber-attack, and the trip signal of the LCDR is blocked. On the other
hand, cyber-attacks cannot fool the proposed method by counterfeiting an V +FFT,5 and/or
V −FFT,5 that satisfies (5.3), since these parameters are obtained locally, and are thus not
attackable.
• Scenario 2: Similar to Scenario 1, this scenario shows how the proposed method
detects the TSA targeted the GPS of Bus 3’s substation in the case study of Section 2.6.3
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Figure 5.7: v+POC,5 and V
+







































Figure 5.8: V +FFT,4 and V
−





in Chapter 2 and prevents tripping of Line 4-3. To this aim, this scenario assumes that the
LCDRs of Line 5-2 are not augmented by the proposed method, so this line is tripped by
a cyber-attack (otherwise, the TSA cannot fool the LCDR installed at Bus 3 into picking
up). As explained in Section 2.6.3, manipulating the time-stamp of measurements sent
from Bus 3 to Bus 4 and tripping Line 2-5 at t = 13 ms move the operating point of Line
4-3’s LCDR installed at Bus 4 into the trip zone, and the LCDR picks up. To trip the
line, however, (5.3) must be met as well. Fig. 5.8 shows V +FFT,4 and/or V
−
FFT,4 during this
cyber-attack: none of these parameters exceed their associated thresholds, so the proposed
method does not detect any fault on Line 3-4. As a result, the relay flags a cyber-attack,
and the trip signal is blocked.
• Scenario 3: This scenario investigates the effect of fault resistance and type on the pro-
posed method’s performance. To this aim, bolted PPG, Negative Pole-to-Ground (NPG),
and PP faults are simulated at x = 0.4 from Bus 5 on Line 5-2. All faults happen at t = 10























Figure 5.9: v+POC,5 and v
+



















































FFT,2 during a PPG fault with Rf = 0 Ω at







proposed method obtains (V pFFT,2)s and (V
p
FFT,5)s from voltages across POCs installed on
Buses 2 and 5. Fig. 5.9 illustrates the voltages across the positive pole’s POCs installed
at Buses 5 and 2—i.e., v+POC,5 and v
+
POC,2, respectively—during the PPG fault: v
+
POC,5 and
v−POC,5 start resonating at right after the fault occurs, and decay completely in about 4
ms. The period of this voltage component is almost 0.24 ms, which is associated with the




FFT,2: these parameters reach their associated
thresholds (6.1 v) in less than a microsecond, so LCDRs of Buses 5 and 2 verify the oc-
currence of a fault on the positive pole very quickly. Fig. 5.10b shows that V −FFT,2 and




5 , i.e., 6.1 v, indicating that no fault has happened on
the negative pole. Thus, the proposed method correctly identifies the fault type. Since
LCDRs picked up and the fault was verified, the LCDRs trip the line. Similarly, Figs.






















































FFT,2 during an NPG fault with Rf = 0 Ω at























































FFT,2 during a PP fault with Rf = 0 Ω at







their thresholds in a fraction of a microsecond if there is a fault on the negative pole, while
V +FFT,5 and V
+
FFT,2 satisfy (5.3) only if a fault happens on the positive pole. To further
investigate the performance of the proposed method, Table 5.1 presents V +FFT,5, V
−
FFT,5,
V +FFT,2, and V
−
FFT,2 during faults with Rf = 0, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 150, and 200
Ω, all at x = 0.4 from Bus 5 on Line 5-2: the larger the Rf , the smaller the magnitude of
the fd component. In all cases, (5.3) is satisfied at maximum 25 µs, and the components
with the frequency of fd decays by more than 90% in less than 4 ms. Thus, the proposed
method correctly and quickly detects faults with various resistances.
• Scenario 4: This scenario investigates the effect of fault location on the proposed
method’s performance. To this aim, PP, PPG, and NPG faults with Rf = 0, 1, and 200 Ω
are simulated at locations x = 0.1, 0.2, · · · , 0.9 from Bus 5 on Line 5-2. Table 5.2 shows
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FFT,2 during various faults in


















0 1032.3 855.8 1032.3 855.6 1032.3 855.7 1032.2 855.8
0.1 909.1 773.8 909.1 773.8 965.8 803.2 965.7 803.2
0.5 712.3 651.6 712.4 651.2 812.1 720.1 812.1 720.0
1 578.5 529.6 578.7 529.9 712.4 651.6 712.4 651.6
5 209.4 187.4 209.4 187.4 352.9 318.8 352.9 318.7
10 115.1 101.9 115.2 101.9 209.4 187.4 209.4 187.4
20 60.8 52.9 60.9 52.9 115.1 101.9 115.1 101.9
50 25.6 21.5 25.7 21.5 49.3 42.5 49.4 42.5
100 13.5 10.9 13.4 10.9 25.6 21.5 25.7 21.6
150 9.4 9.4 9.4 7.5 17.6 14.4 17.6 14.4
200 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.0 13.4 10.9 13.5 10.9
Table 5.2: Maximum obtained V +FFT,5 during PPG and PP faults, and captured V
−
FFT,5
during NPG faults of Scenario 4 (all in volts).
x
PPG NPG PP
0Ω 1Ω 200Ω 0Ω 1Ω 200Ω 0Ω 1Ω 200Ω
0.1 1467.0 637.4 9.2 1466.4 637.1 9.2 1466.7 813.8 16.9
0.2 1343.3 617.8 8.2 1343.1 617.6 8.2 1343.2 766.6 15.3
0.3 1181.7 603.9 7.8 1181.5 603.7 7.8 1181.6 737.4 14.4
0.4 1051.2 582.9 7.3 1051.0 582.8 7.3 1051.1 718.1 13.5
0.5 936.4 554.3 7.3 936.5 555.1 6.9 936.4 681.5 12.7
0.6 845.9 527.7 6.5 846.0 527.7 6.5 846.0 649.2 12.0
0.7 770.3 506.5 6.4 771.0 506.6 6.4 770.5 649.2 12.0
0.8 770.3 490.8 6.5 708.0 491.0 6.5 707.8 649.2 12.4
0.9 684.8 506.7 7.3 685.2 508.5 7.3 685.0 624.7 14.4
(V +FFT,5)s obtained during PPG and PP faults, and (V
−
FFT,5)s captured during NPG faults.
For a certain Rf , the farther the fault location to the POC, the smaller the magnitude of
the fd component; however, the obtained magnitudes in all cases exceed their associated
thresholds in less than 25 µs, indicating that the proposed method correctly and timely
detects faults with various resistances at different locations. Figs. 5.13a and 5.13b show
V +FFT,5 during PP and PPG faults with Rf = 200 Ω and 1 Ω, respectively.
• Scenario 5: This scenario investigates the effect of the proposed method on VSCs’
transients. To this aim, a bolted fault is simulated at x = 0.1 from Bus 5, i.e., a fault
that results in a very high current from Bus 5’s VSC. Fig. 5.14a shows the current of this
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Figure 5.13: V +FFT,5 during (a) PP faults with Rf = 200 Ω, (b) PPG faults with Rf = 1 Ω.
VSC, with and without addition of POCs: the peak current is decreased by 30.7 kA after
installing POCs, which is equivalent to 39% reduction in the maximum fault current, and
the rise time becomes almost half. This happens due to the inductive behavior of POCs in
frequencies lower than f0. Thus, the POCs significantly reduce the risk of damaging IGBTs.
Moreover, the proposed method does not affect the fault current, after the transient period
is passed. To better evaluate the proposed method’s effect on the VSC’s peak current,
Table 5.3 shows the peak current during PP(Rf = 0 Ω) and NPG(Rf = 1 Ω) faults at
different locations, with and without installing POCs. This table also shows the reduction
in the peak current after installing POCs. For both fault types, the higher the current,
the more reduction in the peak current would happen. Additionally, in all cases, the peak
current has been reduced, resulting in less damage to the system during faults. On the
other hand, Fig. 5.14b shows the VSC’s voltage during a bolted PP fault at x = 0.1. This
fault results in the maximum difference between voltage of Bus 5’s VSC in cases of with
and without installing POCs. The VSC’s voltage when POCs are installed undershoots
500 v more and settles down 4 ms later compared to when POCs are not utilized. However,
this is not an issue since the voltage during faults is lower than the nominal voltage.
• Scenario 6: As explained in Section 5.1.1, converters filter transients happening due
to a change in loads or generations. Thus, POCs do not resonate during events that occur
on the other side of interfacing converters. This scenario investigates the performance
of the proposed method implemented in LCDRs of Line 5-2 when (i) the generation of
the PV installed at Bus 2 (the nearest generation unit to Line 5-2) increases by 25%
at time t = 10 ms, and (ii) the load installed at Bus 5 (the nearest load to Line 5-2)
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Figure 5.14: Current and voltage of Bus 5’s VSC during a bolted PP fault at x = 0.1
from Bus 5 on Line 5-2, (a) Positive pole’s current (b) voltage.
Table 5.3: Comparison between the peak current of Bus 5’s VSC during faults, with and
without installing POCs.
x
PP(Rf = 0 Ω) NPG(Rf = 1 Ω)
With Without Peak With Without Peak
POCs (kA) POCs(kA) reduction(%) POCs(kA) POCs(kA) reduction(%)
0.1 47.99 78.65 -38.99 1.41 1.72 -18.33
0.2 35.27 46.54 -24.22 1.22 1.39 -12.69
0.3 27.50 33.39 -17.65 1.02 1.14 -10.04
0.4 22.61 26.21 -13.75 0.81 0.89 -9.67
0.5 19.19 21.65 -11.37 0.78 0.82 -4.36
0.6 16.74 18.51 -9.57 0.72 0.73 -1.46
0.7 14.79 16.13 -8.31 0.71 0.72 -0.95
0.8 13.23 14.30 -7.49 0.705 0.709 -0.49
0.9 12.00 12.90 -6.95 0.701 0.703 -0.28







during the above-mentioned events: in non of the figures, the captured magnitudes for
the component with the frequency of fd exceed the determined thresholds. Therefore, this
scenario confirms that load and generation changes at the other side of converters do not
make POCs resonate.
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Figure 5.15: Magnitude of frequency component oscillating with fd in Scenario 6: (a)








This chapter proposed a method for DC LCDRs to detect cyber-attacks, and to differen-
tiate them from faults. The proposed method installs a POC on each pole in series with
each converter. When a fault occurs in the grid, POCs resonate and a generate a sinusoidal
damped component with a specific frequency. However, this specific frequency component
is not generated by POCs during cyber-attacks, load-changes, and other non-fault events
in the system, and thus it can be regarded as a fault signature. On this basis, the proposed
attack-detection submodule incorporated in DC LCDRs verify the occurrence of faults by
applying FFT to the voltage across POCs and capturing the magnitude of the component
oscillating with this specific frequency. Thus, LCDRs’ pickup without detecting this spe-
cific frequency denotes a cyber-attack. On the other hand, the proposed method cannot
be compromised by FDIAs and TSAs, since the proposed method uses only local measure-
ments, which are not attackable. Numerical analysis confirmed that the proposed method
is system independent. Other salient features of the proposed method are (i) fast decision
time, i.e., less than 25 µs, (ii) sensitivity to faults with resistance up to 200 Ohms, and
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(iii) ability to determine fault types. The proposed scheme was tested on a multi-terminal
DC system under various fault and cyber-attack scenarios.
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Chapter 6
Vulnerability of AGC systems to
Cyber-Attacks: Background,
Problem Statement, and System
Modeling
Chapters 2-4 unveiled a cyber-vulnerability of protection systems and proposed two solu-
tions to address it. This chapter, on the other hand, introduces a vulnerability of control
systems in power networks, and discusses its potential consequences.
Today’s power grids are highly interconnected through a variety of communication
systems for protection, monitoring, and control. One of these communication-dependent
functions is that of AGC, which is carried out by the SCADA center [37]. AGC is the
secondary controller of the LFC system and the only automatic closed loop between the
cyber and physical parts of a power grid [39]. The AGC maintains tie-lines’ powers at their
scheduled values and regulates grid frequency by adjusting the set-points of a power plant’s
governors [109]. To calculate these set-points, the control center in each area receives sensor
readings, i.e., frequency and tie-line power measurements, using communication systems.
The calculated set-points are then sent back to AGCs. Although the AGC is developed
for improving the system operation and economy, its dependence on communication in-
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frastructure makes power systems susceptible to cyber-attacks.
This chapter first briefly explains the AGC system operating principal and alarms in
Section 6.1. Afterwards, Section 6.2 investigates the vulnerability of AGC systems to cyber
attacks, and Section 6.3 demonstrates how FDIAs against AGC systems can be destructive.
Thus, some basic attacks against the AGC system are introduced, and their impacts on
power system operation are studied. Next, Section 6.3.3 formulates and optimizes an SHA
to disrupt normal operation of the AGC system quickly and undetectably. After unveiling
the cyber-vulnerability problem of AGC systems, Section 6.4 introduces the LFC system
state-space model in normal condition and during attacks. To this end, first the state-
space model of the system is obtained for normal conditions. Then, the developed model
is modified to represent the attacked system.
6.1 AGC System’s Operating Principal and Alarms
Fig. 6.1 shows the AGC system architecture for an area of a power system. As shown in
this figure, after receiving measurements, each area’s control center forms an Area Control
Error (ACE) signal and passes it through controllers, which are usually integrators. The
output of the controllers are sent to the power plant as a set-point for governors, every 2
to 4 seconds [36]. The ACE signal of Area i is




where Bi and ∆ωi are Area i ’s frequency bias and angular frequency deviation, respec-
tively; ∆Ptiei,j is the active power deviation of the tie-line that connects areas i and j ; and
δi is the set of areas to which Area i is connected. The ACE signal and system frequency
are permanently controlled, and an alarm is raised to notify the operator if:
• The change of frequency during a 15-second rolling time window exceeds a certain
threshold, e.g., 0.3 Hz for Quebec in Canada [110].
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    Determine ΔPc1    
Communication System
Figure 6.1: AGC system architecture.
• The ACE signal exceeds a predefined threshold, e.g., 0.05 p.u. [2].
• The ACE signal does not return to around zero within 10 minutes [36].
• The average of the ACE signal during 10-minute periods of each hour exceeds a
specific limit, e.g., 5+0.025∆L, where ∆L is the greatest hourly change in the area’s
load during its maximum summer or winter peak load [36].
6.2 Attack Model and Analysis
To regulate a system’s frequency and tie-lines’ power, an AGC receives measurements
using communication system, through Distributed Network Protocol Version 3.0 (DNP3).
This protocol is a part of IEC-60870-5 [112] and is widely deployed by North American
electric utilities [113]. The dependence of the AGC on communication, however, makes
the LFC system vulnerable to cyber-attacks [114]. Additionally, DNP3 vulnerabilities to
cyber-attacks have been demonstrated in various studies [113, 115, 116].
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AGC systems can be targeted by FDIAs and other types of intrusion such as denial-of-
service, malware injection, spoofing, and insider attacks [37]. Although all of these attacks
can impact AGC operation, FDIAs are more destructive, since an FDIA injects incorrect
control or wrong measurements into the AGC data stream to cause undesired operation
of this controller. Consequently, FDIAs can directly affect the frequency, stability, and
economic operation of the grid [37].
6.2.1 Attackers’ Motives and Objectives
As explained before, AGC is the secondary LFC loop with the additional objective of
economic dispatch [36]. This controller operates in a closed automated loop and greatly
depends on communication infrastructure. Since this controller directly adjusts the output
power of generators, it can affect the stability of the system and its economic operation.
Some of the objectives for an attacker to target AGC systems are as follows:
1. Creating frequency instability in the system.
2. Affecting power market by congesting some of the lines.
3. Gaining financial benefit by affecting power markets.
4. Causing financial loss for power networks by decreasing frequency such that under-
frequency load shedding scheme operates.
5. Satisfying curiosity/building reputation, e.g., to increase the attacker’s reputation in
the hackers community
This section focuses on the first objective and shows that targeting AGC can lead to
achieving such an objective.
6.2.2 Assumptions and Attackers’ Capabilities and Constraints
This dissertation considers the following resource constraints and capabilities for attackers
who are aiming to achieve any of the above objectives by targeting AGC systems:
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1. Attackers cannot physically trip generators or initiate under-frequency load shedding
scheme. Without this constraint, it is a trivial exercise to trigger cascading failures
across the power grid.
2. Only some of the generators in each area are controlled by AGC.
3. An attacker’s resources are restricted, so only the AGC system of one of the areas
can be targeted.
4. Attackers can only tamper with remote frequency and tie-line power measurements
by intruding into the communication links or breaking into substations networks.
5. System data including loads, generation, and configuration are available for attackers.
Additionally, an attacker has knowledge about AGC alarms and settings. Selecting
the optimal attack strategy is dependent on accessing this information.
6.3 FDIAs against AGC Systems
The following investigates the effect of FDIAs on AGC systems. All simulations for the
entire section are carried out using MATLAB/Simulink on a three-area power system (Fig.
6.2), whose specifications are given in Appendix C
6.3.1 Over-/under-compensation attacks
During these attacks, the deviation of frequency and tie-line powers from their nominal
values are multiplied by an ACE multiplier m before being sent to the control center.
Therefore, ACEi in (6.1) changes to mi × ACEi, where mi > 1 and 0 6 mi < 1 result in
over- and under-compensation attacks, respectively.
To investigate the behavior of frequency and ACE signal during over-/under-compensation
attacks, assume that the mismatch between the load and generation of Area i in an N -






















Figure 6.2: Single-line diagram of the three-area test system.








∆Ptieij = Bj∆ωi j ∈ δi (6.2b)
If the load changes by ∆PLi in Area i at time step k, substituting ∆ωi and ∆Ptieij from (6.2)
into (6.1) results in ACEi = ∆PLi for Area i, and zero for other areas’ ACE signal [109].
Therefore, Area i ’s AGC system changes the generation of Area i by −ACEki in order to
restore the frequency and tie-line power deviations to zero. However, if an over-/under-
compensation attack initiates, ACEki changes to mi × ACEki = mi∆PLi . As a result, the
generation in Area i changes by −mi∆PLi , instead of −∆PLi . Consequently, the mismatch
between load and generation becomes (1 − mi)∆PLi . In the next time step, the new
ACEi equals ACE
k+1
i = (1−mi)∆PLi before the attacker injects new false measurements.
However, after manipulating the measurements by over-/under-compensation attacks, the
ACE signal becomesmi(1−mi)∆PLi . Therefore, the AGC operation changes the generation
by−mi(1−mi)∆PLi , resulting in (1−mi)2∆PLi mismatch between the load and generation.
The above trend continues in subsequent time steps. The results have been summarized
in Table 6.1. As seen in this table, the over-compensation attack makes the frequency os-
cillate, and the under-compensation attack causes the AGC system to work asymptotically
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(by decreasing the AGC operation speed). Therefore, over-/under-compensation attacks
negatively affect the frequency and the AGC’s normal operation.
Table 6.1: Area i’s Frequency Deviation and ACE Signal During Over-/Under-/Negative-
Compensation Attacks
Time ACEi during (∆PLi −∆PGi ) Frequency deviation
step attack after AGC operation from nominal value
k mi ×ACEki (1−mi)∆PLi −
(1−mi)∆PLi∑N
j=1 Bj







k + η mi(1−mi)η−1ACEki (1−mi)η∆PLi −
(1−mi)η∆PLi∑N
j=1 Bj
The frequency deviations during over-/under-compensation attacks with m1 =0.5, 2 and
1 (i.e., no attack) are shown in Fig. 6.3. The attack targets Area 1 at t=30 s and continues
until t= 100 s. Fig. 6.4 displays the ACE signal of Area 1, which is normalized based on
the active power rating of the generator in this area. As shown in Figs. 6.3 and 6.4, under-
compensation FDIAs do not change the frequency and ACE signal noticeably because
they improve the system’s operation in the same direction as normal AGC operation does,
but less effectively. In contrast, over-compensation FDIAs make the frequency and ACE1
oscillate largely. When the load changes during an over-compensation attack, the AGC
system alters the generation set-points m times more than needed, so deteriorates the
frequency deviations. However, the risk of this attack being detected is high, since the
ACE changes noticeably.
6.3.2 Negative-compensation attacks
These attacks resemble over-/under-compensation attacks, but the ACE multiplier m is
a negative number. Substituting a negative mi in Table 6.1 indicates that such attacks
amplify the expected effect of the AGC on power system operation, but in the reverse direc-
tion. Additionally, smaller values of mi impact frequency profoundly over a shorter time.
These attacks can either increase or decrease system frequency, depending on the ACEki ,
120



















 = -1 m
1
= - 0.1 No Attack m1= 0.5 m1= 2
Figure 6.3: System frequency during over-/under-/negative-compensation attacks.
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Figure 6.4: ACE signal of Area 1 during over-/under-/negative-compensation attacks.
or equivalently ∆PLi , at the attack’s start time. For example, if a negative-compensation
attack targets Area 1’s AGC after a load-increase (-decrease) in Area 1, the frequency
drops (grows), and ACEk1 becomes positive (negative).
Fig. 6.3 shows frequency deviations during negative-compensation attacks with m1 =
−0.1 and −1. These attacks target Area 1 after this area’s load decreases. In both attacks,
frequency increases such that the over-frequency elements of a generators protective relay,
discussed in [117], trip the generators. During these FDIAs, the primary frequency control,
i.e., the governor, does not help in recovering the frequency, because the governor receives
erroneous set-points from the attacked AGC system. In fact, FDIAs effectively shift the
droop characteristic of a governor up or down to affect frequency regulation negatively.
Thus, not only does the governor fail to regulate the frequency when an AGC is attacked,
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but also makes the frequency deviate from its nominal value by trying to follow erroneous
set-points.
As seen in Fig 6.3, during negative-compensation attacks, different values of m1 change
the frequency at different rates, i.e, the smaller m1 is in a negative-compensation attack,
the faster the system becomes unstable. However, as Fig. 6.4 shows, a smaller m1 increases
the absolute value of the ACE signal more than a bigger m1, which is undesirable from
detectability viewpoint. Thus, greater values of m1, e.g., −0.1, can change the frequency
to an extent that frequency relays operate, while |ACE1| is small.
6.3.3 Formulation of an SHA
The SHA presented next can target AGC systems destructively and undetectably, by com-
bining under- and negative-compensation through an optimization process. Instead of a
constant ACE multiplier m, an SHA utilizes a time-variant multiplier mk+si (attack starts
at time step k, and k + s indicates the s-th time-step after its start time). An SHA takes
into account the physical characteristics of the LFC system and existing alarms in the
control center in order to damage the system as fast as possible without being detected.
An SHA is able to either increase or decrease the frequency, depending on the ACE signal
value at the attack’s start time, and consequently can trigger the over-/under-frequency
elements of protective relays. To compute the optimal mk+si , an attacker must have access
to the values of frequency bias B and the AGC controller’s gain. Both parameters can be
estimated by intruding into the communication system and using the frequency and tie-line
power measurements sent to the control center, and the set-points sent to the generators.
Considering the detection alarms discussed in Section 6.1, the multiplier mk+si during
an SHA should be determined for all s ∈ {1, · · · , η} such that
(i) the ACE signal does not exceed its maximum permissible value, ACEmax, i.e.,
− ACEmax 6 ACEk+si 6 ACEmax (6.3)
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Table 6.2: Area i’s ACE and frequency deviation during an SHA
Time step ACEi after manipulation Frequency deviation (∆fi)

















































∣∣∣∣ 6 λ (6.4)
where TAGC is the interval between two successive operations of the AGC, and λ is
the maximum permissible ACE curve’s slope.
(iii) the frequency deviation sent to the control center remains within an acceptable range,
i.e.,
−∆fmax < mk+si ∆fk+si < ∆fmax (6.5)
where ∆fmax is the maximum frequency deviation that does not raise an alarm.






∣∣∣∣ 6 γ (6.6)
where γ is the maximum permissible slope of the frequency curve.





Satisfying conditions (i) to (v) during an SHA guarantees attack’s stealth while the
attacker’s desired frequency is reached. However, to carry out the attack in the shortest
possible time, the SHA must be formulated as an optimization problem to find the optimal
attack multipliers. To this end, Table 6.1 is modified for the case of using time-variant
multipliers mk+si , so Table 6.2 is obtained. Using this table, an SHA against Area i of an
N -area system can be formulated as the following optimization problem that minimizes










subject to: (i) to (v)
(6.8)
where η is the required number of time steps for the attack, which is a function of mki to
mk+ηi , and k represents the time step at which the attack starts. To formulate conditions
(i) to (v) using attack multipliers during the attack, these conditions are represented using
the results in Table 6.2. Condition (i) is rewritten by substituting ACEi from the middle










∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ACEmax s ∈ {1, 2, · · · , η} (6.9)

















∣∣ s ∈ {2, · · · , η} (6.10)
Additionally, given that ACEki before the attack equals ∆PLi , condition (iii) can be rewrit-















∣∣ s ∈ {1, 2, · · · , η} (6.11)
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∣∣ s ∈ {1, 2, · · · , η}
(6.12)













To simulate the proposed SHA for Area 1 of the three-area test system, ACEmax, TAGC ,
λ, ∆fmax, and γ are considered to be 0.05 p.u., 2 s, 0.02 p.u./s, 0.1 Hz, and 0.05 Hz/s,
respectively [36, 2, 111, 110]. The attack starts after a 0.1 p.u. load increase in Area 1.
The target frequency for the end of this attack is set to 62 Hz. Fig. 6.5 illustrates the
real and manipulated frequencies of Area 1 after being targeted by the proposed SHA:
deviation of the frequency received by the control center from 60 Hz is acceptable, but the
real frequency of the system is growing noticeably. This figure also illustrates the real and
manipulated system frequencies if the attack starts after a 0.1 p.u. load decrease in Area
1, and the target frequency at the end of the attack is set to 59 Hz. During this attack, the
frequency decreases, initiating load-shedding schemes. The ACE of Area 1 during the SHA
that increases the frequency is shown in Fig. 6.6: the ACE does not exceed the defined
ACEmax at any time, and its rate of change also is controlled. Therefore, no alarm is raised
and the SHA remains undetected.
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Figure 6.5: The real and manipulated frequencies during an SHA.















Figure 6.6: ACE signal of Area 1 during an SHA that increase the frequency.
6.4 LFC System Modeling
An AGC system deals with relatively small disturbances [118]. Therefore, for LFC stud-
ies, each area of a power network can be represented by a linear model comprised of an
equivalent rotating mass, governors, turbines, and the AGC system. Additionally, the LFC
control loop can be decoupled from the AVR loop, since the AVR system’s time constants
are appreciably smaller than the LFC system’s. Thus, it is possible to consider only the
steady-state operating point of the AVR [119]. Therefore, a linearized model decoupled
from voltage dynamics can be used to detect and identify FDIAs targeting LFC systems















Governor φi +1 Turbine φi +1
Area 1
...
Area (i - 1)





































Area i's tie-line 
power mismatches 
AGC system
tie i , i-1
ΔP
tie i , i+1












tie i , 1
ΔP








2Hi s + De i
1
Tch       s+1
1






T i , 1
s
T i  , i-1
s
T i  , i+1 ΔP
s






























Tch    s + 1
1 , i
1
Tg   s + 1
1 , i
Governor Gi Turbine Gi
1
Tch      s + 1
ΔP v1








Governor φi Turbine φi
1
Tch      s + 1
ΔP v1












Figure 6.7: Linearized model of LFC system for area i.
6.4.1 The State-Space Model of an N -Area LFC System During
Normal Condition
This section first presents the continuous LFC system model for each area during attack-free
conditions, and then it combines the LFC models of all areas to form the state-space model
of the N -area system. Afterwards, the developed model is modified to incorporate noise.
Finally, the continuous models are discretized to accommodate numerical implementation.
The continuous model of the system
The LFC system in each area can be represented by an equivalent linear model shown in
Fig. 6.7 [36, 109]. In this figure, Gi generators are committed in Area i, among which







(∆Pmi −∆Ptiei −∆PLi −Dei∆ωi) (6.14)
where ∆
.
ωi is the derivative of ∆ωi with respect to time; ∆PLi , ∆ωi, Hi and Dei are Area
i ’s load change, angular frequency deviation, equivalent inertia constant, and equivalent
damping coefficient, respectively; and ∆Ptiei and ∆Pmi are the sum of Area i ’s tie-lines’
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where ∆Pmg,i is the mechanical power deviation of the g-th generator in Area i, and ∆Ptiei,j




P tiei,j = Tij (∆ωi −∆ωj) (6.17)
where Tij is the synchronizing power coefficient between areas i and j. Tie-lines can be
either modeled in the state-space equation separately, or as the sum of all tie-line powers.
To restore the frequency to its nominal value, each generator’s governor adjusts its
turbine’s valve position ∆Pvg,i by sensing ∆ωi and power generation set points ∆Pcg,i
using the following equation:
∆
.






∆ωi + ∆Pvg,i −∆Pcg,i
)
(6.18)
where Tgg,i and Rg,i signify the droop coefficient and the governor’s time constant of the
g-th generator. Adjusting ∆Pvg,i controls the mechanical power by regulating the steam










where Tchg,i is the turbine’s time constant of generator g. Meanwhile, assuming that the
g-th generator is equipped with an AGC, its governor’s ∆Pcg,i is tuned by the AGC to make
the generator’s mechanical power track the load changes ∆PLi , and so tie-lines power and
the frequency are regulated. The AGC integrator block receives ACEi as its input and its
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dynamic can be expressed by
∆
.
P cφ,i = −kφ,i × ACEi (6.20)
where kφ,i is the φ-th AGC’s gain. The formation of the ACEi was shown (6.1), in which
the frequency bias is






However, if a generator is not controlled by an AGC, its governor set-point, ∆Pcg,i , is a
known input to the system.
To find the state-space model of Area i, the following parameters are selected as this
area’s states: ∆ωi, ∆Ptiei , ∆Pmg,i and ∆Pvg,i for all generators, and ∆Pcg,i for generators
that are controlled by the AGC system. Instead of using ∆Ptiei , it is also possible to
consider each tie-line power as a system state individually. The system’s known inputs are
∆Pcg,i for all generators that are controlled manually. ∆PLi is the unknown input for Area
i. As an example, considering ∆Ptiei as a system state, the state-space equation of Area 1
of the three-area power system introduced in Appendix I is given by
.




In the above equation, Uu,1(t) and Un,1(t) are the unknown and known inputs of Area 1,
which are ∆PL1 and ∆Pc1,1 , respectively. Additionally, all the elements of A1j ∈ R7×7 are
zero, except the element at row 1 and column 2, which is −T1j. This element is multiplied
by ∆ωj. The other parameters in (6.22) are

























































As seen in (6.23), other areas’ state variables are involved in Area 1’s state-space model.
These variables are received by the communication system to form the ACE1.
In addition to the state-space equation of (6.22), the output equation of each area
must be determined. Each system output is a physical measurable quantity that can be
modeled by a linear combination of system states and inputs. For example, the outputs of
each area can be considered as ∆Pcg,i for generators that are controlled by the AGC, ∆ωi,
and ∆Ptiei . These states are all related to the AGC system and are already available in
control centers. Using these parameters, Area 1’s output equation in the three-area test
system is as follows
Yi(t) = CiXi(t) (6.24)
where Yi(t) is the output vector of Area i, and Ci is the output matrix relating the state




1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1

 (6.25)
In the case of modeling each tie-line power individually as a system state, all tie-line powers
can be considered as system outputs as well.
Using matrices Aii, Aij, Bn,i, Bu,i, and Ci and vectors Xi, Uu,i, and Un,i in (6.22), (6.23)
and (6.24) for all areas i ∈ {1, · · ·N}, the state-space model of an N -area power system in
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the absence of FDIAs can be obtained using [120]:
.
X (t) = AcX (t) + Bc,uUu (t) + Bc,nUn (t) (6.26a)
Y(t) = CX(t) (6.26b)
in which X (t) ∈ Rn and Y (t) ∈ Rp are the state and output vectors, defined as
X =
[





YT1 YT2 . . . YTN
]T
(6.27b)
Moreover, Uu (t) ∈ RN and Un (t) ∈ Rm in (6.26) represent the unknown and known input
vector, which include all areas’ load-change and the governor set-points of all manually
controlled generators, respectively, and are expressed by
Uu =
[





∆Pc1,1 · · · ∆Pcψ1,1 · · · ∆Pc1,N · · · ∆PcΦN,N
]T
(6.28b)
where Φi represents the number of generators controlled by AGC systems in area i. Other
parameters in (6.26), i.e., Ac ∈ Rn×n, Bc,u ∈ Rn×N , Bc,n ∈ Rn×m, and C ∈ Rp×n are the
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To take into account the effect of noise, the process and measurement noise vectors—
which are zero-mean, independent, white, and Gaussian—are added to the system model.
Thus, the state-space representation of an N -area power system in the presence of Noise
is given by
.
X (t) = AcX (t) + Bc,uUu (t) + Bc,nUn (t) + Wc(t) (6.30a)
Y (t) = CX (t) + Vc(t) (6.30b)
where Wc(t)∈ Rn and Vc(t)∈ Rp are the noise vectors with covariance matrices Qc(t)∈ Rn×n
and Rc(t)∈ Rp×p, respectively. The covariance matrices Qc(t) and Rc(t) indicate how the
elements of Wc(t) and Vc(t) are correlated with each other and how they are spread around
their mean values. Therefore, they are required for modeling noise.
Discretization of the Continuous Model
For implementation using digital computers, matrices Ac, Bc,u and Bc,n in (6.26) and (6.30)
are discretized using









where Ts is the discretization time step [79]. Thus, using (6.26) and (6.31), the discretized
model of an N -area power system in the absence of FDIAs and noise is
X [k + 1] = AX [k] + BuUu [k] + BnUn [k] (6.32a)
Y [k] = CX [k] (6.32b)
where X [k] ∈ Rn, Uu [k] ∈ RN , Un [k] ∈ Rm, and Y [k] ∈ Rp are the state, unknown input,
known input, and output vectors at time step k, respectively. Similarly, discretization of
(6.30) using (6.31) results in
X [k + 1] = AX [k] + BuUu [k] + BnUn [k] + W [k] (6.33a)
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Y [k] = CX [k] + V [k] (6.33b)
where W[k] and V[k] are noise vectors at time step k, whose covariance matrices Q[k] and
R[k] are obtained by discretizing Qc(t) and Rc(t).
In the rest of this thesis, (6.32) and (6.33) are used for representing the LFC system
model in the absence and presence of noise during normal conditions.
6.4.2 The State-Space Model of an N -Area LFC system during
FDIAs
In this section, FDIAs against the frequency and tie-line power measurements are modeled
by adding appropriate attack inputs to the LFC system, as shown in Fig. 6.7. These
inputs are represented by hT1,i to hTN ,i for tie-line power measurements of Area i, and by
hf,i for frequency measurements. When the AGC system is targeted, attack inputs hT1,i to

















Since only AGC measurements can be targeted in LFC systems, all other state equations
in (6.14)-(6.19) remain unchanged. Using (6.34) and (6.14)-(6.19), Area i during an FDIA
can be modeled by
.
Xi (t) = AiiXi (t) + Bu,iUu,i (t) + Bn,iUn,i (t) +
∑
j∈δi
AijXj (t) + Bhc,iHi (t) (6.35)
where Hi(t) is the attack vector expressed by
Hi (t) =
[
hT1,i hT2,i · · · hTN ,i hf,i
]T
(6.36)
and Bhc,i is the attack matrix that relates the attack vector to the states. For example, for
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Meanwhile, the output equation during an FDIA remains unchanged, as in (6.26b) or
(6.30b) depending on noise being modeled or not. If noise is not considered, the addition
of Bhc,iHi(t) to (6.26a) during an FDIA changes this equation to
.
X (t) = AcX (t) + Bc,uUu (t) + Bc,nUn (t) + BhcH(t) (6.38)
where Bhc ∈ Rn×z and H ∈ Rz are the attack matrix and vector, defined as follows:
Bhc = diag
[





HT1 (t) HT2 (t) · · · HTN (t)
]T
(6.39b)
To find the discretized system model during attacks, (6.38) should be discretized. The dis-
cretization of Ac, Bc,n, and Bc,u was already explained in (6.31), and Bhc can be discretized
by substituting it with Bc,u in (6.31b), resulting in Bh. Therefore, using (6.38), (6.31),
and (6.30b), the discretized state equation of an N -area power system without considering
noise in the presence of FDIAs can be expressed by
X [k + 1] = AX [k] + BuUu [k] + BnUn [k] + BhH [k] (6.40a)
Y [k] = CX [k] (6.40b)
With the same procedure, the discretized state equation of an N -area power system in the
presence of noise and FDIAs can be expressed by
X [k + 1] = AX [k] + BuUu [k] + BnUn [k] + BhH [k] + W [k] (6.41a)
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Y [k] = CX [k] + V [k] (6.41b)
In the rest of this thesis, (6.40) and (6.41) are used for representing the LFC system model
during FDIAs in the absence and presence of noise, respectively.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter first briefly explained the AGC system operating principal and alarms. Addi-
tionally, it investigated vulnerabilities of AGC systems to cyber attacks, and demonstrated
how FDIAs against AGC systems can be destructive. On this basis, some basic attacks
against the AGC system were introduced, and their impacts on power system operation
were studied. Afterwards, an SHA was formulated and optimized to disrupt the normal
operation of AGC systems quickly and undetectably. This chapter also introduced the
LFC system state-space model in normal condition and during attacks.
135
Chapter 7
Attack Detection and Identification
for Automatic Generation Control
Systems
Chapter 6 unveiled the vulnerability of AGC systems to cyber attacks and showed how
FDIAs against this controller can endanger the integrity of the entire system. To address
this problem, this chapter proposes an anomaly-based attack-detection and -identification
method for protecting the AGC system against cyber vulnerabilities. The proposed method
in this chapter does not consider the effect of noise, and can be implemented within control-
center computing facilities to check the authenticity of frequency and tie-line power mea-
surements sent to the AGC system, before they are used for control purposes. To detect
attacks, the proposed method estimates the LFC system’s states using a UIO and remote
frequency and tie-line power measurements, and calculates the UIO’s RF. A discrepancy
between the RFs and a predefined threshold signifies an FDIA. The proposed method
also utilizes different identification UIOs to determine the attack type, i.e., which system
parameter(s) is (are) targeted by the attack.
The proposed method can run in parallel with network-based techniques, such as en-
cryption techniques, which use a system’s cyber characteristics and constitute the first
layer of security. However, encryption methods are not sufficient to ensure cyber-security
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for all conditions, and their vulnerabilities have been demonstrated in various publications
[121, 122, 123]. Additionally, if attackers circumvent encryption and intrude into the sys-
tem, these methods are unable to detect malicious activities. Thus, the proposed method
works differently from encryption techniques, since the latter reduce attack likelihood by
preventing illegitimate users from entering the system, while the former detects attacks if
they pass through the first layer of security.
This chapter first develops a UIO for LFC systems in Section 7.1. Afterwards, Section
7.2 discusses the proposed attack-detection and -identification schemes for AGC systems.
Section 7.3 then evaluates the performance of the proposed method using simulation results
for a three-area power system and the 39-bus New England network. Finally, Section 7.4
concludes this chapter.
7.1 Development of a UIO for LFC Systems
This section uses a UIO, which was previously introduced in Section 3.2, for estimating
the states of the LFC system based on (6.32). As explained before, a UIO estimates a
system’s states without requiring its unknown inputs, using only the system outputs and
initial states [80, 124]. Therefore, as the real-time load is not normally available in power
systems, UIOs are appropriate tools for estimating the states of the LFC system. Moreover,
as will be shown in Section 7.2.2, this independence from inputs makes a UIO useful for
attack identification, thus facilitating attack mitigation.
The design procedure for the UIO is similar to what explained in Section 3.2, but with
some minor modifications. This section thus explains only the modifications. To develop
a UIO for (6.32), the system outputs given by this equation for the duration of the UIO’s
window, i.e., from k to k + α, should be organized in matrix form, as follows
Y [k : k + α] = OαX [k] + Jn,αUn [k : k + α] + Ju,αUu [k : k + α] (7.1)
In this relation,
Y [k : k + α] =
[
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Op×m Op×m · · · Op×m









Uu [k : k + α] =
[
Uu [k]T Uu [k + 1]T · · · Uu [k + α]T
]T
(7.2e)
Un [k : k + α] =
[
Un [k]T Un [k + 1]T · · · Un [k + α]T
]T
(7.2f)
The UIO’s equation is selected as in (3.8). Therefore, the UIO’s error for LFC systems,
i.e., e [k + 1] = X̂[k + 1]− X[k + 1], is as follows:
e [k + 1] = (A− LOα)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A′
e [k] + LJu,αUu [k : k + α]− BuUu [k] (7.3)
As a result, the explained accuracy condition in Section 3.2.1 is met for LFC systems and




Bu On×N · · · On×N
]
(7.4)
Theorem 4 showed that there is an L that satisfies (7.4) if (7.5) is satisfied [81].
rank (Ju,α)− rank (Ju,α−1) = N (7.5)
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Theorem 4. There is a matrix L that satisfies (3.11) if and only if (3.12) is satisfied. 
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 3.2.1.
Equation (7.5) indicates a necessary condition for developing a UIO for an LFC system.
In other words, if this condition is not met, it will not be possible to estimate the states
of a system without requiring its unknown inputs.
Theorem 5. Regardless of the number of areas and generators under AGC control in each
area, an LFC system satisfies condition (7.5), therefore the system is invertible/observable
and its states can be estimated by a UIO. 
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix D.
As shown in Appendix D, α = 2 satisfies condition (7.5) for LFC systems. Additionally,
as Theorem 2 proved, an L in the following form satisfies (7.4):
L = [L1 L2]×Q (7.7)
in which L2 = Bu, L1 is a free n × (α − 1)N matrix from the perspective of the UIO’s







As explained in Section 3.2.2, L1 can be used to stabilize the UIO. Substituting L from
(7.7) into A′ in (7.3) and decomposing QOα into two sub-matrices S1 and S2, with (α−1)N
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and N rows, respectively, result in
A′ = (A− BuS2)− L1S1 (7.9)







= n+N, ∀z ∈ C, |z| > 1 (7.10)
in which C is the set of all complex numbers.
Theorem 6. Regardless of the number of areas and generators under AGC control in each
area, the condition given by (7.10) is satisfied for the state-space equation of LFC systems,
given in (6.40), when α = 2. 
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3.
Therefore, there exists an L1 that stabilizes the UIO. The procedure for designing such
an L1 is explained in Section 3.2.2. Once L1 is designed, the UIO’s gain is available and,
and the system states can be estimated.
7.2 Proposed Detection and Identification Schemes
7.2.1 Attack Detection Scheme
As shown in Section 6.4.2, during an FDIA, a new terms is added to the system model
in (6.32), resulting in (6.40). The addition of this terms adds a new term to the system
outputs, Yk:k+α in (7.1):
Ỹ [k : k + α] = Y [k : k + α] +MαH [k : k + α] (7.11)
where Ỹ [k : k + α] is the system outputs vector under an FDIA, and H [k : k + α] andMα
are
H [k : k + α] =
[
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CAα−2Bh CAα−3Bh · · · Op×z Op×z




If no attack occurs, all elements ofH [k : k + α] are zero, and so Y [k : k + α] and Ỹ [k : k + α]
become equal. However, during FDIAs, these two matrices differ. As L is designed accord-
ing to (7.4) such that LJu,αUu [k : k + α] − BuUu [k] = 0, the UIO’s error during FDIAs
changes from (7.3) to
e [k + 1] = A′e [k] + LMαH [k : k + α]− BhH [k] (7.13)
It is evident from (7.13) that a UIO’s error deviates from zero in the event of an FDIA,
resulting in inaccurate state estimation. This inaccuracy can be used for detecting attacks
by defining the following RF:
r [k] = Y [k]− CX̂ [k] (7.14)
where Y [k] is the measured outputs of the system, represented by (6.32b). Therefore, By
substituting Y [k] into (7.14), r [k] is equal to Ce [k], which approaches zero in the absence
of FDIAs. However, r [k] grows during FDIAs due to the addition of non-zero terms
LMαH [k : k + α] and BhH [k] to r [k]. Therefore, attacks can be detected by monitoring
the RF and comparing it with a predefined threshold, tr∗. In other words, an attack has
occurred if
‖r [k]‖ > tr∗ (7.15)
where tr∗ is the detection threshold, which is a unit-less number, and operator ||.|| de-
termines the norm of vectors. This threshold should be found so as to minimize false
attack-detection during non-attack conditions, e.g., existence of noise, load changes, and
system disturbances. The procedure for determining this threshold will be explained in
Section 7.3.
In the rest of this chapter, the UIO designed based on (6.32), (7.14), and (7.15) is called
the Main UIO and is used for detecting FDIAs against AGC systems.
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7.2.2 Type Identification Scheme
The method presented in Section 7.2.1 can only detect FDIAs, not identify their types.
Identification helps to mitigate attacks more quickly by indicating which sensor measure-
ments have been targeted. To identify attacks, possible attack types and their correspond-
ing distribution matrix Bh should be determined, as per Section 6.4.2. Then, assuming
that z is the number of possible attacks targeting the system, z separate type-identification
UIOs should be designed using (6.40). Each UIO is associated with one of the attack inputs










Y [k] = CX [k]
(7.16)
where B−jh is an n × (z − 1) matrix that includes all columns of Bh except the j -th one,
and H−j [k] is a (z− 1)× 1 vector that comprises all elements of H [k] except the j -th one.
The input vector
[
Uu [k]T (H−j [k])
T
]T
in (7.16) is unknown. Designing the j -th UIO
yields a UIO that is insensitive to all attacks associated with H [k], except the j -th attack.
Therefore, if any attack associated with H−j [k] happens, the j -th UIO’s RF does not
increase since such attacks and their impacts on the system are modeled in the j -th UIO’s
state-space equations, as shown in (7.16). However, the occurrence of the attack respective
to the j -th element of H [k] increases the j -th UIO’s RF, since this UIO is designed based




X [k + 1] = AX [k] +
[
Bu B−jh
] [ Uu [k]
H−j [k]
]
+ BjhHj [k] + BnUn [k]
Y [k] = CX [k]
(7.17)
in which Bjh denotes the j -th column of Bh, respectively, and Hj [k] denotes the j -th element
of H [k].
In this method, attacks associated with the j -th input of H [k] are modeled in all
identification UIO’s except in the j -th UIO. Consequently, if the j -th attack occurs, only
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the RF of the j -th UIO increases. Therefore, the j -th attack can be identified if the RF of
the Main UIO and the j -th UIO exceed their thresholds, i.e.,
‖r [k]‖ > tr∗ and ‖rj [k]‖ > tr∗j (7.18)
where rj [k] and tr
∗
j are the j -th UIO’s RF and its threshold.
The designed UIOs are able to identify attacks. However, if any non-attack event—such
as a fault—happens, the RFs of all of them increase, since other events are not modeled
in these UIOs’s state-space equations. Therefore, it is impossible to understand whether
all AGC parameters are targeted or a non-attack event is in progress. To address this
shortcoming, another UIOs that includes all attack inputs in its model is designed based










Y [k] = CX [k]
(7.19)
Since this UIO includes all possible attack inputs, the RF of this UIO does not increase
during attacks. However, if any non-attack event, such as a fault, happens, the RF of this
UIO increases.
For example, there are three attack inputs for Area 1 of the three-area power system
mentioned in Chapter 6. Thus, three UIOs should be designed for this area, as denoted in
Table 7.1 by UIOs A to C. In this table, hT2,1, hT3,1, and hf,1 are attack inputs that represent
FDIAs targeting ∆Ptie1,2 , ∆Ptie1,3 , and ∆f1, respectively. The state-space equation of each
UIO models the attack inputs shown in column 2. Hence, each UIO’s model in Table 7.1
includes a combination of FDIAs that can target the parameters presented in column 4.
The unknown inputs of each UIO are the attack inputs associated with that UIO as well
as the system unknown input vector Uu [.]. As a result of this design, when Area 1 is
targeted, the RF of UIO A does not increase for its respective attacks, since its state-space
equation includes those attacks in its model as unknown inputs. In other words, the RF
of UIO A increases only if the power measurements of the tie-line connecting Areas 1 and
2 are targeted. As a result, if the RFs of the main UIO and UIO A increase over their
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thresholds, it signifies that measurements associated with ∆Ptie1,2 are being manipulated.
Table 7.1: UIOs for Area 1 of the Three-Area Power System
UIO
Considered unconsidered Parameters whose parameter whose Unknown
inputsattack input(s) attack input(s) attacks are modeled attack is not modeled
A hT3,1, hf,1 hT2,1 ∆Ptie1,3 , ∆f1 ∆Ptie1,2 hT3,1, hf,1, ∆PL1 ,Uu
B hT2,1, hf,1 hT3,1 ∆Ptie1,2 , ∆f1 ∆Ptie1,3 hT2,1, hf,1, ∆PL1 ,Uu
C hT2,1,hT3,1 hf,1 ∆Ptie1,2 , ∆Ptie1,3 ∆f1 hT2,1, hT3,1, ∆PL1 ,Uu
D hT2,1,hT3,1, hf,1 - ∆Ptie1,2 , ∆Ptie1,3 ,∆f1 - hT2,1, hT3,1, hf,1, ∆PL1 ,Uu
Table 7.2: Identification Logic for Area 1 of The Three-Area Test System
Targeted parameter(s)
RF increase for UIOs
A B C D
hT2,1 X - - -
hT3,1 - X - -
hf,1 - - X -
hT2,1, hT3,1 X X - -
hT2,1, hf,1 X - X -
hT3,1, hf,1 - X X -
hT2,1, hT3,1, hf,1 X X X -
Other events, such as faults X X X X
Using UIOs designed in Table 7.1, attacks are identified according the RF-increase for
the UIOs, as indicated in Table 7.2. For example, in Table 7.2, an increase in the RFs of
UIOs B, C, accompanied by less-than-threshold RFs for the rest of the UIOs, indicates that
hT3,1 and hf,1 are targeted. Similarly, a simultaneous increase in the RFs of UIOs A to C,
while the RF of UIO D is less than its threshold, indicates that all three parameters—i.e.,
hT2,1, hT3,1, and hf,1—are targeted. Additionally, as shown in Table 7.2, UIO D ’s RF does
not increase during any attack, since its state-space model includes all possible attacks
inputs as unknown inputs. Based on this design, the RF of UIO D does not increase
during normal conditions or modeled FDIAs. Therefore, any increase in the RF of this
UIO signifies other abnormal non-attack events, such as faults.
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7.3 Performance evaluation
This section investigates the performance of the proposed method on 39-bus New England
and the three-area test systems.
7.3.1 Three-Area Test System
The specifications of this test system is given in Appendix C. There are two generators in
each area of this system. Thus, including each tie-line separately in state-space equation,
the number of states in each area is 8. Moreover, the number of known and unknown
inputs for each area is 1 and 1, and the number of outputs is 4.
As explained in Section 7.2, FDIAs targeting the power and frequency measurements of
Area 1 in the test system are modeled by attack inputs hT2,1, hT3,1, and hf1 . Three similar
attack inputs are defined for each other areas as well. The AGC system operates every
2 seconds [36]. Before the attacks start, all attack inputs are zero and the ACE signal
is calculated as shown in (6.1). However, the attack inputs become non-zero following
the attacks’ inception, and thus the ACE signal becomes as shown in (6.34). Using the
procedure elaborated in Section V-B, four identification UIOs are designed for each area,
whose specifications are summarized in Table 7.1.
To detect and identify cyber-attacks, thresholds tr∗ and tr∗j (j = A, . . . , D) in (7.15)
and (7.18) must be found—as explained in Section 7.2—such that false-positive and false-
negative alarms are minimized. Load change does not affect these thresholds because
they are unknown inputs in all UIOs, and thus their effects are eliminated. Therefore,
these thresholds are determined in the presence of process and measurements noise, and
parameter uncertainties. In order to consider the effect of noise on LFC systems, (6.41)
is used to model noise, which is represented by its mean and covariance. The process
noise added to each area’s state equations in (6.41) is zero-mean and Gaussian with the
covariance matrix of Cov1 = 0.03 × diag
[
1 1 0.03 1 1 1 1 1
]
, i.e., the covariance
of the noise corresponding to the frequency is 0.009 and the covariance of the noise cor-
responding to other parameters is 0.03 [125]. Similarly, the measurement noise affecting
each area’s outputs in (6.41) is zero-mean and Gaussian with the covariance matrix of
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Cov2 = 0.03 × diag
[
1 1 0.03 1
]
[125]. in addition to load changes and measurement
and process noise, parameter uncertainties are also factored in. This uncertainty is modeled
for each parameter by a percentage error that is normally distributed around zero, with
5% standard deviation. To obtain the above-mentioned thresholds, the designed UIOs’
RFs were recorded for 1000 seconds in the presence of noise and by considering param-
eter uncertainties during normal condition. The largest recorded RF for each UIO plus
a 20% security margin was assigned to the threshold of that UIO. Afterwards, to verify
the obtained thresholds, the above-mentioned procedure was repeated two more rounds,
each for 1000 seconds. If the obtained thresholds in the test rounds are greater than the
initial ones, the initial thresholds are replaced by the larger recorded ones. This proce-
dure was continued until the test rounds verified the obtained thresholds, and resulted in
tr∗ = 0.6 and tr∗j = 0.7. As an example, Fig. 7.1 illustrates the Main UIO’s RF with and
without noise for 200 seconds: without noise, the Main UIO’s RF is zero; however, when
measurements are noisy, its RF increases.



















Figure 7.1: Main UIO’s RF, (a) Without noise, (b) With noise.
The following scenarios are carried out against Area 1:
• Scenario 1: The SHA introduced in Section 6.3.3 targets the frequency and both
tie-line power measurements of Area 1. This attack starts at t=30 s and lasts until t=200
s. The measurements are manipulated such that conditions (6.3)-(6.7) are satisfied. As
Fig. 7.2 illustrates, the RFs of all detection and identification UIOs exceed their thresholds
since this kind of attack multiplies ∆f1, ∆Ptie12 , and ∆Ptie13 by m
k
1. With a similar pattern
to frequency deviations in Fig. 6.5, as the attack starts, the RF of the detection and
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identification UIOs increase (with a small rate at the beginning and faster ones afterwards,
until they become constant). Therefore, the proposed method correctly identifies that all
three measurements for Area 1 are attacked.











































Figure 7.2: Scenario 1’s RFs, (a) Main UIO, (b) UIO A, (c) UIO B, (d) UIO C.
• Scenario 2: The AGC system is targeted by an over-compensation attack, in which
∆f1, ∆Ptie12 , and ∆Ptie13 are all multiplied by mk,1 =1.002. The reason for selecting such
a small attack multiplier is to show how small manipulations can affect the main and
identification UIOs’ RFs. The attack starts at t = 30 s and lasts until t = 200 s. The
results of this scenario are shown in Fig. 7.3: as the attack starts, the RFs of all UIOs
exceeds the detection and identification thresholds, signifying that all measurements are
manipulated. since the attack multiplier in this scenario is very close to one, the increase
in this scenario’s RFs is less than in Scenario 1.
• Scenario 3: The measured frequency is manipulated and decreased by 0.12 Hz between
t= 30 and t= 120 s. Fig. 7.4 shows the RFs of the Main UIO, as well as UIOs A, B, and
C for this scenario: the RFs of the Main UIO and UIO C surpass their thresholds during
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Figure 7.3: Scenario 2’s RFs, (a) Main UIO, (b) UIO A, (c) UIO B, (d) UIO C.
this interval, signifying that frequency measurements are targeted. In addition, the RFs
of UIOs A and B do not increase, as their corresponding attacks are inactive.
• Scenario 4: The attacks corresponding to UIOs A and B are active, and each tie-line
power measurement is increased by 5% during 30 6 t 6 120 s. Fig. 7.5 shows that the
RFs of the Main UIO as well as UIOs A and B exceed their thresholds during the attack,
but the RF of UIO C remains small, as its corresponding attack is inactive. As a result,
the proposed scheme is able to detect and identify FDIAs and also determine their start
and end times.
7.3.2 39-Bus New England Test System
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed method using 39-bus New Eng-
land system, whose specifications can be found in Appendix A. The generators that are
controlled by AGC and the tie-lines between the three areas of this system are shown in
Fig. 7.6. For each area, governor and turbine time constants as well as droop and damping
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Figure 7.4: Scenario 3’s RFs, (a) Main UIO, (b) UIO A, (c) UIO B, (d) UIO C.
coefficients have been considered similar to those of the three-area test system (Table C.2).
Additionally, the same protective relays as in the three-area system with the same settings
have been used for the 39-bus New England network as well.
Areas 1, 2, and 3 include 3, 6, and 1 generators, resulting in 13, 23, and 7 states for
these areas, respectively. The number of unknown inputs for each area is 1, which is that
area’s load change, and the known inputs in each area are the set-point of the generators
that are controlled manually. The number of attack inputs for Areas 1 to 3 are 4, 5, and
4, respectively. As a result, 5, 6, and 5 identification UIOs must be designed for these
areas, respectively. For example, using the procedure elaborated in Section 7.2.2, five
identification UIOs are designed for Area 3, as follows:
• UIO E, identifies FDIAs targeting the power measurement of the tie-line that con-
nects Buses 5 and 8.
• UIO F, identifies FDIAs targeting the power measurement of the tie-line that con-
nects Buses 7 and 8.
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Figure 7.5: Scenario 4’s RFs, (a) Main UIO, (b) UIO A, (c) UIO B, (d) UIO C.
• UIO G, identifies FDIAs targeting the power measurement of the tie-line that con-
nects Buses 1 and 2.
• UIO H, identifies FDIAs targeting Area 3’s frequency.
• UIO I, identifies other abnormal non-attack events and differentiates them from at-
tacks.
The detection and identification thresholds, i.e., r∗ and r∗j (j =E, . . . , I) in (7.15) and
(7.18), are determined with the same technique used for the three-area test system. Using
similar noise mean and variance values, the RF of Main UIO was obtained tr∗ = 1.8, and
identification UIOs’ RFs were set to 1.5.
In the following, three scenarios involving FDIAs against Area 3’s measurements are
investigated. For each scenario, only the RF of UIOs E, F, G, and H are presented.
• Scenario 5: Similar to Scenario 1, the SHA introduced in Section 6.3.3 targets the








































Figure 7.6: Single-line diagram of 39-bus New England test system.
lasts until t=200 s. As the attack starts, the Main UIO’s and the identification UIOs’ RFs
in Figs. 7.7a to 7.7d exceed their thresholds, indicating that all AGC measurements are
erroneous.
• Scenario 6: The power measurements of Tie-lines 5-8 and 7-8, both of which connect
Areas 3 and 2, are manipulated by +5% and−10%, respectively. The attack starts at t = 40
s and lasts until t = 140 s. As Fig. 7.8 illustrates, the RFs of UIOs E and F increase
above the determined thresholds, indicating that their corresponding measurements are
erroneous. Meanwhile, the two other identification UIOs do not detect any attack, since
the power measurements of Tie-line 1-2 and frequency measurements are correct.
• Scenario 7: This scenario involves an attack against all measurements. The attack
starts at t = 40 s with all attack inputs equal to zero. Then, the attack inputs are raised
continuously until t = 100 s, when tie-line power and frequency measurements are increased
by 5% and 0.12 Hz, respectively. Afterwards, the attack inputs are lowered continuously
until t = 140 s, when they reach zero. As Fig. 7.9 shows, the RFs of Main UIO and
identification UIOs follow the same pattern as the attack inputs, correctly identifying the
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Figure 7.7: Scenario 5’s RFs, (a) UIO E, (b) UIO F, (c) UIO G, (d) UIO H.
attack type, start time, and end time, and illustrating the high correlation between the
attack inputs and RFs. However, as Fig. 7.10 shows, the RF of UIO I remains less than
its threshold, meaning that the increase in the RFs of all identification UIOs is due to an
attack that targets all parameters, not due to an abnormal non-attack event.
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Figure 7.8: Scenario 6’s RFs, (a) UIO E, (b) UIO F, (c) UIO G, (d) UIO H.















































Figure 7.9: Scenario 7’s RFs, (a) UIO E, (b) UIO F, (c) UIO G, (d) UIO H.
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Conclusion











Figure 7.10: RF of UIO I during Scenario 7.
7.4 Conclusion
To protect an AGC systems against cyber-intrusions, this chapter proposed an attack-
detection and -identification method that detects FDIAs by estimating the LFC system’s
states and comparing the estimator’s RF with a predefined threshold. For estimating the
LFC system’s states, the proposed method uses a UIO that does not require the LFC
system’s inputs. This independence from inputs was also used for identifying FDIAs using
identification UIOs. To design these UIOs, the potential attack types were determined first.
Then, each identification UIO was designed based on the LFC system’s state-space model
that includes all potential attack inputs except one of them as its unknown inputs. Hence,
each UIO’s RF increases when the attack excluded from its unknown inputs occurs. The
simulation results showed that the proposed method effectively detects attacks targeting
AGC systems, identifies their types, and determines their start and end times.
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Chapter 8
Attack Detection and Identification
for Automatic Generation Control
Systems in the Presence of Noise
Chapter 7 presented an attack-detection and -identification method for AGC systems.
However, this method did not take into account the effect of noise, while noise considerably
affects UIOs’ RF, as shown in Fig. 7.1, and consequently influences the attack-detection
accuracy.
To address this issue, this chapter presents a method to detect FDIAs targeting AGC
systems by developing a SUIE. A SUIE estimates the states of the LFC system, which
contains the AGC as a control loop. An increase in the SUIE’s RF beyond a defined
threshold signifies an FDIA. A SUIE is designed such that it works independently from
some or all inputs to the system’s state-space model. In addition, the effect of process
and measurement noise on the estimated states is minimized through an optimal gain
setting technique for the SUIE. Therefore, not only does the SUIE eliminate the need for
information about real-time load changes throughout the grid, it also maximizes the state
estimation accuracy. The combination of these features distinguishes the proposed method
from existing FDIA-detection techniques for AGC systems. This chapter also develops a
number of AISUIEs to determine which measurements are compromised by an FDIA, thus
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facilitating FDIA mitigation strategies. The AISUIEs model FDIAs targeting each AGC
measurement by an attack input. These inputs serve as the unknown inputs of different
AISUIEs, whose RFs indicate the type of attack. The designed AISUIEs also differentiate
between attacks and non-attack abnormalities, such as faults. In fact, the proposed method
utilizes the physical characteristics of the LFC system and runs in parallel with intrusion-
detection and prevention strategies that exploit the cyber-attributes of the system.
On this basis, Section 8.1 develops a SUIE for LFC systems. Afterwards, Section 8.2
elaborates on the proposed FDIA diagnosis technique and develops AISUIEs. Finally,
using simulation analysis of the three-area power system, Section 8.3 corroborates the
effectiveness of the proposed method. Additionally, Section 8.3 tests the performance of
the proposed method using OPAL RTS, and compares it with another technique from the
literature.
8.1 Development of a SUIE for LFC system
This section develops a SUIE for estimating the states of the LFC system. A SUIE is
robust against process and measurement noise, and can accurately estimate the states of
a system using the outputs and initial states of that system, i.e., without requiring the
unknown inputs [126]. Therefore, a SUIE is suitable for attack-identification, as an attack
is practically an unknown input. Equally important, a SUIE’s independence from system
inputs makes it suitable for estimating the states of the LFC system, since it eliminates
the need for information about real-time load changes, which are not usually available.
As explained in Chapter 3, accurate state estimation without using system inputs is
possible only by introducing a delay, denoted by α, to the estimator [82]. Thus, a window
of α+1 sampling instants from time step k to k+α is considered. This (α+1)-sample-long
window, referred to as the SUIE window, moves with time. Its length depends on system
parameters and is explained later in this section. The objective of the following SUIE is to
estimate the system states at the beginning of the SUIE window, i.e., X [k], using system
outputs within the SUIE window, i.e., Y [k] to Y [k + α], and the states at time step k− 1,
i.e., X [k − 1].
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To develop a SUIE for the LFC system presented in (6.41), which considers the effect
of noise, the system outputs given in this equation for the duration of the SUIE window
should be obtained based on X [k]. To do this for time step k, X [k] should be substituted
into (6.41b). The system states at the subsequent time steps are obtained based on X [k]
using (6.41a) and substituted in (6.41b). Following the same procedure until time step
k + α and organizing the results in a matrix form gives the output vector over α+ 1 time
steps of the window:
Y [k : k + α] = OαX [k] + Ju,αUu [k : k + α] + V [k : k + α]
+ Jn,αUn [k : k + α] +Nw,αW [k : k + α− 1] (8.1)
where
Y [k : k + α] =
[
Y [k]T Y [k + 1]T · · · Y [k + α]T
]T
(8.2a)
Uu [k : k + α] =
[
Uu [k]T Uu [k + 1]T · · · Uu [k + α]T
]T
(8.2b)
Un [k : k + α] =
[
Un [k]T Un [k + 1]T · · · Un [k + α]T
]T
(8.2c)
V [k : k + α] =
[
V [k]T V [k + 1]T · · · V [k + α]T
]T
(8.2d)
W [k : k + α− 1] =
[
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In the next step, the SUIE’s general form and its gain should be designed such that (i)
the SUIE is unbiased and independent from the system inputs, i.e., the expected value of
SUIE’s error approaches zero when k →∞, (ii) the noise on the SUIE’s error is white, and
(iii) the SUIE is accurate, i.e., the mean square error between the estimated and actual
states is minimized. Accordingly, using (8.1), the general form of a SUIE for estimating
the state vector X [k + 1] in (6.41) can be
X̂ [k + 1] = AX̂ [k] + BnUn [k] + L [k]
(
Y [k : k + α]−OαX̂ [k]− Jn,αUn [k : k + α]
)
(8.3)
where X̂ [k] is the estimate given by the SUIE for X [k], and L [k] is the SUIE’s gain [126].
To satisfy condition (i), the SUIE’s error, i.e., X̂ [k + 1]−X [k + 1], is derived using (6.41a)
and (8.3):
e [k + 1] = (A− L [k]Oα)X̂ [k] + L [k]Y [k : k + α]− AX [k]− BuUu [k]−W [k] (8.4)
Substituting Y [k : k + α] from (8.1) into (8.4) yields
e [k + 1] = (A− L [k]Oα)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A′
e [k] + L [k]V [k : k + α] + L [k]Ju,αUu [k : k + α]+
L [k]Nw,αW [k : k + α− 1]−W [k]− BuUu [k] (8.5)
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For an unbiased SUIE, the expected value of e [k], i.e., E {e [k]}, must be zero. As
measurement and process noise are white, independent, and have zero mean, the expected
values of V [k : k + α], W [k : k + α− 1], and W [k] in (8.5) are zero. Rewriting BuUu [k]
as
[
Bu On×N · · · On×N
]
Uu [k : k + α] and substituting it in (8.5) demonstrates that
the following condition must be satisfied in order for E {e [k]} to be zero:
L [k]Ju,α =
[
Bu On×N · · · On×N
]
(8.6)
Theorem 7 showed that there is a matrix L[k] at time-step k that satisfies (8.6) if (8.7) is
satisfied [81].
rank (Ju,α)− rank (Ju,α−1) = N (8.7)




Op×N Op×N · · · Op×N Op×N






CAα−3Bu CAα−4Bu · · · Op×N Op×N




Theorem 7. There is a matrix L[k] at time-step k that satisfies (8.6) if and only if (8.7)
is satisfied. 
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 3.2.1.
Equation (8.7) indicates a necessary condition for developing a SUIE for an LFC system.
In other words, if this condition is not met, it will not be possible to estimate the states
of a system without requiring its unknown inputs.
Theorem 8. Regardless of the number of areas and generators under AGC control in each
area, an LFC system satisfies condition (8.7), therefore the system is invertible/observable
and its states can be estimated by a SUIE. 
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix D.
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As shown in Appendix D, α = 2 satisfies condition (8.7) for LFC systems. To satisfy
condition (ii), the noise on the SUIE’s error should be investigated. Noise can affect
the estimation error commensurate with its mean and variance. There are two types of
noise: white and colored [127]. Either type increases the SUIE’s error, but colored noise
is more undesirable and increases the estimation error more than white noise does [128].
To investigate the SUIE’s type-of-noise, the noise on its error should be found. If L [k] is
designed such that (8.6) is satisfied, the SUIE’s error in (8.5) is expressed by the following
state-space model:
e [k + 1] = A′e [k] + Γ [k]ξ [k] (8.9)
where A′ is as shown in (8.5). Additionally, ξ [k] and Γ[k] are the SUIE’s error noise vector
and matrix, and are defined as
ξ [k] =
[





δ1:n[k]− In×n δn+1:2n[k] · · · δ(α−1)n+1:αn[k] L [k]
]
(8.10b)
in which δi:j[k] is a sub-matrix of L[k]Nw,α that contains columns i to j. The noise vector
ξ [k] is called colored if it is characterized by the state-space equation shown in (8.11) [127]:
ξ [k] = J [k − 1]ξ [k − 1] + Pnn [k] (8.11)
where ξ−1 = 0, and n [k] is a noise vector that is uncorrelated, zero-mean, Gaussian, and
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Satisfying (8.11) indicates that the SUIE’s noise is colored, and thus condition (ii) is not
satisfied. This problem can be solved by modifying the LFC system states to form an
Augmented LFC system (ALFCS), as discussed in the next subsection.
8.1.1 Development of a SUIE for ALFCS
An ALFCS addresses the above problem of colored noise by eliminating J [k − 1]ξ [k − 1]
from the noise vector in (8.11) and including it in the LFC’s state-space equations, given by
(6.41) [127]. Thus, the noise vector n [k] in (8.11) is dealt with as noise, and the other noise
elements in ξ [k], i.e.,W [k : k + α− 2] and V [k : k + α− 1], are regarded as system states
that should be estimated [126]. Therefore, the condition of (8.11) no longer holds, and
condition (ii) in Section 8.1 is satisfied. The states of the LFC can be obtained using the
ALFCS states, as later discussed in Section 8.1.2. To differentiate between the parameters
of the ALFCS and LFC, all parameters of the ALFCS are presented by an over-line.
The ALFCS is developed from LFC using:
X [k + 1] = A X [k] + BuUu [k] + BnUn [k] + Pnn [k] (8.13a)
Y [k] = C X [k] (8.13b)
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where Pn and n [k] are defined in (8.12), and
X [k] =
[
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C Op×n · · · Op×n Op×n Ip×p Op×p · · · Op×p Op×p
]
(8.14e)
As seen in (8.13b), the system outputs are the same in both LFC and ALFCS; thus, no new
measurements are required for the ALFCS. As X [k] ∈ Rn, W [k : k + α− 2] ∈ R(α−1)n×1,
and V [k : k + α− 1] ∈ Rαp×1, the dimension of X in (8.13a) is n = α (n+ p). Similar to
the LFC system, the ALFCS’s SUIE has the general form of
X̂ [k + 1] = A X̂ [k]+BnUn [k]+L [k]
(
Y [k : k + α]−OαX̂ [k]− Jn,αUn [k : k + α]
)
(8.15)
where L [k] ∈ Rα(n+p)×(α+1)p is the SUIE’s gain. Moreover, Y [k : k + α] must be found
based on X[k], as follows:
Y [k : k + α] = OαX [k] + Ju,αUu [k : k + α] +N n,αn [k] + Jn,αUn [k : k + α] (8.16)
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In (2.3), N n,α and Oα are
N n,α =
[
On×p On×p · · · On×p CT
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Since condition (ii) was held by developing the ALFCS, the SUIE’s gain L [k] in (8.15)
should be designed such that conditions (i) and (iii) in Section III-A are also fulfilled for
this system. To design L [k], the SUIE’s error must be found first, using (8.13), (8.15), and
(8.16) with the same process carried out for the LFC in (8.5). Then, Y [k : k + α] from
(8.16) must be substituted in the SUIE’s error, leading to












Bu Oα(n+p)×N · · · Oα(n+p)×N
])
Uu [k : k + α] (8.18)
Satisfying condition (i) and developing an unbiased SUIE entails equating the expected
value of the SUIE’s error in (8.18) with zero, which results in
L [k]Ju,α =
[
Bu Oα(n+p)×N · · · Oα(n+p)×N
]
(8.19)
As explained in the previous subsection, (8.19) entails satisfaction of (8.7). With a similar
approach as in Appendix D, it can be shown that α = 2 satisfies (8.7). Additionally,




L1 [k] L2 [k]
]
Q (8.20)
where L2 [k] = Bu and L1 [k] ∈ Rα(n+p)×(p−N) is a free matrix from the perspective of the
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Hence, for any value of L1 [k], multiplying L [k] by Ju,α results in the right hand side
of (8.19), and condition (i) in Section 8.1 is satisfied. Since L1 [k] does not affect the
unbiasedness condition of the SUIE, it can be chosen such that condition (iii) in Section
8.1 is met. To this end, the mean square error between the estimated and actual states—or
equivalently the trace of error’s covariance matrix—should be minimized [129]. Thus, the
SUIE’s error covariance matrix should be found. By substituting L [k] from (8.20) into
(8.18), the SUIE’s error is












Q N n,α − Pn
)
n [k] (8.22)











where Φ1 ∈ R(n−N)×α(n+p) and Φ2 ∈ RN×α(n+p). Similarly, Q N n,α in (8.22) is decomposed
to






where Ψ1 ∈ R((p−N)×(n+p)) and Ψ2 ∈ RN×(n+p). Substituting (8.23) and (8.24) into (8.22)
yields the following estimation error:
e [k + 1] =
(




L1 [k]Ψ1 + Bu Ψ2 − Pn
)
n [k] (8.25)
The error’s covariance matrix, E
{
e [k + 1] e [k + 1]T
}
, can be obtained using (8.25), and
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is given by



























Λ = A− BuΦ2 (8.27a)
Υ = BuΨ2 − Pn (8.27b)
Π [k] = E
{




Q [k + α− 1] 0
0 R [k + α]
]
(8.27c)
In (8.27c), Q and R are the process and measurement noise covariance matrices introduced
in Chapter 6. To find the optimal L1 [k] that minimizes the trace of the error’s covariance
matrix Σ [k + 1], the gradient of (8.26) with respect to L1 [k] is obtained and equated with
















Substituting L1 [k] from (8.28) into (8.26) results in the minimum error’s covariance matrix,
which is as follows:




































must be inverted in order
to find the optimal L1 [k] and the minimum error’s covariance matrix. Since Σ [k] in ϑ is
dependent on noise, ϑ is a random matrix whose distribution depends on noise parameters.
Thus, it can be shown that the probability of singularity for a random matrix is practically
zero, because the Lebesgue measure for the zero set of its determinant polynomial is zero.
Therefore, ϑ is practically invertible. However, for the practically unlikely scenario of
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singularity for ϑ, pseudo-inverse can be used instead of inverse [83].
In conclusion, condition (ii) in Section 8.1 was met by developing the ALFCS from the
LFC. Then, L [k] was designed according to (8.20) to satisfy conditions (i) and (iii). Con-
dition (i) was addressed by choosing L2 [k] = Bu and designing Q using (8.21). Condition
(iii) was also held by finding the optimal L1 [k] according to (8.28). After designing the
SUIE for ALFCS, the outputs of this system at time steps k to k+α and its states at time
step k− 1 must be substituted in (8.15) to obtain the ALFCS’s states at time step k. The
flowchart of this procedure is illustrated in Fig. 8.1. By considering that (i) the number
of states, i.e., n, is greater than or equal to N,m, and p, and (ii) all the steps in Fig. 8.1
involve only simple matrix summation, multiplication, and inversion, the computational
complexity for each on-line step in the flowchart is calculated using Big O notation [130],
and is shown beside it. Therefore, using the obtained complexity for each step, the overall
computational complexity of the algorithm is bounded by O(n3).
Construct the ALFCS from the LFC using (7.13)-(7.14)
Initialize the SUIE with an initial state     and set k =1 
k=k+1
Set the minimum time delay α equal to 2   
Find     such that (7.21) is satisfied















Estimate the states of the ALFCS at time step k+1 using 

















Find          using (7.28) and equate          with   .
find the SUIE’s covariance matrix at time step k+1 using 
































  1 k   2 k u
  1 k   2 k  k
Figure 8.1: Flowchart of state estimation for the ALFCS using a SUIE.
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8.1.2 Relation Between ALFCS and OLFCS
The following explains how to find the states, estimation error, and covariance matrix of
the LFC system from those of the ALFCS. As shown in (8.14a), the first n states of the













where e [k] is given in (8.25). Additionally, using Σ [k + 1] in (8.29), the error covariance
matrix of the LFC system is calculated by










8.2 FDIA Diagnosis Using SUIE
This section presents a technique for detecting and identifying FDIAs targeting an AGC
system.
8.2.1 FDIA Detection
As explained in Section 6.4.2, when an FDIA is in progress, a new component, i.e., Bh ×
H [k], is added to the system model in (6.33), and modifies it to (6.41). This new component
also modifies (8.16) to:
Ỹ [k : k + α] = Y [k : k + α] +MαH [k : k + α] (8.33)
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H [k : k + α] =
[
H [k]T H [k + 1]T · · · H [k + α]T
]T
(8.34b)
When the system is not under an FDIA, all elements of H [k : k + α] are zero, and
thus Y [k : k + α] equals Ỹ [k : k + α]. However, during an FDIA, Ỹ [k : k + α] differs from
Y [k : k + α], resulting in the following estimation error:
ẽ [k + 1] = e [k + 1] + L [k]MαH [k : k + α]− BhH [k] (8.35)
where e [k + 1] is the SUIE’s error during attack-free operation of the AGC, and is given
in (8.25). Additionally, Bh is developed using the same procedure as for (8.14c), and is
Bh =
[
BTh Oz×n · · · Oz×n Oz×n Oz×p Oz×p · · · Oz×p Oz×p
]T
(8.36)
where z is the possible number of attacks can target the system. It is shown in Appendix E
that during an FDIA, the probability of amplification of the estimation error in (8.35) after
one time step is practically 1. In other words, for an FDIA, the probability of remaining
undetectable after one time step is zero. This issue leads to erroneous state estimation
during FDIAs, and is exploited to detect such attacks by using
r [k] = Y [k]− CX̂ [k] (8.37)
where Y [k] is given in (6.41b). By substituting the estimated states given by (8.30) into
(8.37), r [k] during attack-free operation equals C × e [k] + V [k], whose expected value is
168
zero. During an FDIA, however, r [k] becomes










Thus, an FDIA can be detected when the Euclidean norm of r [k] increases above a certain
threshold. Meanwhile, as suggested by the χ2−testing method, the weighted vector norm
of this function—instead of its Euclidean norm—can be used to decrease the rate of false
alarms [131]. As a result, the RF for detecting FDIAs can be as
g [k] = r [k]TΩ [k]−1 r [k] (8.39)
where Ω [k] is the covariance matrix of r [k], i.e., E
{
r [k]× r [k]T
}
, and can be obtained
using
Ω [k] = CΣ [k]CT + R [k] (8.40)
In fact, Ω [k] indicates how accurately the elements of r [k] are estimated; smaller values
on the trace of Ω [k] signify more accurate estimation of their corresponding states [131].
Therefore, by taking the inverse of Ω [k] and using it as a weighting factor in (8.40) for
adding up the square of the components of r [k], the elements that are estimated more
(less) accurately have larger (smaller) weighting factors. FDIAs targeting an AGC system
can be detected by comparing the Euclidean norm of g [k] with a threshold, denoted by
tr∗. In other words, an FDIA is detected if
‖g [k]‖ > tr∗ (8.41)
Since ‖g [k]‖ has no unit, tr∗ is also a unit-less number that must be chosen such that all
FDIAs are detected, while false alarms are avoided. This threshold can be set either by
monitoring the SUIE’s RF during attack-free conditions and selecting its highest value,
or by using hypothesis testing and the χ2−testing method’s tables [131]. Using the first
method, tr∗ is determined numerically in Section 8.3. In the rest of this chapter, the SUIE
used for FDIA detection based on (8.37)-(8.41) is termed the Main SUIE.
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8.2.2 FDIA Type Identification
The method presented in Section 8.2.1 can detect FDIAs, but it is not able to identify their
types. Identification helps to mitigate FDIAs more quickly by indicating which sensor
measurements have been targeted. To identify FDIAs, a number of AISUIEs must be
designed. To this aim, as explained in Section 6.4.2, the system model during FDIAs,
given by (6.41), and the number of attack inputs (hf,i and hT1,i to hTN ,i) should be found
for each area. Then, for designing each AISUIE, a certain combination of attack inputs
are modeled as unknown inputs, and other attack inputs and their impacts on the system
states are ignored in the AISUIE state-space model. Additionally, instead of the sum of all
tie-lines’ power deviation, each tie-line’s power deviation must be individually considered
as a system state. Given that the number of possible attack inputs in Area i of Fig. 6.7 is
zi, 2
zi−1 separate AISUIEs, each associated with a combination of Area i ’s attack inputs,
should be designed. For example, there are three attack inputs for Area 1 of the three-
area power system mentioned in Chapter 6. Thus, seven AISUIEs should be designed for
this area, as denoted in Table 8.1 by AISUIE A to G. In this table, hT2,1, hT3,1, and hf,1
are attack inputs that represent FDIAs targeting ∆Ptie1,2 , ∆Ptie1,3 , and ∆f1, respectively.
The state-space equation of each AISUIE models the attack inputs shown in column 2,
as well as their impacts on the system states. Hence, each AISUIE’s model in Table 8.1
includes a combination of FDIAs that can target the parameters presented in column 3.
The unknown inputs of each AISUIE are the attack inputs associated with that AISUIE
as well as the system unknown input vector Uu [.]. Thus, the state-space equation used for









+ BnUn [k] + W [k]
Y [k] = CX [k]V [k]
(8.42)
where HA [k] is the attack input vector of AISUIE A, which contains attack input hT2,1,
and BAh is a matrix that includes only the column(s) of Bh that is(are) associated with
the attack input(s) of HA [k]. The output equation of all AISUIEs are the same as the
system output equation, shown in (6.41b). As a result of this formulation, when Area 1 is
targeted, the RF of AISUIE A does not increase for its respective attacks, since its state-
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Table 8.1: AISUIEs for Area 1 of The Three-Area Power System
AISUIE
Considered Unconsidered Parameter(s) whose Parameter(s) whose Unknown
input(s)attack input(s) attack input(s) attack(s) is(are) modeled attack(s) is(are) not modeled
A hT2,1 hT3,1, hf,1 ∆Ptie1,2 ∆Ptie1,3 , ∆f1 hT2,1, Uu
B hT3,1 hT2,1, hf,1 ∆Ptie1,3 ∆Ptie1,2 , ∆f1 hT3,1, Uu
C hf,1 hT2,1, hT3,1 ∆f1 ∆Ptie1,2 , ∆Ptie1,3 hf,1, Uu
D hT2,1, hT3,1 hf,1 ∆Ptie1,2 , ∆Ptie1,3 ∆f1 hT2,1, hT3,1, Uu
E hT2,1, hf,1 hT3,1 ∆Ptie1,2 , ∆f1 ∆Ptie1,3 hT2,1, hf,1, Uu
F hT3,1, hf,1 hT2,1 ∆Ptie1,3 , ∆f1 ∆Ptie1,2 hT3,1, hf,1, Uu
G hT2,1, hT3,1, hf,1 − ∆Ptie1,2 , ∆Ptie1,3 , ∆f1 − hT2,1, hT3,1, hf,1, Uu
space equation includes those attacks in its model as unknown inputs. In other words, if
any attack that is not associated with AISUIE A happens in Area 1, the RF of AISUIE A
increases. As a result, if the main SUIE’s RF increases over its threshold and AISUIE A’s
RF does not, it signifies that only some/all of the attacks associated with AISUIE A are
active, as shown in the following equation:
‖g [k]‖ > tr∗ and ‖gA [k]‖ < tr∗A (8.43)
where ‖gA [k]‖ is the Euclidean norm of AISUIE A’s RF, and trA is this AISUIE’s threshold.
Using the AISUIEs designed in Table 8.1, attacks are identified according the RF-
increase for the AISUIEs, as indicated in Table 8.2. For example, in Table 8.2 an increase
in the RFs of AISUIEs B, C, and F, accompanied by less-than-threshold RFs for the rest
of the AISUIEs, indicates that hT2,1 is targeted. Similarly, a simultaneous increase in the
RFs of AISUIEs A to F indicates that all three parameters—i.e., hT2,1, hT3,1, and hf,1—are
targeted. Additionally, as shown in Table 8.2, AISUIE G ’s RF does not increase during any
attack, since its state-space model includes all possible attacks inputs as unknown inputs.
Based on this design, the RF of AISUIE G does not increase during normal conditions or
the modeled FDIAs. Therefore, since all possible attacks are modeled in AISUIE G, any
increase in the RF of this AISUIE signifies other abnormal non-attack events, such as a
fault.
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Table 8.2: Identification Logic for Area 1 of The Three-Area Test System
Targeted parameter(s)
RF increase for AISUIEs
A B C D E F G
hT2,1 - X X - - X -
hT3,1 X - X - X - -
hf,1 X X - X - - -
hT2,1, hT3,1 X X X - X X -
hT2,1, hf,1 X X X X - X -
hT3,1, hf,1 X X X X X - -
hT2,1, hT3,1, hf,1 X X X X X X -
Other events, such as faults X X X X X X X
The designed AISUIEs in Table 8.1 identify FDIAs targeting Area 1 when only this
area is under attack. However, if any other area is targeted at the same time, the RFs of
all AISUIEs increase, since the out-of-area attacks have not been modeled in the AISUIEs
of Table 8.1. This issue can be easily addressed by modeling the attack inputs of all other
areas as unknown inputs for the AISUIEs of each area. For example, if the attack inputs
hf,2, hT1,2, hT3,2, hf,3, hT1,3, and hT2,3—which represent intrusions against ∆ω2, ∆Ptie2,1 ,
∆Ptie2,3 , ∆ω3, ∆Ptie3,1 , and ∆Ptie3,2 of Areas 2 and 3, respectively—are also modeled as
unknown inputs for the AISUIEs of Area 1 in Table 8.1, the RFs of these AISUIEs do
not increase for attacks targeting Areas 2 and 3. As a result of this modeling, the RF of




Using MATLAB/Simulink, this section assesses the performance of the proposed FDIA-
detection and -identification technique for the three-area power system introduced in Ap-
pendix C. The state-space equation of this test system was presented in Section 6.4.2.
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However, in this section, each tie-line’s power is modeled separately. The estimation delay
for the Main SUIE and all AISUIEs is α = 2 time-steps. The process noise (W and V)
added to each area’s state-space equations in (6.41) is zero-mean Gaussian noise with the
time-invariant covariance matrix of 0.03 × diag
[
1 1 0.03 1 1 1 1 1
]
[125]. The
elements of this covariance matrix are related to and in the same order as those in (6.23a),
e.g., the variances of the process noise corresponding to the frequency is 0.0009, and other
states’ noise variances are 0.03. The output equation of each area includes the power being
delivered by each tie-line, ∆ωi, and ∆Pcg,i for the generator(s) that is(are) controlled by
the AGC. The measurement noise in the output equation is also Gaussian, zero-mean, and
with the time-invariant covariance matrix of 0.03 × diag
[
1 1 0.03 1
]
. Moreover, as
explained in Section 6.4.2, each area’s AGC can be targeted by three attacks. Thus, seven
AISUIEs, shown in Table 8.1, should be designed for each area.
To determine the thresholds for the Main SUIE and AISUIEs, the SUIEs’ RFs are
monitored during attack-free conditions, and the thresholds are determined such that no
FDIA is detected. Not only does this method take into account the effect of noise on
RFs, it also considers other unknown sources of error or known ones (such as parameter
uncertainties, which are modeled by a percentage error that is normally distributed around
zero, with 5% standard deviation). To obtain the above-mentioned thresholds, the Main
SUIE’s and the designed AISUIEs’ RFs were recorded for 1000 seconds in the presence
of noise and parameter uncertainties during normal condition. The largest recorded RF
for each SUIE plus a 20% security margin was assigned to the threshold of that SUIE.
Afterwards, to verify the obtained thresholds, the above-mentioned procedure was repeated
two more rounds, each for 1000 seconds. If the obtained thresholds in the test rounds are
greater than the initial ones, the initial thresholds are replaced by the larger recorded ones.
This procedure was continued until the test rounds verified the obtained thresholds. As
an example, Fig. 8.2 illustrates the Main SUIE’s RF for 1000 seconds: the maximum of
g [k] is 0.15. Thus, the FDIA-detection threshold for the Main SUIE can be selected as
0.15 plus 20% security margin, and so tr∗ is set to 0.18. Similar results are also obtained
for the AISUIEs.
Next, six scenarios involving FDIAs against Area 1’s measurements are investigated.
For each scenario, the RF of the Main SUIE and AISUIEs A, B, and C in Table 8.1 are
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 g [ k ]   = 0.15
 t = 180 s
Figure 8.2: Main SUIE’s RF considering noise and parameter uncertainties.
























Figure 8.3: Main SUIE’s RF, (a) Scenario 1, (b) Scenario 2.
presented.
• Scenario 1: In this scenario, no attack targets the AGC, and the system operates
normally in the presence of noise. However, the Main SUIE does not take into account the
effects of noise in the state-space model, i.e., the noise means and variances are considered
to be zero. This scenario and the next one show how the designed SIUE reduces the impact
of noise on its estimated outputs and RFs. Fig. 8.3a displays the Main SUIE’s RF during
Scenario 1: when the noise is not considered in designing the Main SUIE, its RF is in the
order of 1 at all times, which is greater than tr = 0.18. Thus, noise can increase the false
alarm rate in the system if it is not properly dealt with.
• Scenario 2: This scenario is similar to Scenario 1, but the noise and its effects are
included in the Main SUIE’s equations to show how accurately the Main SUIE works in
the presence of noise. Fig. 8.3b shows the Main SUIE’s RF: the RF is in the order of 10−6.
This reduction in the Main SUIE’s RF with respect to Scenario 1 indicates the effectiveness
of the designed SUIE in eliminating the noise impact on estimated states.
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Figure 8.4: Scenario 3 RFs, (a) Main SUIE, (b) AISUIE A, (c) AISUIE B, (d) AISUIE C.
• Scenario 3: In this scenario, an FDIA uses attack input hf,1 to decreases the frequency
measurements gradually by 0.12 Hz. The FDIA starts at t = 100 s. As Fig. 8.4 shows,
the RFs of the Main SUIE and the AISUIEs increase one time step, i.e., 2 s, after the
FDIA starts, as explained in Appendix E. As hf,1 is the only non-zero attack input in this
scenario, the RFs of AISUIEs A, B, and D increase. The RFs of other AISUIEs remain
very small, since they include hf,1 in their model as an unknown input (Table 8.1 and Fig.
8.4d).
• Scenario 4: The FDIA in this scenario increases the power measurements of the tie-
line that connects Areas 1 and 2 by 5%. The attack starts at t = 50 s and ends at t = 150
s. Fig. 8.5 shows the Main SUIE’s and the AISUIEs’ RFs: the RFs of the Main SUIE and
AISUIEs B and C grow large. The RF of AISUIE A does not rise, since this AISUIE’s
model involves the FDIAs that target power measurements of the tie-line between Areas
1 and 2 (Table 8.1). Therefore, an increase in the Main SUIE’s RF without rising AISUIE
A’s RF signifies that hT2,1 is targeted.
• Scenario 5: This scenario involves an FDIA that utilizes attack inputs hf,1, hT2,1, hT3,1
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Figure 8.5: Scenario 4 RFs, (a) Main SUIE, (b) AISUIE A, (c) AISUIE B, (d) AISUIE C.
to manipulate all of the measurements. The FDIA starts at t = 30 s and ends at t = 150 s.
The measurements are manipulated gradually until the deviations of the tie-line power and
frequency measurements from their nominal values reach 5% and 0.12 Hz, respectively. The
increase in the RFs of the Main SUIE and three sample AISUIEs has been depicted in Fig.
8.6. The RFs of these AISUIEs increase, since two of the non-zero attack inputs are absent
in these AISUIEs’ unknown inputs (Table 8.1), e.g., AISUIE C ’s model lacks the attacks
against tie-line power measurements. Similarly, the RFs of AISUIEs D, E, and F increase
since their models lack one of the non-zero attack inputs. Therefore, this scenario’s FDIA
cannot be identified by AISUIEs A to F. However, because AISUIE G ’s model includes
all non-zero attack inputs, the RF of this AISUIE does not increase, as shown in Fig. 8.7,
meaning that all measurements have been targeted simultaneously. Additionally, as the
injections increase gradually, the RFs also change with a similar pattern. The abrupt end
of the FDIA also makes the RFs drop suddenly.
• Scenario 6: This scenario shows the performance of the proposed method for multiple
simultaneous attacks on different areas and parameters of the system. In this scenario, the
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Figure 8.6: Scenario 5 RFs, (a) Main SUIE, (b) AISUIE A, (c) AISUIE B, (d) AISUIE C.
FDIA discussed in Scenario 3 targets the frequencies of Areas 1 and 2 at the same time; i.e.,
the targeted parameters are hf,1 and hf,2. In addition to the unknown inputs mentioned
in Table 8.1, the attack inputs of Areas 2 and 3 are modeled as unknown inputs as well,
resulting in the development of AISUIEs that are robust against out-of-area attacks. Fig.
8.8 illustrates the RFs of AISUIEs A, B, C, and G for Area 1. The RF of AISUIE C —
which is associated with hf,1 (Tables 8.1 and 8.2)—remains around zero, indicating that
only hf,1 is under attack in Area 1. The RF of AISUIE G also remains around zero, because
both the nonzero attack inputs, i.e., hf,1 and hf,2, are modeled as unknown inputs for this
AISUIE. However, AISUIEs A and B detect the attack, because the respective state-space
equations do not model the attacks on hf,1. Area 2’s AISUIEs also give the same results,
because the same parameter (hf,2) is under attack in that area.
177











Figure 8.7: RF of AISUIE G during Scenario 5.




















































Figure 8.8: Scenario 6 RFs, (a) AISUIE A, (b) AISUIE B, (c) AISUIE C, (d) AISUIE G.
8.3.2 Real-Time Simulation
This section investigates the performance of the proposed method using an OPAL RTS.
As explained in Section 4.3.2, utilizing an RTS for testing power system control/protection
methods is a well-established practice [132, 133, 134, 135]. This approach integrates a
physical control/protection platform within a software-based real-time digital simulator
and constitutes an HIL verification environment. In an HIL setup (Fig. 8.9), a physical
controller emulates the proposed method by using simulation signals obtained in real time.
In the developed HIL setup, the processor that emulates the proposed attack-detection
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Figure 8.9: HIL setup.
technique uses 16 GB of RAM, and its speed is 3.33 GHz. Using this processor, the
minimum simulation step size that allows running the proposed FDIA-detection algorithm
in real-time for the three-area test system is 4 ms. Since the AGC system time step (2 s)
is substantially larger than 4 ms, the proposed method can be implemented in real-time
for this system. Additionally, since the RFs of the Main SUIE and all AISUIEs must be
converted to a voltage in order to be shown by the oscilloscope and as the voltages of
the I/O ports are limited to 15 V, the RFs are scaled down by a factor of 1/100. In this
subsection two scenarios are investigated:
• The attack defined in Scenario 4 of the previous subsection targets the system for 110
s. When the power measurements of the tie-line that connects Areas 1 and 2 are increased
by 5% in Scenario 4, the RFs of the Main SUIE and AISUIEs B and C increase, as shown
in Fig. 8.10. The time and voltage divisions for all sub-figures in Fig. 8.10 are set to 25 s
and 1 V, respectively. The increases in the RFs of the Main SUIE and AISUIEs B and C
are about 5.2, 1.75, and 1.75 V, respectively, one time step after the attack starts. Thus,




Figure 8.10: Scenario 4 RFs obtained by RTS, (a) Main SUIE, (b) AISUIE A, (c) AISUIE
B, (d) AISUIE C.
• Scenario 7: This scenario starts an FDIA by increasing the power measurements of
the tie-line connecting Areas 1 and 3 by 5%, i.e., hT3,1 = 5%; after 35 s, this tie-line’s
measurements are increased by 10% instead of 5%; after 40 s, hT3,1 is changed to 15%; and
finally, the attack ends 110 s after its inception. The results of this scenario are shown
in Fig. 8.11. In all sub-figures of 8.11, the time division is set to 25 s, while the voltage
division is set to 5 V for Fig. 8.11a and to 1 V for Figs. 8.11b-8.11d. The Main SUIE’s RF
reaches 3.5 V in Fig. 8.11a after the first step of the attack is carried out, demonstrating
that an attack has been initiated. The RF of the Main SUIE increases in three steps up to
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about 15 V, indicating the three stages of this FDIA. On the other hand, as shown in Table
8.1, FDIAs against this tie-line’s power measurements have not been modeled in AISUIEs
A, C and E. Therefore, in addition to the Main SUIE’s RF, the RFs of AISUIEs A and C
rise in Figs. 8.11b and 8.11d. However, the RF of AISUIE B does not grow, since attack
input hT3,1 is modeled in AISUIE B as an unknown input.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 8.11: Scenario 7 RFs obtained by RTS, (a) Main SUIE, (b) AISUIE A, (c) AISUIE
B, (d) AISUIE C.
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Figure 8.12: Load and wind generation profiles used for comparative analysis (a) Load,
(b) Wind generation.
8.3.3 Comparative Analysis
As explained in Section 8.1, one of the main advantages of the proposed method is its
independence from load changes in the network. Therefore, unlike other techniques, e.g.,
in [2, 38], the proposed method does not require forecasted data for the system load and the
generation of intermittent renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar, for detecting
FDIAs. Therefore, the performance of the proposed method is not affected by forecasting-
techniques’ error. Considering uncertainties in load and wind generation forecasts, the
following scenarios compare the performance of the proposed method with the anomaly
detection engine in [2] from the perspective of false alarms:
• Scenario 8: In this scenario, the actual and forecasted load and wind-generation
profiles (Fig. 8.12) for each area of the three-area test system have been extracted from
the New England ISO website [136]. These profiles are related to September 1st, 2017, and
are normalized based on the peak-load of the day. In this scenario, the scheduled tie-line
powers are considered to be 300, 60, and 240 MW for tie-lines 1-2, 1-3, and 2-3, respectively.
To compare the proposed method with that in [2], the anomaly-detection engine presented
in this reference is simulated. Using the forecasted load and wind-generation profiles in
Fig. 8.12, parameters ACEmax, ACEmin, and δ2 for each hour are obtained such that
false alarms are minimized (Fig. 8.13). Using the obtained values, the anomaly-detection
engine generates three false positive alarms at hours 8, 13, and 14 when the load and wind
generation changes with the actual profiles in Fig. 8.12. These alarms are generated due
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Figure 8.13: Parameters of the method proposed by [2] obtained for Scenario 7, (a) ACEmax
and ACEmin, (b) δ2.
to the large error between the forecasted and actual load and wind generation at these
hours. On the other hand, the RF of the Main SUIE during this scenario is shown in Fig.
8.14. Due to the independence of the proposed method from load changes in the system,
the RF is less than the defined threshold at all times, and thus it does not generate any
false positive during this period.
• Scenario 9: This scenario shows that the independence from load changes in the
system is a critical feature, since raising false positive alarms due to load changes can
potentially lead to system instability. To illustrate this issue, over-frequency elements of
the protective relays are set based on the guidelines for Western Interconnection, USA [137].
According to this setting, the over-frequency elements of generators trip if the frequency
(i) exceeds 60.6 Hz and does not fall below this threshold within 180 s, (ii) exceeds 61.6 Hz
and does not recover within 30 s, or (iii) surpasses 61.7 Hz. In this scenario, the forecasted
load and wind generation are considered to be perfectly matched with the actual ones.
However, at t = 100 s, a short-circuit fault happens in Area 2 of the three-area system.
The fault removal protective relays lead to 20% load loss in this area. Since faults are
generally unpredictable, their effects on the forecasted ACE cannot be considered. Thus,
the anomaly-detection engine generates a false positive alarm, due to the large ACE signal
created after the short-circuit fault. As the alarm is raised, the actual ACE values are
replaced by forecasted values, and are sent to the AGC system of Area 2 once every 5
minutes. However, because the AGC system in Area 2 does not contribute properly to
frequency regulation due to its erroneous inputs, this area’s frequency exceeds 60.6 Hz,
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as shown in Fig. 8.15. Therefore, the relays detect an over-frequency. After 3 minutes,
the relays pick up based on their settings, tripping the generators. This issue renders the
system unstable.










Figure 8.14: Main SUIE’s RF during Scenario 7.
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 and clears after 1.5 cycles 
Figure 8.15: System frequency during Scenario 8.
8.4 Conclusion
This chapter proposed a method for detecting and identifying FDIAs against AGC systems
in the presence of measurement and process noise. This method uses a SUIE that estimates
the LFC system’s states without requiring the real-time load changes in the grid. FDIAs
are detected by comparing the SUIE’s RF with a predefined threshold. To identify FDIAs,
a number of AISUIEs were developed. A certain combination of attack inputs is among the
unknown inputs of each AISUIE. Thus, if an FDIA happens, the RFs of all AISUIEs that
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lack the respective attack input in their model increase. Implementing the proposed method
for a three-area system using MATLAB/Simulink showed that this method properly detects
and identifies FDIAs in the presence of noise, without requiring information about load
changes in the grid. Additionally, the proposed method was tested using the OPAL RTS,





The main objectives of this dissertation were divided into two main groups: (i) to introduce
LCDRs as vulnerable protective elements in AC and DC power systems, in terms of cyber-
attacks, and to address this issue by proposing methods that detect intrusions in a timely
fashion, and (ii) to present AGC systems as susceptible controllers in power networks,
and to propose application-based measures to make this controller robust against cyber-
attacks. On this basis, the dissertation was divided into two parts. In the first part,
the vulnerabilities of LCDRs to cyber-attacks were discussed and illustrated first. The
destructiveness of cyber-attacks against LCDRs in both AC and DC systems was then
demonstrated through three case studies. Afterwards, two methods were proposed to
address the cyber-security problem of AC LCDRs, and one technique was presented to
make DC LCDRs cyber-resilient. The first method for AC LCDRs was proposed for SV-
based ones, and the second method can be employed in both SV-based and phasor-based
relays. Both methods are initiated after LCDRs’ pickup to confirm the occurrence of faults
and to differentiate them from cyber-attacks.
The second part of the dissertation, on the other hand, focused on the other group of
objectives. To this aim, first the vulnerabilities of AGC systems were discussed, and the
LFC system model under FDIAs was obtained. Afterwards, to prove the potentials and
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destructiveness of cyber-attacks against AGC systems, an SHA was proposed to disrupts
the normal operation of this controller quickly and undetectably. Finally, two methods
were proposed to detect and identify intrusions against AGC systems, and to make this
controller robust against attacks. Both methods work without requiring load data in the
system, in contrast to other methods presented in the literature. Additionally, the second
proposed method takes into account the process and measurement noise and minimizes the
noise effect on attack-detection accuracy.
The contents of each chapter can be summarized as follows:
• Chapter 2 unveiled the vulnerabilities of AC and DC LCDRs to cyber-attacks, and
elaborated on how intrusions can target this relay type in both types of systems. The
mathematical formulation of cyber-attacks against both AC and DC LCDRs and the crite-
ria that must be met in order to trip the lines protected by each relay type were discussed
next. In particular, a number of attack strategies were simulated for AC LCDRs to il-
lustrate how cyber-attacks can move the operating point of this relay type into the trip
zone. Finally, three case studies were presented to demonstrate the destructiveness of co-
ordinated attacks against AC and DC LCDRs. It was shown that coordinated attacks can
result in a kind of instability, depending on the attack strategy, and potentially lead to a
system collapse.
• To detect attacks and differentiate them from faults, Chapter 3 proposed an attack-
detection method for SV-based AC LCDRs. This method is initiated immediately after
LCDRs pick up. In the proposed method, an SV-based AC LCDR detects attacks by
comparing its terminal’s estimated and locally-measured voltages in each sequence. To
estimate the local voltage for each sequence, an LCDR uses a UIOs, the local and remote
measurements, and the state-space model of the faulty line, all associated with that se-
quence. The difference between measured and estimated local voltages in each sequence
is small during internal faults, since in such situations the proposed method’s state-space
model, based on which the UIO operates, and the actual system model are the same.
Nonetheless, these two models differ during FDIAs, resulting in a large difference between
the estimated and measured voltages. As a result, monitoring the the above-mentioned
difference in both sequences can be used to confirm faults.
• Similar to Chapter 3, Chapter 4 presented a method for detecting attacks targeting AC
187
LCDRs, yet for both SV-based and phasor-based types. In the proposed method, when
an LCDR pick up, its PS and NS submodules calculate and measure the superimposed
voltages at the relay’s local terminal. Attacks are then detected if the difference between
the calculated and measured superimposed voltages in any sequence exceeds the defined
threshold for that sequence.
• Chapter 5 presented an attack-detection method by which DC LCDRs can differen-
tiate between cyber-attacks and faults using local measurements. The proposed method
installs a POC, which includes an inductor and a capacitor in parallel, at each converter’s
terminal. A POC thus resonates and generates a damped sinusoidal component with a spe-
cific frequency during faults. However, this specific frequency component is not generated
by POCs during cyber-attacks, load-changes, and other non-fault events in the system, and
thus it can be regarded as a fault signature. On this basis, the proposed attack-detection
submodule incorporated in LCDRs verify the occurrence of faults by applying FFT to the
voltage across POCs in real-time and capturing the magnitude of the component oscillating
with this specific frequency. Detecting this specific frequency thus validates an LCDR’s
tripping decision. Accordingly, a cyber-attack is flagged if an LCDR picks up without
detecting the specific frequency.
• Chapter 6 began by explaining an AGC system’s operating principal and alarms, its
vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks, and the potential destructiveness of attacks targeting this
controller. Afterwards, a number of basic attacks were introduced against AGC systems,
and their impacts on power system operation were studied. An SHA was formulated and
optimized next to disrupt the normal operation of AGC systems quickly. The SHA was de-
signed such that no AGC alarm is raised, so the attack remains undetectable. Additionally,
this chapter introduced the LFC system state-space model in under attack.
• Chapter 7 proposed a method to detect and identify intrusions against an AGC
system. In contrast to other techniques in the literature, this method works independently
from load data in the system. The proposed method detects attacks by estimating the LFC
system’s states using a UIO, and calculating the UIO’s RF. An increase in the UIO’s RF
over a predefined threshold signifies an attack, since in normal conditions, the estimated
and measured values for LFC states are ideally the same. This method also identifies
attacks by designing a number of identification UIOs.
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• Analogous to Chapter 7, Chapter 8 proposed a method for detecting and identifying
FDIAs against AGC systems. However, the method proposed in Chapter 8 takes into
account measurement and process noise as well. Therefore, instead of a UIO, a SUIE
was used to estimate the states of LFC systems and calculate the RF. Attacks were then
detected by comparing the SUIE’s RF with a predefined threshold. Additionally, the
proposed method identifies FDIAs by utilizing a number of AISUIEs.
9.2 Contributions
The research presented in this dissertation made the following main contributions:
• Introduced LCDRs as vulnerable protection relays and proposed a novel intrusion-
detection method for unveiling attacks targeting SV-based AC LCDRs.
• Developed another attack-detection technique for AC LCDRs, that can be employed
in both LCDR types.
• Proposed an attack detection method for DC LCDRs, that can differentiate between
attacks and faults in a few microseconds.
• Developed basic attacks against AGC systems and investigated their impacts on
power system operation. Additionally, it formulated an SHA to disrupt the normal
operation of AGC systems quickly and undetectably.
• Presented a new model for describing LFC systems under attack. This model can be
used for identification purposes and for analyzing the system during FDIAs.
• Presented an anomaly-based intrusion-detection method for discovering FDIAs tar-
geting AGC systems. The method works without requiring load data in the system.
Additionally, it identifies the parameters that are targeted and differentiates attacks
from other abnormal non-attack events, such as faults.
• Presented another intrusion-detection and -identification method for AGC systems.
This method utilizes a SUIE for detecting attacks, and it works independently from
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load data in the system. Additionally, by optimally designing the SUIE’s gain, the
proposed method minimized the effect of noise on detection accuracy. Therefore, un-
like with existing methods in the literature, with the proposed method, load forecast
errors do not affect detection accuracy, and noise impact is minimized.
9.3 Directions for Future Work
Further research on the cyber-security of protection and control systems in general, and
LCDRs and AGC systems in particular, may include the topics listed below:
1. Utilizing machine learning techniques for detecting attacks and differentiating them
from faults.
2. investigating the performance of multi-terminal high-voltage DC networks under
cyber-attacks targeting voltage regulation system.
3. Investigating the effect of cyber-attacks against AGC systems on electricity markets,
and proposing attack scenarios accordingly.
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Description of the 39-bus new
England Test System in Chapters 2,
3, 4, and 7
The details of the 39-bus New England power system [72] shown in Figures 2.2 and 7.6 are
presented in this section. This test system includes 3 areas as illustrated in Fig. 7.6. The
base power is 100 MW, and the generated voltages and powers of generators are shown
in Table A.1. For each area, governor and turbine time constants as well as droop and
damping coefficients have been considered similar to those of the three-area test system
in C (Table C.2). The system consists of 34 lines and 19 loads, whose data is provided in
Tables A.2 and A.3.
In this test system, Lines are protected by distance and overcurrent relays. Additionally,
Lines 6-11, 4-14, 2-3, and 3-18 are critical and protected by LCDRs, which are set based
on the default settings of [1]. The frequency relays utilized in this test system are Over
Frequency Relays (OFRs) and Under Frequency Relays (UFRs), which are used for Under
Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS), as well as for over- and under-frequency generator
rejection schemes [138], [117]. The UFLS scheme sheds 10%, 15%, and 20% of the load
when the frequency drops below 59.2 Hz, 58.8 Hz, and 58 Hz, respectively [36], and trips
the generator if the frequency reaches 57.8 Hz [137]. The OFRs trip generators if the
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frequency (i) exceeds 60.5 Hz and does not fall below this threshold within 10(90.93−1.45f) s,
or (ii) surpasses 61.8 Hz [137].
Table A.1: Generators’ voltage and power in 39-bus New England system
Bus V [kV] P [pu] Q [pu]
31 225.860 5.713 3.639
30 240.925 2.500 0.832
32 226.113 6.500 0.015
33 229.356 6.320 0.697
34 232.829 5.080 1.488
35 241.339 6.500 1.670
36 244.605 5.600 0.754
37 236.394 5.400 -0.353
38 236.095 8.300 -0.005
39 236.900 10.00 -0.365
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Table A.2: Transmission line characteristics of 39-bus New England system
Line
R [pu] X [pu] B [pu]
From Bus To Bus
1 2 0.1522 1.7872 30.3821
1 39 0.0265 0.6613 19.8375
2 3 0.0208 0.2412 4.1090
2 25 0.0637 0.0782 1.3284
3 4 0.0293 0.4800 4.9893
3 18 0.0155 0.1871 3.0085
4 5 0.0108 0.1733 1.8174
4 14 0.0109 0.1761 1.8862
5 6 0.0006 0.0072 0.1194
5 8 0.0095 0.1327 1.7490
6 7 0.0058 0.0895 1.0999
6 11 0.0061 0.0711 1.2050
7 8 0.0019 0.0224 0.3796
8 9 0.0883 1.3941 14.6094
9 39 0.0265 0.6613 31.7400
10 11 0.0018 0.0196 0.3317
10 13 0.0018 0.0196 0.3317
13 14 0.0096 0.1079 1.8412
14 15 0.0413 0.4982 8.4028
15 16 0.0090 0.0935 1.7006
16 17 0.0066 0.0838 1.2637
16 19 0.0330 0.4023 6.2718
16 21 0.0114 0.1928 3.6393
16 24 0.0019 0.0368 0.4245
17 18 0.0061 0.0711 1.1443
17 27 0.0238 0.3166 5.8864
21 22 0.0118 0.2074 3.7993
22 23 0.0061 0.0975 1.8749
23 24 0.0815 1.2961 13.3678
25 26 0.1094 1.1038 17.5310
26 27 0.0218 0.2286 3.7264
26 28 0.2156 2.3771 39.1264
26 29 0.3769 4.1328 68.0426
28 29 0.0224 0.2412 0.3978
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Table A.3: Load characteristics of 39-bus New England system






















Description of the DC Test System in
Chapters 2 and 5
The details of the 7-bus medium-voltage DC test system shown in Fig. 2.22 is presented
in this section, [67]. The system voltage level is 5 kV, which is typical for DC networks
[139]. This test system consists of eight lines with the resistance and inductance of 0.017
Ω/km and 2 mH/km, respectively, and has seven converter terminals. The AC/DC two-
level converter connected to Bus 1 interfaces the DC grid to an AC system. Converters
#2, #4 and #7 are of boost type and connect distributed energy sources to the DC grid.
Each individual converter, consisting of a 200 µH inductor and a 10 mF capacitor, controls
the DC system voltage through V-I droop control, where the voltage is linearly reduced
when the converter’s output current is increased. Simultaneously, these converters ensure
power balance in the system. On the other hand, each buck converter, #3, #5, and # 6,
includes a 200 µH inductor and a 10 mF capacitor, connects DC loads to the grid, and
adopts constant power control.
Considering the action of the droop control loop, the current reference provided by the
voltage control loop is given by




where Ii,inner,ref and Ii are the inductor’s reference and output measured currents of the i-th
converter, respectively; VDC,i,ref and Vi are the reference and measured terminal voltages of
the i-th converter, respectively; kdroop,i is the droop gain of the i-th converter; and GPI(s)
denotes the PI controller.
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Appendix C
Description of the Three-Area Test
System in Chapters 6, 7, and 8
The three-area test system is shown in Fig. 6.2 [36]. The original system in [36] is a real
two-area power network, but it is small for LFC studies. Thus, a third area is added to the
two-area system in this study to make it appropriate for LFC studies. Each area consists
of two 20 kV, 900 MVA generation units with the parameters shown in Table C.1. One
generator in each area is equipped with an AGC system. The parameters related to the
LFC and AGC systems are shown in Table C.2.
The per unit length susceptance and series impedance of all of the tie-lines areB = 3.308
µf/km and z = 0.053 + j0.53 Ω/km. Additionally, the rating voltage and power of
transformers are 20/230 kV and 900 MVA, and their leakage reactance is 15%. Capacitor
banks installed in Areas 1 to 3 are 200, 315, and 330 MVAr, respectively. The generated
power and loads for each area also are shown in Table C.3.
The utilized protective relays include UFRs, which are used for UFLS scheme, Rate-
of-Change-of-Frequency (ROCOF) relays, and OFRs [138], [117]. The UFLS scheme sheds
10%, 15%, and 20% of the total load if the frequency drops bellow 59.2 Hz, 58.8 Hz, and
58 Hz, respectively [36]. Furthermore, for frequencies below 59.4 Hz, 10%, 15%, 20%, and
25% of the total load are shed if the rate provided by the ROCOF elements of the relays
exceeds -0.4 Hz/s, -1 Hz/s, -2 Hz/s, and -4 Hz/s, respectively [36]. OFRs trip generators if
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the frequency (i) exceeds 60.5 Hz and does not fall below this threshold within 1090.93−1.45f
s, or (ii) surpasses 61.8 Hz [137].
Table C.1: Generator Specifications for the Three-Area Test System





do 0.8 ASat 0.015
Xq 1.7 X′′d 0.25 T
′





do 0.03 ψT1 0.9
X′d 0.3 Ra 0.0025 T
′′
qo 0.05 KD 0
Table C.2: LFC System Parameters in Each Area of the Three-Area Test System
Parameter
Value
Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
H: Generators inertia constant (s) 6.5 6.175 6.175
Tg : Governor time constant (s) 0.08 0.3 0.3
Tch: Turbine time constant (s) 0.4 0.36 0.36
R: Speed droop coefficient (Hz/MW) 2.4 2.4 2.4
D: Damping coefficient (MW/Hz) 0.014 0.008 0.008
Table C.3: Generated and Consumed Powers in the Three-Area Test System
Area
Generated power Load
(MW or MVAr) (MW or MVAr)
1 PG1 = 730 QG1 = 213 PG2 = 803 QG2 = 115 PL1 = 967 QL1 = 90
2 PG3 = 802 QG3 = 122 PG4 = 780 QG4 = 133 PL2 = 1590 QL2 = 90
3 PG5 = 677 QG5 = 78 PG6 = 742 QG6 = 98 PL3 = 1698 QL3 = 95
214
Appendix D
Proof of Theorem 5
To prove Theorem 5, the following theorem should be used:
Theorem 9. Consider the following discrete system
〈S〉 :
{
X [k + 1] = AX [k] + BuUu [k]
Y [k] = CX [k]
(D.1)
which is associated with the following continuous system
(S) :
{
Ẋ(t) = AcX(t) + Bc,uUu(t)
Y(t) = CX(t)
(D.2)
and X ∈ Rn, Uu ∈ RN , and Y ∈ Rp. Condition (7.5) holds for 〈S〉—or equivalently 〈S〉 is
invertible/observable—if and only if it holds for (S) [87]. 
In the following, it is proved that α = 2 satisfies (7.5) for continuous LFC systems in
multi-area power networks. This proof can be done in four steps as follows:
• Step 1 : Determining the general state vector Xi and matrices Aii, Aij, Bu,i, and Ci
for each area: For Area i, the total number of generators and the number of generators
equipped with an AGC system are denoted by Gi and ψi, respectively. This area is con-
nected to Areas j ∈ δi, where δi denotes the set of all areas that are connected to Area i.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































where the number of states in Xi is 2Gi + ψi + 2. For Area j∈δi, Aij is a matrix with all
elements equal to zero, except the elements located on row 1 and column 2, which are equal
to −Ti,j. For all other areas, Aij ∈ R(2Gi+ψi+2)×(2Gi+ψi+2) is a zero matrix. The unknown














1 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
0 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0






















• Step 2 : Determining the state-space matrices of the whole N-Area system using the
obtained matrices for individual areas: Using (6.29), the state matrix Ac ∈ Rn, unknown





A1,1 A1,2 · · · A1,N
















C1 C2 · · · CN
]
(D.9)
• Step 3 : Forming matrices Ju,α and Ju,α−1: Using (7.2c), (7.6), (D.7)-(D.9), and by




















C1Bu,1 0 · · · 0











0 0 · · · 0
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2H1
0 · · · 0
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0 0 · · · 0
0 −1
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• Step 4 : Determining the rank of Ju,2 and Ju,1: Since all elements of Ju,1 except CBc,u
are zero in (D.11), the rank of Ju,1 is equal to the rank of CBc,u. As shown in (D.12), the
rank of CBc,u is N , because all N non-zero elements of CBc,u are located on different rows
and columns. On the other hand,




































































0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
−1
2H1
0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
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To find rank(Υ), one should start by adding the rows of [CAcBc,u CBc,u], called {<1 · · · <p},
to [CBc,u 0], which has N independent rows. Addition of {<2,<ψ1+4,<ψ1+ψ2+6, · · · ,<p−1}
increases the rank by N , since these rows are independent from each other, and they cannot
be built by linearly combining the rows of [CBc,u 0]. This is because the non-zero elements
of CBc,u are located in columns N + 1 to 2N . However, other remaining rows are in the
subspace spanned by the non-zero rows of [CBc,u 0], and thus these remaining rows do not
affect the rank of Υ. As a result, the rank of Ju,2 is 2N , which yields
. (D.16)
rank (Ju,2)− rank (Ju,1) = 2N −N = N (D.17)
Therefore, the continuous state-space equation of an LFC system represented by (D.3)-
(D.9) satisfies the invertibility/observability condition of (7.5), regardless of the number
of generators that are controlled by the AGC system in each area. Therefore, according to
Theorem 9, so does the discretized LFC system.
221
Appendix E
Feasibility of Stealthy FDIAs Against
AGC Systems
This appendix investigates the feasibility of stealthy FDIAs against AGC system when the
proposed method in Chapter 8 is utilized.
For an attack to remain stealthy at each time step, the last two terms of (8.35) must
cancel out each other, i.e.,
L [k]MαH [k : k + α]− BhH [k] = 0 (E.1)








H [k : k + α] = 0 (E.2)
In (E.2), the last z columns of θ[k] are zero, since the last z columns ofMα in (8.34a) and
[Bh Oα(n+p)×z · · · Oα(n+p)×z] are zero. Therefore, θ[k] can be written as
θ [k] =
[
θ1[k] · · · θα[k] Oα(n+p)×z
]
(E.3)
where θ1[k] to θα[k] are sub-matrices of θ[k], each containing z columns. On the other
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hand, as shown in (8.20), θ1[k] to θα[k] depend on L1[k], which is a sub-matrix of L[k].
L1[k] is not a constant matrix and should be specifically determined for each time step in
real time using the estimation covariance matrix, as shown in (8.28). Therefore, due to the
time-varying nature of Σ[k] in (8.29) and L1[k] in (8.28), an attacker does not access these
matrices for any time step beforehand. Consequently, θ1[k] to θα[k] cannot be predicted
before time step k.
Assume that an attacker initiates an LCDR against an AGC system at time step k. At
this time step, the SIUE is estimating the states of the system at time step k−α, since the
SUIE is delayed for α time steps. Therefore, for a stealthy LCDR, H[k] must be designed
such that (E.4) is met.
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In the first time step, any H[k] satisfies (E.4). The injected attack vector at time step k is
denoted by H∗[k].
In the next time step, i.e., k + 1, H[k + 1] must be determined such that (E.5) holds:
[












To satisfy (E.5), θα[k−α+1]H∗ [k] must be zero. As H∗ [k] was determined in the previous
time step without using θα[k − α + 1], since θ1[k − α + 1] to θα[k − α + 1] were unknown
in the previous time step when H∗ [k] was formed, the probability of H∗ [k] being in the
null-space of θα[k − α + 1] is practically zero. Accordingly, the probability of (E.5) being
satisfied is zero.
Similarly, if the injected attack vector at time step k+1 is denoted by H∗[k+1], H[k+2]
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must be chosen such that


θ1[k − α + 2]T
...
θα−2[k − α + 2]T
θα−1[k − α + 2]T










H∗ [k + 1]




In (E.6), if θα[k − α + 2]H∗ [k + 1] + θα−1[k − α + 2]H∗ [k] is equal to zero, this equation
is satisfied. However, with the same rationale, the probability of (E.6) being satisfied
is practically zero. This trend continues until the end of the attack. As a result, the
probability of carrying out a stealthy attack is practically zero, and FDIAs will be detected
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